Kherson as an Internationalised City: A Ceasefire Mechanism or a Risky Compromise?

The proposal to make Kherson—strategically placed at the mouth of the Dnipro River—an internationalised city under supervised international governance is one of the more provocative and delicate ideas in any discussion of a ceasefire or peace settlement between Ukraine and Russia.

It carries echoes of historical experiments in shared sovereignty and neutral administration, from the Free Territory of Trieste to UN-administered Mitrovica. Yet Kherson’s geography, wartime experience, and symbolic importance make the prospects of such an arrangement both intriguing and problematic.

Why Kherson?

Kherson’s significance in the war is threefold:

1. Strategic Location – It controls a key crossing of the Dnipro and access to both riverine and maritime trade routes, with proximity to Crimea and Mykolaiv.

   
   

2. Symbolic Value – It was the first major city Russia captured after the February 2022 invasion, and the first significant one Ukraine recaptured in November 2022. Its liberation was a morale victory, but the city remains under constant artillery and drone attack from Russian-held territory across the river and its civilian institutions are subject to infiltration by the Russian intelligence agencies.

   
   

3. Potential as a Buffer – An internationalised Kherson might, in principle, serve as a demilitarised buffer zone between Ukrainian and Russian forces, reducing the intensity of shelling and creating conditions for humanitarian recovery.

How an Internationalised Kherson Could Work

Kherson under international governance in theory might require a formalised and enforceable agreement involving Ukraine, Russia, and a supervising international authority, although in practice it could simply be imposed by international will (as has happend in the case of many past internationalised territories). In practical terms, this could include:

• Neutral Security Forces: A multinational peacekeeping contingent drawn from states acceptable to both Kyiv and Moscow—potentially under UN, EU or OSCE mandate, although Russia’s Security Council veto complicates the former.

  
  

• Civilian Administration: An international governor supported by an advisory council of city representatives, with the governor empowered to make final decisions on municipal governance.

  
  

• Demilitarisation and Monitoring: Withdrawal of all national armed forces to agreed distances, with constant monitoring through drones, sensors, and on-the-ground inspection teams.

  
  

• Humanitarian and Reconstruction Oversight: Direct administration of aid distribution, infrastructure repair, and economic development, ensuring funds are not siphoned off by corruption or political manipulation.

  
  

• Fixed Duration: A clear timeline—perhaps five years—after which sovereignty would revert fully to Ukraine unless a mutually agreed extension was signed.

Potential Advantages

1. Humanitarian Relief – The population of Kherson has endured relentless shelling and infrastructural collapse. International control could bring relative safety, repair utilities and restore normal commerce.

   
   

2. Conflict De-escalation – Removing Kherson from the direct line of fire could reduce civilian casualties and free Ukrainian forces for other defensive operations.

   
   

3. Diplomatic Breakthrough – It could provide a politically face-saving compromise for both sides: Ukraine does not cede sovereignty, and Russia avoids a perception of total withdrawal from influence over a symbolic location.

   
   

4. Testing Ground for Peace – If successful, Kherson could become a model for stabilising other contested zones.

Risks and Pitfalls

However, the dangers are considerable:

• Subversion Risk – Russia could use the arrangement to infiltrate operatives, gather intelligence, and manipulate local politics under the cover of “civil participation”. However this is already taking place in Kherson to a significant degree, so the present of an international civilian force would hopefully reduce, rather than increase, the level of infiltration by the Russian intelligence services.

  
  

• Mandate Fragility – Without robust and impartial enforcement, the arrangement could collapse at the first major violation, leaving civilians exposed.

  
  

• Precedent Effect – Moscow could demand similar arrangements in other cities, fragmenting Ukraine’s sovereignty. However in practice such demands are unlikely to be acceded to, because no other large city is actually on the "Zero Line" in Ukraine as is Kherson.

  
  

• Geopolitical Deadlock – As seen in Danzig or Cyprus, temporary international governance often becomes indefinite, freezing the conflict rather than resolving it.

Ukrainian Perspective

For Kyiv, agreeing to internationalisation might be substantially attractive. It would encourage an international civilian and military presence on Ukraine's front line in a contested and fragile area. It would gain short-term humanitarian relief for Kherson's benighted population and show diplomatic flexibility, However it must not be shaped as a concession for a domestic political audience, or Ukrainian public opinion is likely to turn against it.

Any such arrangement would need ironclad guarantees:

• Explicit reaffirmation that Kherson is Ukrainian territory.

  
  

• Clear reversion clauses.

  
  

• Binding security commitments from NATO or other guarantors to deter Russian attempts to manipulate the arrangement.

Russian Perspective

Moscow could be drawn to the idea if it allowed continued influence in Kherson without the costs of direct occupation, while also softening sanctions pressure by appearing cooperative. Nevertheless Russia has historically resisted genuine international oversight in contested areas and might only agree if it could shape the mission’s composition and rules—risking a compromised mandate.

Hence such an arrangement would likely ultimately have to be imposed by a "Coalition of the Willing" western nations, because genuine Russian cooperation is unlikely save down the barrel of a gun.

International Will and Capacity

The success of any such plan would rest on whether a coalition of credible states could provide the troops, funds, and political backing for years of sustained engagement. Without this, the mission could deteriorate into a weak, symbolic presence—dangerous for civilians and politically embarrassing for its sponsors.

Nevertheless the current situation in Kherson, with massive destruction, near-daily Russian attacks upon civilians, and a municipal infrastructure comprehensively undermined by Russian intelligence infiltration, that internationalisation, with all the costs it incurs, may be the only way to bring medium to long-term relief to the people of Kherson.

An Experiment in a Complex Conflict

Internationalising Kherson is possible but would require a convergence of political will, diplomatic dexterity, and security resources. It has happened before in contemporary peacekeeping, but it requires strong determination.

If the forthcoming latest round of peace talks in Alaska are to bear fruit, then they will have to discuss a viable future for Kherson. At the current time the city is theoretically under Ukrainian sovereign control but is the victim of Russians just over the river who control the civilians in Kherson by shelling and drone attacks upon civilian administrators who do not do what they want, and by the insididious infilitration of the FSB and GRU, two of Russia's most notorious intelligence agencies. This is not a credible basis for genuine peace in Kherson. An entirely different model for Kherson's future governance after a ceasefire agreement needs to be pursued.