Military Links between Ukraine and Israel
- Matthew Parish
- 2 days ago
- 8 min read

The contemporary relationship between Ukraine and Israel is an intriguing and complex story, rooted in overlapping historical experiences, shared technological priorities and evolving strategic needs. Both states emerged from unique traumas of the twentieth century, and both built militaries under conditions of existential insecurity. Out of these parallel circumstances has grown a pattern of military links that range from arms sales and defence technology transfer to intelligence cooperation and diplomatic tension over the conduct of Ukraine’s war against Russia.
Historical Background
The military connections between Ukraine and Israel must be understood against the background of complex historical legacies. A substantial proportion of Israel’s population traces its ancestry to Eastern Europe, including Ukraine. Jewish communities in Ukraine were devastated by both Soviet repression and the Holocaust, and many of their descendants later emigrated to Israel. This legacy has created a human link between the two states, one that influences perceptions of security and survival.
For Israel, military doctrine has always centred upon ensuring technological superiority over her adversaries. Ukraine, after regaining independence in 1991, inherited a substantial but outdated portion of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Her challenge has been the opposite: to modernise vast quantities of Cold War equipment in order to deter Russian aggression. This contrast established fertile ground for mutual interest.
Arms Trade and Defence Industry Cooperation
From the early 1990s, Israel became an important source of military technology for Ukraine. Israel’s defence companies specialised in upgrading Soviet-designed systems for third countries, particularly aircraft and armoured vehicles. This niche capability was invaluable to Ukraine, whose armed forces relied heavily upon such platforms. Israeli firms provided avionics, radar, night-vision devices, drone systems and modern communications technologies to retrofit Soviet legacy equipment.
In return, Ukrainian firms offered Israel access to skilled engineers, heavy industrial capacity, and sometimes the supply of spare parts for Soviet-designed weapons still in circulation across the Middle East. This exchange underpinned a quiet but pragmatic military-technical relationship.
Drones and Electronic Warfare
One of the most notable areas of cooperation has been unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Israel was a pioneer in drone technology, and her small, highly adaptable UAVs became a global export success. Ukrainian forces, long aware of Russia’s numerical superiority, sought such systems to gain intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting advantages. Israeli-designed drones or Israeli-assisted designs became an early component of Ukraine’s arsenal, well before the full-scale war starting in 2022.
There have also been reports of Israeli involvement in the supply of electronic warfare equipment and counter-drone technologies. While much of this cooperation has been shrouded in secrecy, it is consistent with the strategic needs of both sides: Ukraine requires advanced electronic solutions against Russian dominance, and Israel has an interest in testing and refining such systems in real battle conditions.
Intelligence Links and Diplomatic Limits
Beyond hardware Israel and Ukraine share intelligence interests, particularly concerning Russia and Iran. Ukraine monitors the transfer of Iranian weapons—particularly drones—to Russia, while Israel is concerned about Moscow’s facilitation of Iranian operations in Syria. It is natural that Kyiv and Jerusalem exchange information, directly or indirectly, on such matters.
Nevertheless Israel has trodden carefully. She has refrained from providing Ukraine with certain high-end weaponry, most notably the Iron Dome missile defence system, despite repeated Ukrainian requests. The reason lies in Israel’s delicate geopolitical position: she wishes to avoid antagonising Russia, which until December 2024 controlled airspace over Syria where Israel frequently conducted (and still conducts) operations against Iranian targets. Moreover Moscow retains strong formal ties with Israel's principal adversary, Iran. At least until recently, the thinking in Jerusalem was that overt a military alignment with Ukraine could jeopardise Israel’s freedom of action in the Middle East. However this may change as the United States aligns with Israel and developments diplomatic ties with the new, broadly anti-Russian, regime in Damascus.
