Population decline in Ukraine

Ukraine’s demographic travails did not begin with Russia’s full-scale assault upon her in 2022. The war has pushed a grave underlying problem to the brink of national crisis, yet the origins of population decline lie in the economic and social dislocations that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Any assessment of the demographic consequences of war must therefore start from the longer arc of decline that preceded it.

We consider three stages of Ukraine’s demographic evolution: first, the period of decline before the war; second, the demographic shocks associated with Russian aggression since 2014, culminating in the full invasion of 2022; and third, the measures that Ukraine’s government might adopt after the war to give the country a viable demographic future.

Pre-war decline

On the eve of independence, some 52 million people lived within Ukraine’s borders. Since then the country has experienced one of the steepest peacetime population contractions recorded in modern Europe. By the late 2010s her de facto population had already shrunk by well over ten million people, depending upon the method of estimation.

Several forces combined to produce this contraction.

First, fertility declined sharply after 1991. The total fertility rate fell below replacement level, entering what demographers call the lowest-low category familiar in parts of Central and Southern Europe. A brief upturn in births during the late 2000s never restored fertility to sustainable levels. By 2019 the average number of children per woman stood at roughly 1.23, far beneath the threshold required even to stabilise population.

Second, mortality remained high. Ukraine inherited from the Soviet period elevated rates of premature death, particularly amongst men, driven by cardiovascular disease, alcohol and tobacco use, industrial accidents and fragile public health institutions. Life expectancy stagnated and at times deteriorated. This created an entrenched pattern of excess deaths, compounding the effects of falling births.

Third, economic upheaval generated sustained emigration. Millions of Ukrainians sought work abroad over three decades, some in Russia but an increasing number in the European Union as mobility rules eased. Younger and more educated citizens often departed first. In parts of western Ukraine near the EU frontier, high outward migration of working-age people became an enduring feature of local life.

Fourth, the events of 2014 drove a wedge through Ukraine’s demographic record. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and her orchestration of rebellion in parts of the Donbas removed millions from Kyiv’s administrative and statistical control. Those upheavals also prompted internal displacement and spurred new waves of outward migration. By 2019 several authoritative estimates placed Ukraine’s actual population at around 37 million, implying the loss of almost one third of the people who had lived in the country at the moment of independence.

The demographic impact of the war

Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 has deepened each of these trends, adding acute shocks to the chronic decline of the preceding decades.

Territorial loss and displacement have been central. Russian forces hold large tracts of Ukrainian territory whose pre-war population may approach 5 million but whose population now is anyone's guess. Even more significant has been the mass movement of people fleeing the fighting. At various points more than 6 million Ukrainians have been registered as refugees in Europe, and millions more have been displaced internally or forcibly displaced to Russia. Those who have left are disproportionately women of child-bearing age and their children, removing from Ukraine precisely the cohorts needed for future demographic recovery.

Births have collapsed. War discourages family formation by creating uncertainty over housing, employment, security and the availability of basic services. It also separates spouses through mobilisation. Ukraine recorded only about 187,000 births in 2023, a dramatic fall from pre-war levels. Demographers estimate that the fertility rate may have fallen to around one child per woman, far beneath any level sustainable over time.

Deaths have risen. Combat fatalities, disruption of medical care, stress and the worsening management of chronic diseases have raised mortality. In recent years deaths have been roughly triple the number of births. The combined effect is a rapidly ageing population with a shrinking base of young people.

Because Ukraine has not conducted a census since 2001 and large parts of her territory are contested, precise figures are elusive. Nevertheless the broad picture is clear. Most estimates suggest that somewhere between 29 and 31 million people presently live under the government’s control, with perhaps 33 to 36 million in total within Ukraine’s pre-1991 boundaries. Forecasts for 2050 and beyond, assuming no major change in trends, present the possibility of a country with twenty to twenty-five million inhabitants and an even more pronounced imbalance between working-age citizens and retirees.

These figures are not merely statistics. They touch upon Ukraine’s capacity for economic renewal, the preservation of her cultural life, the functioning of her armed forces and the viability of her social systems.

Principles for a demographic recovery strategy

A viable demographic future requires that Ukraine stabilise her population and improve its age structure. She cannot reasonably aspire to restore the numbers of 1991, but she can work to ensure that the country remains populous enough to sustain economic growth, social welfare and credible defence.

A coherent strategy is likely to rest upon four pillars: encouraging the return and retention of citizens; raising fertility to less catastrophic levels; improving health and reducing preventable mortality; and shaping a managed approach to immigration.

Return, retention and the diaspora

Encouraging the return of refugees and long-term emigrants is essential. The government’s recent moves to permit multiple citizenship signal recognition that maintaining bonds with the diaspora is a matter of national interest.

