Munich again — and the argument about the West

Saturday 14 January 2026

The Munich Security Conference is often described as a barometer. That is true, but it understates what happened over Friday 13 February 2026 and Saturday 14 February 2026. Munich did not merely measure the atmospheric pressure of transatlantic relations — it exposed two competing ideas of what the West is for, what it is afraid of, and what it should build next. In the corridors and on the stage, the question was not simply whether Europe will spend more on defence, or whether the United States will stay committed to NATO. The deeper question was whether the West remains a values-based political project, or becomes a looser, transactional alignment of sovereign states cooperating when interests overlap.

What gave this year’s conference its particular edge was that both sides spoke in the language of unity while describing sharply different worlds. The United States, represented by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, offered reassurance that America and Europe ‘belong together’ — but the reassurance came tethered to a diagnosis that the post-war rules-based order has become a machine that dilutes sovereignty, encourages mass migration and produces domestic fragility. Europe, led in headline terms by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, spoke less about abandoning America than about becoming capable of acting without her permission — and about building a European security identity that is not reducible to American domestic politics. 

Between those two visions sits Ukraine — not as a symbol, but as the practical test case. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s blunt warning that Europe being absent from negotiations would be ‘a big mistake’ landed because it framed European autonomy not as pride, but as necessity. Peace, he argued, is built on security guarantees — and Europe will carry much of the weight of whatever settlement emerges. 

The American vision — civilisation, sovereignty, leverage

Rubio’s central move in Munich was to treat the West as a civilisational unit whose internal coherence is threatened less by Russian missiles than by political and social disintegration. In this account, the post-1945 architecture — alliances, institutions, norms — is not scrapped, but reworked so it serves sovereign democracies rather than constraining them. The threats emphasised were migration pressures, industrial decline, and a perceived culture of bureaucratic overreach that, in the American telling, leaves societies brittle and polarised. 

There is a strategic logic behind this. If Washington believes the defining contest of the century is not only with Russia but with multiple rivals across regions, then America wants allies who can carry more of the regional burden while aligning with her priorities — border control, reindustrialisation, energy resilience, selective engagement with global institutions rather than moral attachment to them. The tone in Munich was more courteous than the transatlantic scolding of the previous year, but the conditionality was still present — partnership, yes, but partnership on terms shaped in Washington. 

In practical terms, the American vision treats Europe as indispensable — culturally, economically, militarily — while also treating European policy preferences on climate, trade regulation and global governance as negotiable rather than foundational. That is why Rubio could sound like an heir to Atlanticism while leaving European listeners uncertain about specifics — including how Washington conceives NATO’s role, or how she intends to pressure Russia in diplomacy. 

The European vision — autonomy inside NATO, not autonomy from NATO

Europe’s response in Munich was not anti-American. It was post-dependent. Merz’s remark that even the United States is no longer powerful enough to ‘go it alone’ was directed as much at Europeans who still wish to outsource strategy as at Americans tempted by unilateralism. The argument was that the old order — in which America set the direction and Europe harmonised — has ended, and that clinging to it is a strategic error.

Von der Leyen’s speech pushed this argument into treaty language. She urged the European Union to bring her mutual defence clause, Article 42(7), ‘to life’ — not as a symbolic declaration, but as an operational principle that forces Europeans to plan, procure and command as if they really mean collective defence. Her emphasis upon faster decision-making, including using qualified majority mechanisms already available within the treaties, was a quietly radical point — it implies that Europe’s main enemy is not merely external aggression, but internal veto culture. 

Macron’s contribution was different in texture — less institutional, more strategic. He defended Europe against what he called caricatures of weakness and overregulation and floated again the idea of a European nuclear conversation, including a form of shared thinking around France’s deterrent, even if not a simple replication of American nuclear sharing. Merz’s reported discussions with Macron about a French ‘umbrella’ signal that Europe is now willing to discuss what used to be taboo — deterrence not merely as an American service, but as a European responsibility. 

Even NATO’s own leadership, in Mark Rutte’s remarks about the alliance becoming more European-led as spending rises, sat within this European turn. The subtext was clear — Europe is being asked to grow up, and she is beginning to accept that she must. 

The real clash — what ‘the West’ means

The speeches can be summarised, but the competing worldviews cannot be reduced to soundbites.

One vision sees the West primarily as a civilisation under cultural and demographic strain — the state exists to protect social cohesion, borders, industry and a certain inherited political identity. In that vision alliances and institutions are instruments — useful when they amplify sovereign power, suspect when they constrain it. 

The other vision sees the West primarily as a political project — a set of institutions and rules that make power predictable and therefore tolerable, especially for medium-sized states. In that vision, sovereignty matters, but it is exercised most effectively through shared frameworks — trade rules, collective defence commitments, arms control, legal norms and the idea that agreements bind even when inconvenient. 

