Russia’s Bonus and Bounty System for Combat Personnel

When the Russian Federation launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, she found herself faced with the challenge of maintaining momentum amid mounting casualties and equipment losses. In that context, Moscow introduced a range of financial bonus and bounty schemes designed to reward battlefield success, encourage enlistment and retention, and increase operational aggression.

One prominent reported example was that in June 2023 the Ministry of Defence announced that Russian troops who destroyed German-made Leopard tanks or Western-supplied armoured vehicles would receive payments. According to the report, up to 10,000 personnel had already been rewarded for destruction of over 16,000 items of Ukrainian and Western military equipment. An armoured fighting vehicle was valued at 50,000 roubles and a tank at 100,000 roubles. 

In addition a private Russian company, Fores (based in the Urals), offered bounties of up to 5 million roubles for the first soldier who destroyed or captured a Western-made tank such as the U.S. M1 Abrams or German Leopard 2. 

Mechanics and Application

The system consists of several components:

• Fixed bonus payments for destruction of specified enemy equipment: for example, bounties offered by Fores for the capture or destruction of Western-supplied tanks.

• Private‐sector bounties in parallel: for example, in May 2025 the same company paid out 15 million roubles (about US$195,000) to twelve Russian servicemen credited with downing a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet. 

  
  

• Recruitment and retention incentives: cash bonuses or debt relief / enlistment inducements for contract soldiers and volunteers are also reported. 

In terms of drone-specific operations: while there is less open-source detailed breakdown of drone operator incentives under the Russian system, the broader logic applies: successful strikes on high-value Western-supplied equipment, including those engaged or detected by drones, fall under the bounty regime. For example, the downing of an F-16—likely involving both surveillance and strike assets—qualifies under the system. 

Case Study: F-16 Bounty Payment

In May 2025, Fores publicly reported that twelve Russian servicemen had received 15 million roubles (approx. US$195,000) for destroying the first Ukrainian-operated F-16 fighter jet in the conflict zone. The reward was presented in a formal ceremony near the front lines, with Russian military officials present. 

This case illuminates several features of the system: the premium value placed on “symbolic” Western-supplied hardware (in this case an F-16), the role of private industry in incentivising frontline action, and the propaganda dimension of public ceremony payouts aimed at morale and narrative.

Strategic Rationale

The design of this incentive architecture reflects several strategic and organisational drivers:

1. Morale and motivation: Faced with high attrition, logistical strain and a war of attrition, Russia uses financial and symbolic incentives to boost frontline morale.

   
   

2. Propaganda value: The emphasis on destroying Western-supplied systems (tanks, aircraft) serves both operational and narrative objectives—undermining Ukrainian morale and Western support. For instance, leaked documents described the strategy of “financial incentives for destruction of foreign tanks, and then distribution of videos of those destructions” as a means to “hobble Ukraine and the West’s morale”. 

   
   

3. Resource prioritisation: By attaching monetary value to certain target-types, the system encourages the destruction of high-value enemy assets (and perhaps the diversion of Ukrainian resources to protect them).

   
   

4. Recruitment and force-multiplication: The bonus system also serves as a recruitment tool for contract soldiers and volunteers, particularly in a war with heavy losses. 

Benefits and Strengths

• The incentive is clear and easily understood: destroy X, get Y.

  
  

• The public nature of payouts and ceremonies amplifies their psychological effect for both Russian soldiers and domestic audiences.

  
  

• The focus on Western-supplied equipment taps into the heightened strategic and symbolic value of such equipment.

  
  

• It may lower the barrier for frontline units to act aggressively, knowing a tangible reward awaits.

Risks, Limitations and Criticisms

• Cost and sustainability: Cash payouts place an increasing burden on a war economy already under sanctions and high attrition; sustaining large payouts may become difficult.

  
  

• Verification and fraud risk: Unless strict, the system may incentivise inflated claims, mis-identification or even “false kills”. The open-source record suggests verification is weaker than in the Ukrainian system.

  
  

• Behavioural distortion: Operators and units may chase high-bonus, high-visibility targets (e.g., Western tanks) even when operational priority lies elsewhere (e.g., logistics disruption, command posts).

  
  

• Equity and fairness: Units deployed in less “reward-rich” sectors may be disadvantaged; bonuses may emphasise one type of activity (tank/aircraft kills) at the expense of broader war-fighting tasks.

  
  

• Ethical/humanitarian concerns: The financial incentive for destruction of enemy equipment and personnel raises questions of proportionality, target-selection distortion and how civilian harm is accounted for.

  
  

• Adaptation risk: As the nature of warfare evolves (for instance, more drones, fewer large tank formations), the set of targets eligible for large bonuses may shrink or shift, challenging the system’s continuing relevance.

Case Study: Bonus Offered for Western Tanks

In early 2023, Fores offered up to 5 million roubles (about US$72,000) for the first soldier to destroy or capture a Western-made tank (Leopard 2 or Abrams) delivered to Ukraine. Subsequent tanks attracted 500,000 roubles each. 

The case illustrates how the Russian incentive system explicitly sought to discourage Western support for Ukraine by placing high bounties on Western hardware. The tank became not only a tactical target but a strategic symbol. The gap between major upfront bonus for the “first” capture/destroy and smaller subsequent payouts also suggests the system sought drama and propaganda as much as steady reward.