After the war Ukraine might consider temporary tax relief, relocation grants and accelerated processes for recognising foreign qualifications to attract families back. Special incentives could be tailored to professionals in medicine, engineering, teaching and information technology, where the country faces acute shortages.

Equally important is the creation of conditions that make return attractive: personal security, a reliable legal system, predictable economic policies and high-quality public services. Many Ukrainian families now living in the European Union enjoy dependable schooling, healthcare and social security. To persuade them to return, Ukraine must offer something comparably stable.

Diaspora engagement can complement return policy. Schemes such as diaspora bonds, which channel expatriate savings into national reconstruction, may strengthen connections even for those who choose not to relocate.

Family policy and fertility

Ukraine cannot expect a rapid rise of fertility, yet modest improvements would significantly slow long-term decline. A sound family policy would focus upon lowering the costs and risks associated with child-rearing.

Housing support for young families, including subsidised mortgages and rent-to-buy schemes, may encourage earlier family formation. Long-term child allowances, tied to predictable fiscal rules rather than short-term political cycles, can provide stability. Affordable nurseries and kindergartens, particularly in urban areas, would help mothers remain in the workforce and make the birth of a second or third child more feasible.

Support for wartime families will also be essential. Widows, orphans and the children of veterans will require scholarships, psychological assistance and guaranteed access to healthcare. Investment in reproductive health and treatments for infertility may also have a demographic return, particularly for couples separated or injured by the war.

The experience of other European countries warns against simple cash bonuses for births, which tend to have only short-lived effects. The broader environment matters most. Families have children when they feel confident that the institutions surrounding them are dependable and that their children will be safe, educated and able to prosper.

Health, mortality and quality of life

Significant gains can be made by reducing excess deaths. Investment in primary care, preventative medicine and screening for cardiovascular disease and cancer could raise life expectancy. Campaigns against tobacco and alcohol abuse, coupled with sensible taxation and regulation, may reduce some of the most persistent causes of premature mortality.

The rehabilitation of wounded veterans is not merely a moral responsibility but a demographic necessity. Their successful reintegration into civilian life will preserve labour force participation and reduce long-term dependency.

Environmental health will matter as well. Decontamination of polluted sites, demining of agricultural land and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure will shape the health and settlement patterns of entire regions.

Immigration and integration

Even with successful return and family policies, Ukraine is likely to face substantial labour shortages during reconstruction. She may therefore need a welcoming approach to immigration. This is politically sensitive in a time of existential conflict, yet unavoidable if the country is to rebuild at scale.

A points-based system prioritising workers in construction, healthcare and engineering could form the basis of policy. Bilateral agreements with countries that already have cultural affinities with Ukraine might provide a structured path for temporary or circular migration. Language instruction and civic courses would help ensure that newcomers integrate into Ukrainian society and understand the country’s constitutional order, as well as the continuing promotion of the English language in all sectors of society: something that the government has been keen to press.

Governance and institutions

Demographic issues touch every sphere of Ukraine’s national life, from defence and fiscal planning to regional development. They therefore require dedicated institutions capable of long-term analysis and monitoring. The creation of a Ministry of National Unity to manage reintegration is a step in this direction, but further coordination may be needed.

A non-partisan Demographic Council, charged with producing independent projections and evaluating the impact of policies, could improve policy continuity. A new census, conducted as soon as security conditions permit, will be indispensable. Digital governance tools, already well developed in Ukraine through platforms such as Diia, could help track population movements and service provision, though these must be used with due regard for privacy.

Political and ethical considerations

The country’s demographic losses represent profound human suffering. Discussions of population policy must therefore be framed sensitively, recognising that millions have lost relatives, homes and livelihoods. The task is not to reduce people to numbers but to honour the dead by building a state in which life can flourish again.

Ukraine’s partners will also influence her demographic path. European states hosting Ukrainian refugees will need to decide whether to maintain temporary protection, encourage return or facilitate circular migration. Their decisions will affect Ukraine’s prospects of recovery. Ideally legal frameworks would allow Ukrainians to acquire skills and stability abroad yet retain the option of return without bureaucratic obstacles.

Towards a vibrant future

Ukraine enters the middle of the decade with perhaps thirty million people under her government’s control, an age structure skewed towards older cohorts, a fertility rate that has fallen to historic lows, and millions of citizens dispersed across Europe and beyond. These pressures predate the invasion but have been remorselessly amplified by war.

Although the country cannot restore her population to the levels of independence, she can secure a viable demographic future by pursuing a prudent combination of return policies, measures to support families, improved public health and responsibly managed immigration. Demography is not destiny, but it sets the contours within which national recovery must take place. If Ukraine succeeds in creating a stable, secure and prosperous state after the war, she may yet reverse the forces that have hollowed out her population for more than thirty years and rebuild a society capable of sustaining both peace and independence.