These two visions overlap — both speak of democracy, both fear Russian aggression, both want resilient supply chains, both want stronger defence capabilities. But they diverge on first principles. And Munich made that divergence public.

The conference’s own intellectual framing sharpened the mood. The Munich Security Report 2026 is titled ‘Under Destruction’ and is concerned with political forces that prefer wrecking rather than reforming the international order. Whether one agrees with that diagnosis or not, it captures why rhetoric in Munich kept returning to the fragility of systems — NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, trade regimes — and to the temptation to solve complexity by breaking structures. 

Ukraine as the test of reconciliation

Ukraine is where the two Western visions collide in practice.

Washington, judging by Zelenskyy’s complaint, is pressing Ukraine for concessions more readily than she presses Russia — or, at least, Ukraine feels that pressure asymmetrically.  Europe fears a settlement shaped primarily by American political timing, rather than by European security realities. That fear is not abstract. A ceasefire without enforceable guarantees leaves Ukraine exposed, but it also leaves Europe facing a revitalised Russia with time to rearm and a narrative of Western fatigue.

Zelenskyy’s ‘big mistake’ formulation was aimed at preventing a repeat of a familiar pattern — decisions about Europe made without Europe.  If Europe is expected to carry the long-term costs of reconstruction, sanctions enforcement, refugee support and deterrence posture, then she will insist on a voice in the diplomatic design.

This is precisely where reconciliation becomes possible — because interests align even if philosophies differ. America does not want to bankroll European security indefinitely. Europe does not want to live permanently in fear of Washington’s electoral cycles. Ukraine does not want a peace that is merely a pause. All three can agree on a structure that binds behaviour even when politics shifts.

How the two visions can be reconciled — a practical Atlantic bargain

Reconciliation will not come from pretending the visions are the same. It will come from building an agreement that allows both to claim success — because each side gets what it most needs.

A workable transatlantic bargain now has five pillars.

First, European capability as the price of American credibility. Europe should commit to an explicit timeline for fielding real strategic enablers — air defence, ammunition production, strike and intelligence capacities — so that ‘European autonomy’ becomes measurable rather than rhetorical. Von der Leyen’s emphasis on making mutual defence operational supplies the legal and institutional language for this. America, in return, should state plainly what she will do in a crisis — not as a favour, but as a commitment that makes deterrence believable.

Second, NATO for warfighting, Europe for resilience. The argument about duplication between the European Union and NATO is often used as a veto on European action. A better division is functional. NATO remains the central warfighting framework, but European institutions focus on mobilisation — industrial production, infrastructure protection, sanctions enforcement, energy security and decision speed. Rutte’s own comments about NATO becoming more European-led implicitly accept that European weight must grow within the alliance rather than beside it. 

Third, a joint industrial strategy rather than a trade quarrel. The underlying tension is not merely tariffs. It is industrial policy — who subsidises what, who controls supply chains, who regulates digital markets. Munich showed that this issue now sits inside security, not beside it. A transatlantic industrial compact — shared standards for critical minerals, coordinated export controls, reciprocal market access in sensitive sectors — would let America pursue reindustrialisation without treating Europe as collateral damage, and let Europe pursue regulation without treating America as an adversary.

Fourth, migration as a managed problem, not a moral insult. Rubio’s emphasis on mass migration landed in Europe as political theatre, but Europe’s leaders cannot dismiss the underlying pressures.  Reconciliation requires a shared approach — external border management, returns agreements, development policy that is honest about limits, and internal integration policies that are not simply slogans. The point is not to import American rhetoric into Europe, or European moralising into America, but to admit that social cohesion is a security variable.

Fifth, Ukraine negotiations with Europe structurally included. If Geneva talks or any future format is to produce something durable, Europe must be present in a defined role — not merely as a donor, but as a guarantor and implementer. Zelenskyy’s insistence on European involvement should be treated as a design requirement, not a complaint. America can still lead — but leadership that excludes the actors who will enforce the outcome is not leadership, it is improvisation.

Munich’s message — the alliance survives by changing her shape

The Munich Security Conference has no binding communique — it is a forum, not a negotiating chamber. Its value lies in revealing what leaders will say aloud when the diplomatic curtains are drawn back. Over these two days, Europe and America both claimed the language of unity, but the disagreement was about the kind of unity that matters.

If the United States wants a West that acts, she must accept a Europe that decides. If Europe wants autonomy, it must accept responsibility — not as an aspiration, but as spending, production and command arrangements that work under stress. In Munich the argument was not whether the West breaks apart. It was whether she can be redesigned fast enough to avoid being broken for her.