Rewards systems for Ukrainian drone operators

In the protracted struggle against the Donbas-fronted Russian invasion, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been forced to innovate not only tactically but organisationally. One of the most striking developments has been the introduction of a so-called “point-system” or reward regime for drone units. In this system, frontline drone-strike teams accumulate “e-points” for verified attacks on Russian manpower or matériel; these points are redeemable for fresh drones or other military equipment. On the face of it, the scheme resembles a gamified combat system. But it also reflects deeper structural challenges: the asymmetry of Ukraine’s position, the need to incentivise performance under strain, the imperative to streamline procurement, and the difficulties of maintaining morale over time. We review how the system works, why it was introduced, the benefits earned, the criticism it attracts, and the broader implications for Ukraine’s warfighting and humanitarian environment.

Mechanics of the system

The programme is often identified under the label Army of Drones: Bonus (sometimes abbreviated “e-points” or “є-бали”—a Ukrainian play on words) launched by the Ministry of Digital Transformation in collaboration with other arms of state defence. 

Drone teams record strikes on enemy targets and upload video proof of the attack via the ministry’s situational awareness network Delta. After verification, the unit is allocated a number of points depending on the target type. For example, according to multiple open-source summaries at earlier stages of the war:

• Elimination of an enemy soldier: 6 points. 

• Damage to a tank: 20 points. 

• Destruction of a tank: 40 points. 

• Destruction of a mobile rocket system: up to 50 points (depending on calibre). 

However the scoring criteria have evolved as the conflict has matured. As of mid-2025 the value for killing one soldier was doubled (to 12 points) while the value for destroying a tank dropped to around 8 points. Similarly, destroying a Russian drone pilot now fetches 25 points; damaging one earns 15. 

Redemption of points

Once accumulated, points may be exchanged via an online marketplace platform called Brave1 Market, described as an “Amazon-style” site for combat units.  Units may pick from listed items: drones (including first-person-view [FPV] strike drones or heavier “bomber” drones such as the so-called “Vampire”), electronic-warfare kits, robotic platforms, communication gear, and other equipment.  One published example is that the Vampire drone costs 43 points. 

Purpose and prioritisation

The incentive regime is explicitly designed to channel scarce high-technology hardware to the most effective units. As one official summarised: “Destroy, earn points, purchase drone via points.” The system also provides battlefield managers with a stream of verified data (via video uploads) on which targets are being struck, which units are performing, and hence where procurement, training and operational focus should be placed. 

Strategic rationale

Why did the Armed Forces of Ukraine adopt such a system? The rationale may be grouped under several headings: resource constraints, decentralisation of procurement, morale and incentive, and data-driven targeting.

Resource constraints and urgency

Ukraine is fighting a numerically larger force with substantial materiel advantages. In that context, the ability of small drone teams to inflict disproportionate damage has become critical. Instead of relying purely on top-down distribution of equipment, the points system allows units themselves to “earn” further equipment by their performance, thus making the supply chain responsive to battlefield output.

Decentralised procurement & speed

By allowing field units to redeem points directly for equipment, the scheme bypasses some of the bureaucratic delays typical of defence procurement. According to open sources, delivery of ordered items can take as little as a week. This speed is vital in a high-tempo and fluid conflict.

Motivation, competition and effectivity

The point system introduces a competitive element among drone units. Unit leaderboards, rankings and visibility help generate initiative, sharpen performance, and reinforce accountability. As one analyst noted, the better a unit performs, the more firepower it receives: “Results unlock more destruction.” 

Data-driven targeting & adaptation

Because each strike must be recorded and verified, the system generates a large volume of high-resolution operational data. This allows top-level planners to adjust what kinds of targets are prioritised (for example, shifting from tanks to infantry) by tweaking point values. For example, mid-2025 saw a shift in heavier weighting toward personnel kills, citing concerns that Russian infantry buildup was proceeding and Russian tanks were being deployed less. 

Humanitarian, ethical and doctrinal implications

While the point-system has clear tactical and strategic merits in the context of Ukraine’s defence, it also raises significant ethical and humanitarian questions, as well as doctrinal implications.

Framing battlefield destruction in a points-accumulation structure evokes the language of computer games. Indeed, some critics have described the system as “gamifying war”. While the AFU is exercising legitimate rights of defence, awarding points for “enemy soldiers eliminated” may risk lowering the threshold for targeting decisions or intensifying the impersonal calculus of killing. The programme may increase pressure on drone operators to seek high-scoring targets potentially at odds with even more nuanced objectives—such as minimising civilian harm or preserving liberated areas.

Furthermore because the system uses video evidence for verification, concerns arise over operational security, privacy of the footage, and potential mis-identification of targets under duress or in complex terrain.

The shift in scoring priorities (e.g. giving more weight to killing personnel rather than targeting heavy equipment) reveals a solemn calculus: reducing enemy troop strength more rapidly to relieve pressure on Ukrainian defenders. But the humanitarian cost of targeting personnel is higher in terms of killing or wounding combatants, battlefield trauma, the fall-out for local civilians, and the long-term burden of war injuries and bereavement. The system’s incentives could accelerate destruction but perhaps at the expense of more strategic or stabilising operations (for example, the seizure of logistical nodes or enabling humanitarian corridors).

