Should NATO answer Russia’s nuclear signalling with its own nuclear build-up?

Russia’s renewed nuclear rhetoric and the forward positioning of elements associated with her non-strategic arsenal—most notably via Belarus—are intended to intimidate, fragment allied decision-making, and create a sense that Moscow alone controls the escalatory ladder. Since 2024 Russia has rehearsed non-strategic nuclear employment and advertised the basing of nuclear-capable systems and associated infrastructure in Belarus; officials in Minsk and Moscow now frame joint drills as including planning for nuclear use. Whether warheads are permanently stored in Belarus remains opaque, but the political signal is clear. 

At the same time, NATO’s defensive architecture has deepened. The Aegis Ashore site at Redzikowo in Poland has moved from US operational control to NATO structures and is declared mission-ready—part of a ballistic-missile defence network that is explicitly non-nuclear and non-threatening to Russia’s strategic deterrent. Separately, the United States is modernising gravity bombs assigned to the Alliance to the B61-12 standard and integrating dual-capable aircraft such as the F-35. 

Against this backdrop, some Polish leaders have openly explored participation in NATO nuclear sharing or even hosting US nuclear weapons; Paris and London have been urged to clarify how their independent forces underwrite European deterrence. These discussions reflect a sharpened threat perception on the eastern flank, not a settled allied consensus to move nuclear basing eastwards. 

The strategic question

Would a NATO “nuclear arms race” and the deployment of additional nuclear delivery systems on the eastern frontier enhance deterrence—or make Europe less safe?

1. Deterrence credibility

   
   

   Deterrence rests upon capability, communication and cohesion. NATO already possesses overwhelming nuclear strategic capability via the US, British and French forces. Credibility problems today are not about physics but about politics: are allies seen to be united, timely, and predictable in response to limited probes? Re-basing nuclear weapons east would add visible symbols but at the price of new vulnerability and political friction inside the Alliance. Existing nuclear sharing, coupled with rapid F-35 integration and demonstrable readiness, can deliver the same deterrent message with fewer risks. 

   
   

2. Escalation and vulnerability

   
   

   Moving nuclear assets closer to Russia shortens decision times and exposes storage and delivery sites to conventional and hybrid threats. Kaliningrad’s proximity already compresses warning and reaction cycles; replicating that compression on NATO soil would magnify accident and miscalculation risks without changing the central balance of terror. The more stabilising move is to reinforce survivability and dispersal of existing dual-capable aircraft and to harden command-and-control, rather than to add new nuclear targets on the frontier. (This logic is widely reflected in allied and expert assessments of Russian non-strategic exercises and posture.) 

   
   

3. Alliance politics and arms-control leverage

   
   

   A visible eastward nuclear build-up would likely split allies and hand Moscow a propaganda win that “NATO is the escalator.” By contrast a steady posture that tightens conventional air and missile defences, accelerates munitions production and clarifies consequences for cross-border incidents preserves unity and leaves the door open to future risk-reduction talks from a position of strength. The recent transfer of the Polish strategic nuclear base of Redzikowo into NATO structures is a model: defensive, lawful, and alliance-binding. 

What to do instead of a nuclear arms race

A substantial non-nuclear escalation—paired with nuclear signalling that is firm but not inflammatory—best serves deterrence:

• Consolidate nuclear credibility without new basing. Complete B61-12 integration across European bases; certify more allied F-35 squadrons as dual-capable; exercise the nuclear consultation and decision-making machinery more transparently to publics and adversaries alike. This underscores readiness without moving warheads east. 

  
  

• Harden the eastern flank with missile defence and counter-UAS (unmanned aerial system) layers. Build on Redzikowo’s activation with additional sensors, cueing and interception capacity against cruise missiles and drones, integrated with civil defence alerting. This blunts the very tools Russia uses for coercive spill-over, while remaining non-nuclear. 

  
  

• Strengthen conventional rapid-reaction forces and stocks. Forward-position long-range conventional fires, air defence and pre-positioned equipment in Poland and the Baltics; expand allied magazines of interceptors and deep-precision munitions so that any limited attack can be answered at once—without invoking the nuclear ladder. (Russian exercises that pair conventional manoeuvre with non-strategic nuclear signalling are precisely aimed at exploiting perceived NATO shortfalls here.) 

  
  

• Clarify extended-deterrence pathways for Poland and the Nordic states. If Warsaw seeks stronger nuclear assurance, prioritise rapid integration of Polish F-35s into the nuclear mission and formalise consultative links with the UK and France, short of basing warheads in Poland. This gives political reassurance without the escalatory optics of new nuclear storage sites on the frontier. 

  
  

• Maintain arms-control literacy and signalling. Publicly attribute Russian nuclear-related moves (e.g. Belarus deployments and exercises) while stating allied thresholds and responses; keep channels for deconfliction and future risk-reduction proposals open even as Moscow remains in material breach of multiple international legal regimes. 

Standing up to Russia

Russia’s nuclear theatrics aim to make Europe doubt itself. The sound reply is not a race to plant more nuclear systems on NATO’s eastern frontier, but a resolute package that hardens the flank, speeds conventional response, finishes nuclear modernisation already under way, and deepens political assurance to frontline allies—especially Poland—without creating new nuclear liabilities. That approach denies Moscow coercive leverage, sustains allied unity, and keeps the strategic nuclear ladder as tall—and as unused—as possible.