Switzerland's lack of military assistance towards Ukraine

Saturday 14 February 2026

Switzerland’s posture towards Ukraine since Russia’s full scale invasion in February 2022 has been characterised by tension between law, history and geopolitics. She has condemned the invasion clearly and repeatedly, aligned herself with most European sanctions against Moscow, and offered substantial humanitarian and economic assistance to Kyiv. Yet she has also refused to supply weapons directly to Ukraine or to permit the re export of Swiss manufactured arms by third countries. This combination of moral clarity and military restraint has made Switzerland a recurring subject of criticism in Ukrainian and European debates, and has forced Bern to re examine the meaning of neutrality in a continent at war.

At the heart of Switzerland’s approach lies her long standing doctrine of armed neutrality. This is not merely a political posture but a constitutional and legal framework, embedded in domestic law and reinforced by international commitments dating back to the nineteenth century. Neutrality, as Swiss authorities understand it, requires abstention from participation in international armed conflicts and equal treatment of belligerents with respect to military support. For Bern, this has translated into a prohibition on supplying weapons to a state engaged in an active conflict and on allowing Swiss made arms to be transferred onward to such a state.

This legal interpretation explains why Switzerland has refused requests from Germany, Denmark and Spain to re-export Swiss produced ammunition and armoured vehicles to Ukraine. In each case, the Swiss Federal Council has argued that approval would constitute indirect participation in hostilities and would undermine the credibility of Swiss neutrality. From a strictly legal perspective, this position is internally consistent. From a political perspective, it has proven deeply controversial.

Critics, particularly in Ukraine and in states bordering Russia, argue that neutrality cannot be morally symmetrical in a war of aggression. They contend that refusing to assist the victim of an invasion in practice benefits the aggressor, especially when that aggressor seeks to overturn the European security order by force. In Kyiv, Swiss refusals to authorise re-exports have been perceived not as principled distance but as a form of passivity that indirectly favours Moscow. This perception has been sharpened by Switzerland’s historical role as a hub for Russian wealth, finance and commodities trading.

At the same time, Switzerland has not been neutral in every sense. She has adopted European Union sanctions against Russia, freezing Russian state and oligarchic assets, restricting financial flows and banning certain exports. This was a significant departure from past practice, as Switzerland has historically aligned selectively with sanctions regimes rather than adopting them wholesale. Bern justified this shift by arguing that sanctions are not military measures and therefore do not violate neutrality law. Nonetheless the decision marked an acknowledgement that economic neutrality is no longer tenable in the face of a major breach of international law.

Switzerland’s support for Ukraine has therefore been strongest in the humanitarian and economic spheres. She has provided hundreds of millions of Swiss francs in humanitarian aid, supporting internally displaced persons, reconstruction projects and energy infrastructure repairs. Swiss technical expertise has been deployed in areas such as demining, water supply and governance reform. Switzerland has also taken in Ukrainian refugees under a special protection status, granting them access to work, education and healthcare. In these domains, Swiss engagement has been substantial and sustained.

The contrast between generous civilian assistance and strict military abstention has exposed a broader dilemma for Swiss policy. Armed neutrality historically served Switzerland well in a Europe divided by great power rivalry. It allowed her to avoid entanglement while maintaining a credible defensive military. Yet the war in Ukraine has revived a more existential question: whether neutrality remains viable when the core norms of international order are under direct assault.

Within Switzerland, this debate has played out across party lines. Some politicians, particularly from the Greens and the Social Democrats, have argued for a more flexible interpretation of neutrality that would allow limited support for Ukraine’s self defence, especially through re-exports. Others, notably from the Swiss People’s Party, have insisted that any dilution of neutrality would erode Switzerland’s sovereignty and security. The Federal Council has so far sided with the latter view, emphasising legal continuity and institutional stability.

For Ukraine, Switzerland’s stance is frustrating but not irrelevant. Bern’s role as a diplomatic intermediary, host to international organisations and potential venue for future negotiations remains valuable. Switzerland has positioned herself as a facilitator of dialogue, including discussions on humanitarian issues and potential peace frameworks, even as she recognises that any durable peace must respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In the longer term Switzerland’s approach reflects the strain placed on traditional European neutralities by Russia’s war. Like Austria and, until recently, Sweden and Finland, Switzerland must reconcile inherited doctrines with a transformed security environment. Her refusal to provide military support to Ukraine is not born of sympathy for Russia, but of a legalistic and historically grounded conception of neutrality. Whether that conception can endure unchanged will depend not only on the course of the war, but on how Europe as a whole redefines responsibility in the face of aggression.

Switzerland has chosen caution over adaptation, law over expediency. This choice has preserved internal coherence but at the cost of external criticism. In Ukraine, where survival depends on weapons as much as words, such restraint is difficult to accept. Yet Switzerland’s position also serves as a reminder that Europe’s response to the war is not uniform, and that the struggle to defend the continent’s values is being waged not only on the battlefield, but within the legal and moral frameworks of states long accustomed to peace.