Doctrinally, the system recasts frontline strike-teams as both combatants and internal competition winners. The procurement linkage means that high-performing units may get increasingly advanced systems, thereby concentrating capability. On one hand, this is efficient. On the other hand, it may create disparities between units and raise questions of equity and coherence—for example, will low-scoring but stalwart units in quieter sectors be starved of equipment? Some commentators warn that war logistics cannot simply function like a reward arcade. 

It also shapes target-selection behaviour. If destroying a tank yields fewer points but eliminating a soldier yields more (as mid-2025 data suggest), units may shift tactics accordingly, not always in alignment with broader operational priorities. 

Practical outcomes and what the data indicate

By mid-2025, the points system appears to have been widely adopted. Reports suggest over 420 drone units are participating, covering up to 90% of Ukraine’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) force. One elite unit, the volunteer-founded “Magyar Birds”, is cited as accumulating over 16,298 points—enough to purchase 1,000 daytime FPV drones, 100 Vampire drones and 40 reconnaissance drones. 

The system also appears to have influenced battlefield behaviour and even Russian adversary responses: Russian military bloggers noted heightened attrition among drone crews and increased emphasis on drone-countermeasures. 

From an equipment-procurement standpoint, the system is helping Ukraine channel hardware to the most effective units and to track where investment is yielding results. As one analysis put it: “Now we see in real time what’s working, what’s not.” 

Risks, limitations and criticisms

Despite its merits, the scheme is not without drawbacks.

Any incentive system can lead to “gaming” behaviour. If units prioritise high-point targets rather than strategically optimal ones, the broader operational plan may suffer. For example, if infantry kills earn more points than anti-air missile systems (which may be of higher strategic value), then units may divert effort away from enemy capability neutralisation toward “easy” infantry targets.

Units deployed in quieter sectors, or whose terrain, mission type or logistics make high-score kills harder to achieve, may be penalised indirectly. This could lead to imbalance in equipment distribution and morale issues.

The system relies on video verification via Delta. If video is manipulated, mis-represented or subject to adversarial interference, that undermines the system’s integrity. Moreover units may expend precious drone flights in order to document kills rather than to guard more intangible objectives (reconnaissance, area denial, logistic interdiction).

Framing kill-scoring may desensitise operators and broader society to the human cost of war. This is especially true in a war involving significant civilian exposure, hybrid operations, and contested attribution of strikes. There is a fine line between incentivising effectiveness and commodifying death.

As the nature of war evolves—if, for example, Russia shifts to dispersed infantry attacks, electronic-warfare suppression, or deep strikes—the scoring categories may need constant adjustment. The system must remain flexible, but constant recalibration may create confusion or unintended incentive swings (as saw the mid-2025 shift in values).

Longer-term implications and strategic lessons

From a broader perspective, the Ukrainian point-system model reveals important lessons for modern warfare, especially in asymmetric contexts.

Ukraine has demonstrated that in a highly dynamic conflict, decentralised and performance-linked procurement can increase agility. The Brave1 marketplace model may serve as an example of how small states can bypass protracted supply-chain delays.

The requirement for drone footage and digital verification feeds battlefield analytics, offering command a more precise picture of frontline success and failure. In effect, each strike becomes a datapoint. This may help with future targeting, investment planning and doctrine development.

By linking performance to reward, the system introduces a new cultural dynamic among drone units. The sense of competition, measurable achievement and tangible reward can raise morale. In a war requiring high tempo and sustained effort, this can be significant.

However the scheme also forces a reckoning with how war is represented to domestic and international audiences. A system seen as “points for killing” can be weaponised by adversarial propaganda. Ukraine must maintain transparency, guard compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and ensure that the incentive model does not skew targeting decisions away from lawful conduct and proportionality.

For other states observing Ukraine’s war, the model raises questions: could similar incentive schemes become standard in future drone-intensive conflicts? If so, how might they change training, doctrine, command control, and accountability? The Ukrainian experiment may be seen as a laboratory for the future of unmanned warfare management.

Conclusion

The points-based drone reward system introduced by the Armed Forces of Ukraine represents a bold adaptation to the realities of a resource-constrained, high-intensity war against a larger foe. By aligning frontline performance with equipment acquisition, Ukraine has in effect gamified a segment of its drone war—yet the game is one of survival and national defence, not mere entertainment. The initiative has clear tactical, logistical and motivational benefits, but it also carries latent risks: of skewed targeting behaviour, inequality among units, ethical challenges and the commodification of destruction.

In the context of the ongoing conflict, the system may be best seen as a pragmatic innovation rather than a normative model. It reflects Ukraine’s necessity to harness modern technology, decentralise procurement, gather real-time data and motivate her defenders. Yet as the war evolves, so too the incentive model must evolve: score-values must adapt; verification must remain robust; equity must be monitored; and the human dimension of combat must never be lost in the pursuit of points.

For Ukraine, the challenge will be to preserve the dignity and legality of her conduct even while embracing high-tech, data-driven innovation. The arms and drones may change, the algorithms may evolve, but the enduring objective remains: to defend the nation, protect the civilian population, and restore peace when the day comes. The points system may support that objective—but it cannot replace the deeper moral and strategic foundation of the fight.