Re-arming Europe for Parity with Russia

The question of whether Europe can achieve fighting parity with the Russian Federation is no longer hypothetical. Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated both the scale of modern industrial warfare and the extent to which Europe, after three decades of post-Cold War demilitarisation, lacks the manufacturing depth to sustain it. Parity with Russia does not require Europe to mirror Russian doctrine or force structure exactly, but it does require Europe to be able to deter, absorb and defeat a prolonged conventional campaign on the European continent without immediate reliance upon United States intervention.

We consider what that would entail in terms of quantities, categories of armament and the underlying industrial transformation required to produce them.

What “fighting parity” means in the European context

Parity with Russia should not be understood as numerical equality across all domains. Russia remains a continental land power whose military culture prioritises mass, depth and attrition. Europe, by contrast, is a coalition of technologically advanced but politically fragmented states whose advantage lies in precision, integration and logistics rather than sheer manpower.

Fighting parity therefore implies three things.

First, the ability to deny Russia operational success in a high-intensity land war along NATO’s eastern frontier.

Second, the ability to sustain that denial over months or years, not weeks.

Third, the ability to do so largely with European-based manufacturing, repair and replenishment.

The third condition is the most demanding and the most neglected.

Ground forces: mass still matters

Russia’s principal advantage remains in land forces. Even after catastrophic losses in Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated the capacity to field large numbers of infantry, armoured vehicles and artillery, replacing equipment with older stocks and simplified production lines.

To achieve parity, Europe would require:

• Armoured brigades at scale. Europe currently possesses many tanks on paper but few fully equipped, deployable armoured formations. Parity would require the equivalent of at least 40 to 50 fully manned and equipped heavy brigades, each with modern main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and organic artillery. This implies several thousand additional tanks and IFVs beyond current inventories, not merely upgrades to existing fleets.

• Mass artillery. Russia’s war has reaffirmed that artillery remains the dominant casualty-producing arm. Europe would need to produce and stockpile tens of thousands of tube artillery systems, multiple launch rocket systems and, critically, ammunition. Parity requires shell production measured in millions per year, not hundreds of thousands.

• Engineering and logistics units. Russia’s advantage is not only in combat units but in its ability to move, dig, repair and rebuild under fire. Europe would need a dramatic expansion of combat engineers, bridging units, recovery vehicles and logistics battalions to sustain manoeuvre warfare at scale.

This implies not only manufacturing platforms but rebuilding entire force structures that were deliberately dismantled after the Cold War.

Ammunition: the true bottleneck

No area illustrates Europe’s weakness more starkly than ammunition production.

Russia produces artillery shells, rockets and missiles on a scale that Europe currently cannot match. Ukraine’s experience has shown that high-intensity warfare consumes ammunition at rates that Western planners had previously considered implausible.

To achieve parity, Europe would need:

• Artillery shell production in the low millions annually, across 155 mm, 152 mm equivalents, mortar rounds and specialised munitions.

• Rocket and missile production sufficient to sustain deep fires, including guided MLRS rockets, tactical ballistic missiles and loitering munitions.

• Strategic stockpiles measured in years of consumption, not weeks.

This requires not only new factories but assured access to propellants, explosives, metal forgings and chemical precursors, many of which are currently sourced globally rather than domestically.

Air power: fewer aircraft, more resilience

Europe retains a qualitative edge in combat aviation, but that advantage erodes rapidly if aircraft cannot be replaced or repaired under wartime conditions.

Parity with Russia would require:

• A resilient combat air fleet of several thousand aircraft, including fighters, ground-attack platforms and unmanned systems.

• Distributed basing, hardened shelters and rapid runway repair capabilities to survive Russian missile strikes.

• Industrial capacity to replace aircraft losses within months, not decades.

This does not necessarily mean mass production of exquisite fifth-generation fighters. It implies a tiered air force, combining high-end aircraft with simpler, attritable platforms, including unmanned combat aerial vehicles that can be produced in large numbers.

Air and missile defence: the shield Europe lacks

Russia’s doctrine relies heavily upon missile and drone strikes against infrastructure, logistics and civilian morale. Europe’s air defence coverage is currently fragmented and insufficient.

Parity requires:

• Layered air defence systems covering frontline forces, logistics hubs and civilian infrastructure.

• Large quantities of interceptors at multiple price points. Shooting down cheap drones with expensive missiles is unsustainable.

• Industrial capacity to replenish interceptors rapidly under sustained attack.

This is one of the most industrially demanding domains because it combines advanced electronics with mass production requirements.

Naval forces: containment rather than dominance

Russia’s navy is weaker than her land forces, but it remains capable of sea denial, missile strikes and disruption of maritime trade.

European parity does not require matching Russia ship for ship. It requires:

• Sufficient anti-submarine and mine countermeasures forces to secure sea lines of communication.

• Missile defence and strike capacity to neutralise Russian naval assets in the Baltic, Black Sea and Arctic.

• Industrial capacity to build escort vessels, submarines and autonomous maritime systems at a rate faster than peacetime norms.

Here the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain play a disproportionate role, but coordination remains limited.

Manpower and training: industry’s forgotten partner

No manufacturing effort matters without trained personnel to use what is produced.

Parity requires:

• Expansion of active and reserve forces into the millions across Europe.

• Training systems capable of absorbing large intakes rapidly without collapsing quality.

• Doctrine adapted to sustained attritional warfare rather than short expeditionary campaigns.

This has industrial implications. Training consumes ammunition, vehicles, fuel and spare parts at scale. Europe would need to manufacture not only for combat but for constant preparation.

Industrial transformation: from boutique to brutal

The most difficult adjustment for Europe is psychological. European defence industries are optimised for small production runs, export markets and peacetime efficiency. Russian industry is optimised for survival under sanctions, coercion and wartime pressure.

Achieving parity requires:

• Long-term contracts measured in decades, not electoral cycles.

• State intervention in supply chains, including guaranteed demand and price controls.

• Acceptance of simpler, less elegant designs that can be produced quickly and repaired easily.

• Cross-border integration of production, standardisation of calibres and pooling of intellectual property.

In effect, Europe would need to relearn how to fight industrial war.

Time and political will

Even with maximal effort, parity would not be achieved quickly. Ammunition production can be expanded within three to five years. Armoured and air forces would require closer to a decade. Cultural and institutional change may take longer still.

The decisive variable is not wealth but will. Europe possesses the economic base to out-produce Russia several times over. What it lacks is a unified sense of threat and the willingness to subordinate short-term political comfort to long-term security.

Fighting parity with the Russian Federation is not a question of matching Russia’s aggression or replicating her methods. It is a question of whether Europe is prepared to rebuild the industrial, military and social foundations of deterrence that she allowed to erode after 1991.

Parity would require mass production of artillery, armour, ammunition and air defence, resilient aviation and naval forces, expanded manpower and a defence industry that prioritises endurance over elegance. It would require Europe to accept that peace is not preserved by intentions alone but by the visible capacity to wage war and sustain it.

Whether Europe chooses that path will define her security not only for the remainder of this decade but for the century to come.