“No More Russian Hydrocarbons”: What Trump’s Condition Means for NATO, Europe, and Ukraine

President Donald Trump has said that any acceleration of new U.S. sanctions on Russia will be contingent on all NATO member states ceasing purchases of Russian hydrocarbons. That demand collides with a complicated European reality: the European Union has already banned seaborne Russian crude and most refined products, but a handful of NATO economies still take pipeline oil or liquefied natural gas (LNG) originating in Russia. Turkey—outside the EU but inside NATO—remains a large buyer of Russian crude. Understanding who still buys what, in what volumes, and how material this trade is to the Kremlin’s war economy is essential to evaluating what a practicable allied offer to Washington could look like.

Which NATO members are still importing Russian hydrocarbons?

Independent trackers such as the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), as well as European Commission energy statistics, provide estimates of NATO states’ current purchases. Although volumes are far below those of 2021, they are not negligible.

Hungary and Slovakia remain reliant upon the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, which still carries Russian crude. Together, they are estimated to import around 8 to 10 million tonnes of crude per year, worth several billion euros even at discounted rates. The crude supplies MOL’s Százhalombatta refinery in Hungary and the Slovnaft refinery in Bratislava. Both countries can, in theory, be supplied via Croatia’s Adriatic (Janaf/Adria) pipeline, but capacity and costs have hindered a full transition.

The Czech Republic was once in the same position, but in April 2025 she completed her switch to non-Russian crude thanks to expanded capacity on the Transalpine (TAL) and IKL pipelines from Italy and Germany. This demonstrates that alternative routes exist, given investment and coordination.

Turkey, a NATO member outside the EU sanctions framework, has become a crucial Russian customer. CREA’s 2024 data shows that Ankara imported more than 200,000 barrels per day of Russian crude, making her the third-largest buyer worldwide after China and India. Turkey continues to take Russian pipeline gas through TurkStream and Blue Stream although she has signed new LNG supply deals with US exporters, which could provide leverage for diversification.

Several western European NATO members also remain exposed through LNG. France imported about 7.7 bcm (billion cubic metres) of Russian LNG in 2024, Spain 5.7 bcm, Belgium 5.1 bcm, and the Netherlands 1.7 bcm. According to CREA, the total for these NATO/EU countries exceeded 20 bcm in 2024. These cargoes are tied to pre-war contracts and sometimes re-exported, but the bottom line is that billions of euros still flow to Moscow through LNG transactions.

By contrast many allies have already ended their dependence. The Baltic states, Poland and Germany halted pipeline oil by late 2022. Lithuania and Finland stopped importing Russian LNG. Italy and Greece phased out Russian crude, replacing it with Middle Eastern and U.S. suppliers. Even Austria, not a NATO member but once dependent on Gazprom, now sources much of its gas through Germany and Italy.

Do these flows still matter to Russia?

Yes. Russia’s federal budget remains disproportionately reliant upon hydrocarbons. CREA estimates that as of mid-2025 Moscow still earns around €600 to €700 million per day from fossil fuel exports. China and India now dominate as customers, but NATO-linked markets still account for a significant minority. The crude imports into Hungary and Slovakia, together with Turkey’s volumes, may generate €15 to €20 billion per year. LNG into the EU adds another €8 to €10 billion annually. These sums are smaller than Moscow’s Asian earnings but remain strategically important, both as cash inflows and as a means of keeping Russia’s hand inside NATO’s energy supply chains.

The law as it stands—and how it could be strengthened

The EU’s sanctions regime bans seaborne Russian crude and most refined products, with the Druzhba pipeline exemption for Hungary and Slovakia as a glaring loophole. A price-cap mechanism, agreed by the G7, restricts maritime services for oil sold above a capped price, but enforcement against the “dark fleet” remains patchy.

On gas, the EU has no comprehensive ban. Russian LNG continues to flow to European ports, although the European Commission has proposed banning new contracts and ensuring a full phase-out of Russian oil and gas by 1 January 2028. Turkey, outside the EU, is under no obligation and continues to buy heavily.

What NATO could offer to meet Trump’s demand

Meeting Trump’s condition will require a phased, credible plan that removes NATO countries from Russian supply chains without destabilising economies. For example:

• End Druzhba imports by Hungary and Slovakia within six to nine months, with EU and US funding to cover the costlier alternative of importing via Croatia’s Janaf/Adria pipeline.

  
  

• Expand LNG substitution by accelerating the expansion of Croatia’s Krk terminal to 6 bcm per year, supplying central Europe with US LNG.

  
  

• Phase out Russian LNG at EU ports, with compensation for operators and bans on ship-to-ship transfers. France, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands could then unwind contracts by a set deadline.

  
  

• Offer Turkey a diversification package—long-term US LNG contracts, financial support for gas storage, and NATO-backed energy security guarantees—in exchange for phasing out Russian crude.

  
  

• Tighten enforcement of shipping sanctions, price caps, and refinery-origin rules, closing remaining loopholes in the global oil trade.

Echoes of the 1970s and 1980s

Trump’s demand cannot be understood in isolation; it belongs to a longer transatlantic debate about the geopolitics of energy. Two earlier episodes illustrate the stakes.

The first was the oil crises of the 1970s. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 exposed the West’s vulnerability to external suppliers. NATO members responded with the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974, a collective body designed to coordinate oil stockpiles, rationing and emergency sharing in the event of supply shocks. The lesson was stark: energy security is national security, and dependency on politically unstable or adversarial regions could undermine NATO’s cohesion. This experience still resonates, shaping the EU’s collective mechanisms for gas storage and cross-border energy solidarity today.

The second was the dispute of the early 1980s over the Soviet Urengoy–Uzhgorod gas pipeline. President Ronald Reagan imposed sanctions on European companies supplying equipment, warning that Western Europe was binding itself to Moscow for decades. European governments argued that interdependence would restrain Soviet behaviour; Washington countered that it would embolden the Kremlin. Ultimately, the Europeans pressed ahead, and for forty years Soviet—and later Russian—gas flowed west, creating the dependencies that Vladimir Putin exploited in 2022. The ignored American warnings of the 1980s hang heavily over today’s debate, reminding NATO of the cost of prioritising cheap energy over security.

Can a deal be struck?

Trump’s condition is demanding but not unachievable. NATO countries still buying Russian hydrocarbons are limited to Hungary and Slovakia through Druzhba, Turkey via crude and gas, and France, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands through LNG imports. According to CREA and European Commission statistics, these imports together yield tens of billions of euros each year for the Kremlin.

A phased plan to close the Druzhba exemption, ban Russian LNG at EU ports, diversify Turkey’s supplies and strengthen enforcement would allow NATO to tell Washington it has complied. This would unlock deeper US sanctions and close crucial loopholes. Unlike in the 1980s, when Reagan’s warnings went unheeded, NATO has the chance to act decisively. And unlike in the 1970s, when the IEA was born of crisis, NATO and the EU can now pre-empt the next one by severing the Kremlin’s last hydrocarbon lifelines.

In this sense, Trump’s ultimatum may accelerate what Europe already recognises: that energy independence from Russia is not merely an economic adjustment, but a strategic necessity for Ukraine’s survival and for NATO’s future security.