Wartime Dynamics since 2022
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sharpened these dynamics. Ukraine appealed to Israel for direct military assistance, invoking historical memory and shared vulnerability. Israel offered humanitarian support, defensive equipment and intelligence cooperation but stopped short of supplying major offensive weaponry. Jerusalem’s policy has historically been one of cautious balancing: sympathy for Ukraine as a victim of aggression, combined with a pragmatic need to keep channels open with Moscow.
Nevertheless indirect links have continued. Ukrainian drone projects benefited from Israeli expertise and components via third parties. Moreover Ukrainian engineers who had previously worked with Israeli firms began developing indigenous systems drawing upon those experiences. Thus even in the absence of overt transfers, the legacy of cooperation shaped Ukraine’s capacity to resist Russia.
Case Studies of Israeli Systems in Ukraine
While much of the Ukrainian-Israeli relationship has operated in the shadows, several concrete examples highlight its significance.
1. The Aerostar UAV
The Aerostar drone, developed by Aeronautics Defence Systems, was amongst the first Israeli UAVs to reach Ukraine. With long endurance and robust data links, it gave Ukrainian artillery the ability to strike with precision. Its resilience against electronic warfare made it especially valuable on a battlefield where Russia sought to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum.
2. The Tavor Assault Rifle
Ukraine procured the IWI Tavor TAR-21 assault rifle for special forces and elite units. Compact, reliable and NATO-standard, it served both a practical purpose and a symbolic one, marking Ukraine’s transition away from Soviet-pattern small arms.
3. Upgraded Soviet Hardware
Israeli companies have provided avionics and night-fighting upgrades to Ukraine’s Soviet-designed tanks and fighter jets. These improvements, while less conspicuous than new systems, materially extended the battlefield utility of Ukraine’s inherited arsenal.
4. Counter-Drone Technologies
As Russia turned to Iranian Shahed drones, Ukraine acquired jammers and radar systems that bore Israeli design features. Although not branded as Iron Dome, these defensive measures drew upon Israel’s decades of experience in intercepting low-cost aerial threats.
5. Cybersecurity and Intelligence
In the cyber domain, Israeli expertise has helped Ukraine defend against relentless Russian intrusions. Shared intelligence on Iranian weapons supply chains also underscores the mutual benefit of cooperation, as both states monitor threats that connect Europe and the Middle East.
Looking Forward: Prospects for Deeper Cooperation
The trajectory of Ukrainian-Israeli military relations will depend heavily on broader geopolitical change, particularly the fate of Russia’s position in the Middle East. Several future scenarios can be envisaged:
1. Russia's Weakened Position in Syria
Russia’s military commitment in Syria has diminished due to overextension in Ukraine and regime change in Damascus, Israel’s dependence upon Moscow’s tacit cooperation is therefore surely on the wane. This should open space for Israel to deepen her support for Ukraine, possibly revisiting Kyiv’s requests for missile defence systems or advanced radar technologies.
2. Joint Development of Counter-Drone and Missile Defence
Ukraine’s experience under mass drone and missile attack parallels Israel’s long fight against rocket fire. Post-war, the two countries could cooperate on hybrid air defence systems tailored for defending cities against both drones and precision missiles, merging Ukraine’s battlefield lessons with Israel’s proven design expertise.
3. Intelligence and Cyber Alliances
The wars of the future will be fought as much in the digital domain as on the battlefield. Ukraine and Israel, both under constant cyber assault, could institutionalise their cybersecurity cooperation, perhaps within NATO frameworks once Ukraine accedes. This would extend beyond bilateral ties to form part of a wider Western cyber shield.
4. Ukraine as a Defence Export Market
After the war, Ukraine will face the task of rebuilding her armed forces almost from scratch. Israeli companies, accustomed to developing cost-effective yet sophisticated systems, will find in Ukraine both a partner and a lucrative market. Licensed production in Ukraine could serve both countries, marrying Israel’s design expertise with Ukraine’s industrial scale.
A Comparative Perspective: Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia
Israel’s military ties with Ukraine cannot be understood in isolation; they differ significantly from her relations with other post-Soviet states such as Azerbaijan and Georgia.
