Routes Home: How Ukrainians in Occupied Territories May Reach Free Ukraine

For millions of Ukrainians living under Russian occupation since 2014, and especially since the full-scale invasion of 2022, the question of how to return to free Ukraine has become both a moral aspiration and a practical dilemma. The occupying authorities have often pressured, coerced, or compelled residents to accept Russian passports. Many have done so to secure access to basic services, escape harassment, or simply survive. Yet documentation imposed by an occupying power does not extinguish Ukrainian citizenship. The challenge for those who wish to leave is how to navigate the geography, bureaucracy, and hazards of a region in conflict to reach territory controlled by Kyiv.

The possible routes out of the occupied territories have evolved as the military situation has shifted, front lines have moved, and Russia has tightened her internal controls. There is no single safe method. Instead, there is a constellation of imperfect options, each with its own risks, legal implications and humanitarian considerations.

The Direct Route: Crossing the Front Line

In theory the shortest passage from occupied territory to freedom would involve crossing the active line of contact. In practice this is seldom feasible. The fronts in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson regions are among the most heavily militarised zones in Europe. Minefields, fortifications, artillery duels and constant surveillance make civilian movement almost impossible. Only in rare local circumstances, such as moments of military retreat or sudden withdrawal, have civilians been able to pass through. In such cases, those attempting the crossing expose themselves to grave danger from shelling, mines and Russian military patrols. It is therefore neither predictable nor recommended.

Moreover frontline crossings provide no opportunity to present documentation or be processed by Ukrainian authorities according to established procedures. Those who manage to escape are often evacuated from the battlefield by the Armed Forces of Ukraine or territorial defence units, after which they undergo screening and debriefing. This route is one of desperation, not planning.

The Northern Corridor: Via Occupied Ukraine into Russia, then to Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania

For much of 2022 to 2024, the most reliable route for Ukrainian civilians involved travelling north or east into Russia herself, then transiting through one of the Baltic states. Thousands followed this path, especially from occupied parts of Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions. The process remains possible but has become increasingly complicated as Russia restricts exit routes and the Baltic governments tighten entry controls for holders of Russian passports.

A Ukrainian travelling with a Russian passport acquired under occupation remains, in international law, a Ukrainian citizen. Baltic border officials generally understand this situation well. Nonetheless travellers must be prepared for extensive questioning by Russian border guards on departure and for secondary interviews on arrival in Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania. In many cases, Baltic authorities provide humanitarian assistance and expedite travel onward to Poland or directly into Ukraine.

This route has the advantage of involving internationally recognised border crossings rather than irregular movement. Yet it carries the psychological burden of passing through the state that occupies one’s home. In recent months Russia has also increased scrutiny at exit points, demanding military registration documents from men, or interrogating residents of recently annexed areas about their intentions. The unpredictability of Russian security services is the principal danger.

The Southern Route: Crimea to Georgia, then to Ukraine

Crimea presents a unique geography. For some residents of Melitopol, Tokmak and the Azov coast, reaching Crimea is easier than heading north. From Crimea, ferries and flights connect to southern Russia, and land routes run to the Caucasus. In earlier phases of the war, many Ukrainians used the land border between Russia and Georgia at Upper Lars. Once in Georgia, they continued to Armenia or directly to western Europe, eventually making their way back to Ukraine through Poland, Romania, or Moldova.

This route bypasses the Baltic restrictions on Russian passports but introduces another challenge: Russia’s southern border controls are often stringent, particularly for men of military age. The Upper Lars crossing is notorious for long queues and sporadic closures. Nevertheless Georgia has accepted many Ukrainians transiting through, and Ukrainian consular services in Tbilisi and Batumi have assisted travellers whose documents were confiscated or invalidated by occupation authorities.

The Belarus Option: A Narrow and Worsening Channel

Belarus once offered an alternative exit corridor, particularly for residents of northern Luhansk region who could travel via Russia to the Belarusian border and then transit into Lithuania or Poland. However the Belarusian authorities have gradually aligned their practices more closely with Moscow’s. Western governments now consider Belarus unsafe for many Ukrainians, and entry from Belarus into Poland or Lithuania is heavily restricted. Only limited humanitarian exceptions are made. This route therefore remains available on paper but is fraught with legal and political complexities.

Transit through Third Countries

A pragmatic, if logistically difficult, method involves moving from Russia or Belarus to a third country further afield. Some Ukrainians have travelled to Turkey, Kazakhstan or the United Arab Emirates and then boarded flights to Europe. This requires financial resources and a willingness to traverse multiple jurisdictions. For those whose Ukrainian passports were confiscated and replaced with Russian ones, proof of Ukrainian citizenship can still be established at embassies and consulates, including through internal Ukrainian identity documents, birth certificates or digital records. In practice, Ukrainian diplomats have tried to assist such travellers, but the process can be slow and emotionally draining.

Reasserting Ukrainian Citizenship and Identity Documents

The question of documentation is central. Under Ukrainian law, a citizen cannot lose his or her citizenship by accepting documents issued by an occupying power. A Russian passport forced upon or accepted under duress has no legal effect upon Ukrainian citizenship. It is possible to cross international borders on a Russian passport and then seek assistance from Ukrainian consular officials to regularise one’s documents.

Ukrainian embassies and consulates routinely issue certificates of return to Ukraine for citizens who lack proper papers. Digital records stored in Ukraine’s Diia system, or in the Ministry of Interior’s population registry, can confirm identity even when the person possesses no physical documentation. Upon arrival in free Ukraine, those who lived in occupied territories undergo a standard security screening to protect the state from espionage or infiltration, after which they may apply for restoration or reissuance of Ukrainian passports.

Personal Security Considerations

For many, the greatest risk lies not in crossing an international border but in the journey to that border. Internal Russian checkpoints, document inspections, and the risk of detention by Russian security services create a climate of intimidation. Men face particular dangers, including the possibility of mobilisation or accusations of disloyalty. Women and elderly residents may find travel easier, although not without risk. Travellers therefore often rely upon discreet transportation networks, private drivers familiar with the checkpoints, or buses that operate semi-official routes from occupied cities into Russia.

Communication security is also crucial. Mobile phones, messaging histories, and photographs are often inspected at Russian checkpoints. Travellers must assume that any digital trail may be scrutinised and should take measures accordingly.

Supporting Structures on the Ukrainian Side

Once in the European Union, the path to Ukraine becomes considerably more predictable. Government agencies, diaspora networks, religious charities and volunteer groups operate in Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and the Baltic states to assist those fleeing occupation. They arrange transport, provide temporary accommodation, and help individuals navigate the process of re-establishing documentation.

Returning to free Ukraine is therefore not merely a logistical undertaking but a re-entry into a legal and civic community. Those who have lived under occupation often arrive with trauma, uncertainty, and a sense of cultural dislocation. Civil society groups in Kyiv, Lviv, Dnipro, and elsewhere have tried to support returnees in rebuilding their lives.

There is no wholly safe or simple way for Ukrainians in occupied territories to reach free Ukraine. Each route carries its own risks. The decision often depends upon geography, financial means, personal circumstances and the temperament of the occupying authorities at the moment of departure. Yet the unifying principle remains that Ukrainian citizenship endures, irrespective of the papers forced upon a citizen by an occupying power. International law, state practice, and Ukraine’s own legal frameworks all affirm this point.

The journey home may involve detours through Russia, the Caucasus, the Baltic region, or distant transit hubs. It may require patience, courage, and the willingness to face interrogations and uncertainty. But every year, thousands undertake it successfully. Their determination reflects the enduring bond between citizens and their country, even when that country is divided by war.