However the offer also raises questions of sustainability: the “first” target bonus may be unsustainable as more Western equipment arrives; and as Ukraine adapts tactics (e.g. dispersal, smaller assets), the tank-focus may become outdated.

Implementation in the Drone Domain and Observed Trends

Although open-source data do not provide a fully detailed breakdown of drone-specific reward values under the Russian system, we may infer the following:

• High-value target destruction (Western equipment, aircraft) creates collateral benefit for drone strike-teams, who are likely involved in surveillance or strike.

  
  

• The publicised F-16 kill bounty suggests that functions which involve detection, tracking and drone-enabled strike (or counter-drone) are likely covered.

  
  

• The broader shift of Russian operations to include dedicated drone units (for example the Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, created in August 2024) supports the logic that drone operators are becoming critical, and thus eligible for bonuses. 

  
  

• The risk remains that as drone warfare proliferates and targets become lower profile (infantry, supply trucks), the traditional bonus categories (tanks, aircraft) may lose relevance.

Operational and Humanitarian Impacts

The presence of a cash-bonus system has several operational consequences:

• Aggressive behaviour incentivised: Units may be more willing to take risks or push for strikes against high-value targets in hope of payout.

  
  

• Target bias: Perhaps increased focus on tanks/aircraft rather than other valuable targets (e.g., logistics, small units).

  
  

• Verification lag and claim inflation: Without rigorous verification, the incentive may encourage exaggerated claims.

  
  

• Morale implications: For successful units, bonus payouts may boost morale; for others, perceived unfairness may demoralise.

  
  

• Humanitarian risk: With financial reward tied to destruction, there is risk of lowering thresholds for attacks or less rigorous target‐validation, increasing danger of civilian harm or violations of the law of armed conflict.

Russia versus Ukraine Incentive Systems

• Russia’s system uses direct cash payments/bounties for destruction of enemy equipment (especially Western-supplied assets) and possibly associated kills; the reward is financial.

  
  

• Ukraine’s equivalent uses a points-based system (sometimes described as gamified) under which verified strikes earn “points” redeemable for equipment (for example drones, electronic-warfare kits) rather than immediate cash. 

Verification and Transparency

• Ukraine’s model emphasises verification via video uploads to the secure platform Delta, scoring systems, and an equipment marketplace. 

  
  

• Russia’s model has less transparent verification publicly documented; although documents show planning for video-distribution of destroyed Western tanks, the exact verification chain is less clear. 

Incentive Tied to Capability Acquisition

• In Ukraine’s system, the reward is equipment acquisition rather than cash. For instance points earned can be redeemed via the platform Brave1 Market to acquire drones, EW kits, and the like.

  
  

• In Russia’s system the reward is monetary cash, with a less explicit link to further procurement of new equipment for the unit.

Strategic Orientation of Targets

• Ukraine’s system allows flexible adaptation of target-value weightings: for example, doubling the point value of personnel kills in September 2025 in response to battlefield realities. 

  
  

• Russia’s system focuses heavily on high‐symbolic targets (e.g. Western tanks, aircraft) which serve propaganda objectives as well as operational ones. This focus may limit flexibility to changing battlefield realities.

Cost & Sustainability

• Ukraine’s model may be more sustainable for a country under economic strain, as the reward is gear procurement (which can be managed) rather than large cash payouts.

  
  

• Russia’s model places recurring cash burdens on a war economy already under strain; sustaining large bonuses over time may prove difficult (and analysts warn of long-term affordability issues). 

Ethical, Humanitarian and Psychological Effects

• Both systems raise ethical questions: war reward systems based on destruction or elimination of individuals or assets can skew target selection, reduce threshold for action, and increase risk of civilian harm.

  
  

• Ukraine’s gamified system is innovative and data-driven, but observers warn of the danger of “turning war into a game” with points and leaderboards. 

  
  

• Russia’s cash-bonus system may increase the commodification of killing and destruction, with direct financial reward linked to battlefield elimination.

Operational Implications

• Ukraine’s model strengthens a feedback loop: operator performance → points → equipment → improved capability. This may accelerate innovation and effectiveness.

  
  

• Russia’s model may incentivise success but lacks a direct reinvestment loop; cash reward does not automatically lead to capability upgrade for the specific unit. Over time, the model may favour short-term kills rather than sustained capability growth.

Conclusions

Both Russia and Ukraine have developed incentive systems to motivate combat personnel, bolster morale and channel frontline effort. Russia’s system is straightforward, monetarily driven, and oriented around the destruction of Western-supplied equipment, with strong symbolic and propaganda value. Ukraine’s system is far more technologically oriented, linking frontline performance in drone warfare to a points-and-equipment model, backed by digital verification and feedback.

Ukraine’s system appears better adapted to a modern, unmanned-systems-intensive war, emphasising responsiveness, data and capability renewal. Russia’s system, while potent in a conventional war of destruction, may be less flexible in adapting to drones, dispersed operations and capability regeneration.

The case studies reinforce these conclusions: the Russian F-16 bounty shows the premium on symbolic kills; the Ukrainian “Army of Drones: Bonus” programme demonstrates real-time data linking and equipment reward. As the war progresses, the sustainability of both models will matter: Ukraine must ensure equitable distribution, avoid distortion of target-selection, and maintain verification rigour; Russia must confront the cost of cash payouts, verify claims, and adapt incentive architecture as the nature of warfare shifts.