With Azerbaijan, Israel enjoys one of her closest defence partnerships in the post-Soviet space. Baku has purchased billions of dollars’ worth of Israeli drones, air defence systems and intelligence equipment. This cooperation is strategic: Azerbaijan borders Iran, and Israeli access to Azerbaijani airspace and intelligence serves as a counterweight to Tehran. Unlike Ukraine, where Israeli caution stems from Russian sensitivities, Azerbaijan has received Israeli arms with far fewer restrictions, because it does not clash with Israel’s Middle Eastern calculus.
In Georgia, the story is more ambivalent. Israel supplied Tbilisi with UAVs and other equipment in the years leading up to the 2008 war with Russia. But once hostilities broke out, Israel froze arms sales, fearing Russian retaliation. Georgia’s experience resembles Ukraine’s in that Israeli support was constrained by Israel’s need to maintain workable relations with Moscow.
Ukraine thus occupies a middle ground. She has received more tangible and enduring Israeli support than Georgia, but not on the same scale or openness as Azerbaijan. The difference lies in geopolitical geography: Azerbaijan is Israel’s partner against Iran, while Ukraine sits at the intersection of Israel’s uneasy relationship with Russia, something which remains driven by Israel's significant Russian-Jewish population.
Perceptions in Washington and Brussels
Ukrainian-Israeli military cooperation has not gone unnoticed in the Western capitals that largely arbitrate the flow of advanced military technology. Both Washington and Brussels have regarded these links with a mix of approval and caution.
In the United States, policymakers have often encouraged discreet Israeli assistance to Ukraine, particularly in the fields of drones, electronic warfare and cybersecurity, which complement American aid without provoking direct escalation with Moscow. At the same time Washington has tacitly accepted Israel’s refusal to supply Iron Dome, recognising that pressing too hard could destabilise Israel’s delicate security architecture in the Middle East. American officials therefore see Israeli contributions as an auxiliary element of the broader Western support effort: useful, but not central.
Within the European Union, the perception has been more ambivalent. Brussels views Israel as a valuable source of military innovation and has welcomed Israeli technology transfers to Ukraine where they align with EU priorities, particularly in counter-drone defence. Yet European leaders are wary of appearing complicit in any clandestine transfers that could complicate peace negotiations with Russia. The EU also remains conscious of Israel’s controversial standing in broader Middle Eastern politics, meaning that Ukrainian-Israeli military ties are rarely highlighted in official European discourse.
Overall, both Washington and Brussels regard Ukrainian-Israeli military cooperation as a quiet but welcome complement to their own support programmes. It strengthens Ukraine’s battlefield resilience without overtly shifting the geopolitical balance. At the same time, they accept and even value Israel’s policy of discretion, which reduces the risk of confrontation with Moscow while still delivering practical benefits to Kyiv.
Conclusion
The military links between Ukraine and Israel are emblematic of a broader truth: small and medium powers, when facing existential threats, turn to one another for lessons, resources and innovations. Ukraine and Israel both live under the shadow of larger adversaries and share a common instinct for survival through technology.
Their cooperation, ranging from drones and rifles to cyber defences and intelligence exchanges, has already shaped Ukraine’s war effort and Israel’s military development. Yet this partnership remains constrained by Israel’s delicate balancing act with Russia.
Looking ahead, the scope for deeper cooperation will grow as Russia’s influence continues to wane in the Middle East. A Ukraine rebuilding after war, and an Israel seeking new allies in a shifting international order, may find in one another enduring partners. Compared with Georgia’s curtailed experience and Azerbaijan’s privileged access, Ukraine’s ties with Israel stand as a pragmatic blend of ambition and restraint. Washington and Brussels, while quietly supportive, prefer this relationship to remain understated, lest it provoke Moscow unnecessarily. Bound by history, necessity and a shared vision of survival through innovation, their subtle but substantial military relationship is likely to expand in both scale and openness in the years to come.