Iran’s Strategic Imagination: Foreign Policy, Defence Doctrine, and the Psychology of Terror

Saturday 7 March 2026

Iran’s contemporary foreign policy and defence posture cannot be understood solely through conventional frameworks of international relations. The Islamic Republic has constructed a strategic worldview shaped by revolution, ideological identity, perceived encirclement, and the experience of war. Her policies combine traditional statecraft with unconventional instruments of influence: proxy warfare, ideological mobilisation, and forms of coercion that often fall within the spectrum of terrorism. To understand Iran’s behaviour in the contemporary Middle East one must examine three interconnected elements: the ideological origins of her foreign policy, the structure of her defence doctrine, and the psychological logic that underpins the use of terror as a strategic tool.

The Revolutionary Foundations of Iranian Foreign Policy

Iran’s foreign policy was fundamentally transformed by the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The overthrow of the Shah did not merely replace one regime with another; it replaced an entire strategic orientation. Under the Shah Iran had pursued a largely Western-aligned, state-centric foreign policy focused on regional stability and economic development. After the revolution the Islamic Republic adopted a foreign policy rooted in revolutionary ideology, anti-imperialism and religious legitimacy.

The revolutionary leadership conceived of Iran not merely as a nation-state but as the vanguard of an Islamic political movement. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e faqih—the rule of the Islamic jurist—gave the state a theological foundation that transcended national borders. Iranian foreign policy therefore acquired a missionary dimension: the defence and expansion of what Tehran called the “Islamic Revolution”.

This ideological orientation produced a profound hostility towards the United States and Israel, both portrayed as pillars of Western domination in the Middle East. Over time this confrontation became institutionalised within the Iranian political system. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), created to defend the revolution, acquired enormous influence in foreign policy and security decision-making. Scholars widely regard the IRGC as one of the decisive actors shaping Iran’s strategic posture and maintaining a confrontational relationship with the West. 

Yet ideology alone does not explain Iranian foreign policy. Geography and history are equally important. Iran sits at the crossroads of Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf and the Levant. Historically she has experienced repeated foreign intervention—from Tsarist Russia to British imperial influence and the American role in the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. These experiences have reinforced a powerful sense of strategic insecurity. Iranian leaders therefore tend to interpret international politics through the lens of survival and resistance.

The result is a foreign policy that mixes ideological ambition with deep strategic defensiveness.

Forward Defence and the “Axis of Resistance”

Iran’s defence doctrine has evolved in response to this perceived insecurity. The catastrophic Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988 was particularly formative. During that conflict Iran’s conventional armed forces struggled against Iraqi military power and international isolation. The lesson drawn by Iranian strategists was clear: Iran could not rely on conventional military parity with her adversaries.

Instead Tehran developed an asymmetric defence strategy built upon three pillars: ballistic missiles, a potential nuclear deterrent, and networks of proxy organisations across the Middle East. 

This approach is often described as “forward defence”. Rather than fighting wars on Iranian soil, Tehran seeks to project influence beyond her borders through allied militias and political movements. The network commonly known as the “Axis of Resistance” includes groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen and Palestinian militant organisations. These groups allow Iran to extend her strategic reach while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. 

Proxy warfare offers several advantages to Iran.

First, it compensates for conventional military weakness. Iran’s economy and armed forces cannot match the technological superiority of the United States or Israel. Supporting irregular forces allows Tehran to challenge these adversaries indirectly.

Secondly, proxies expand Iran’s strategic depth. By establishing allied forces across the Levant and the Persian Gulf, Iran attempts to ensure that any conflict with Israel or the United States would occur far from Iranian territory.

Thirdly, the proxy network serves ideological purposes. These groups reinforce the narrative that Iran is leading a broader struggle against Western domination and Israeli power.

However this strategy carries inherent risks. Proxies have their own political agendas and are not always controllable. Moreover reliance on irregular warfare can provoke escalation when adversaries respond directly against Iran itself.

The Militarisation of Iranian Policy

Over time Iran’s political system has become increasingly militarised. The IRGC now occupies a central position not only in defence but also in economic and political life. The organisation controls vast business networks and plays a decisive role in strategic decision-making.

Recent conflicts have reinforced this tendency. Iranian missile and drone capabilities have expanded dramatically, and the IRGC has assumed an even greater leadership role in wartime strategy and internal security. 

Iran’s missile arsenal is particularly significant. Ballistic and cruise missiles provide a form of deterrence that compensates for the absence of a powerful air force. Military exercises regularly demonstrate the capacity to launch large salvos of missiles and drones against regional targets. 

At the same time Iranian planners have always recognised that conventional warfare with the United States or Israel would be extremely costly. Their doctrine has therefore emphasised disruption rather than decisive victory. Analysts often describe this as a strategy of “chaos management”: creating instability across multiple theatres in order to increase the political cost of confrontation for Iran’s enemies. 

Hence Iran seeks to make conflict painful and unpredictable enough that adversaries prefer negotiation to escalation.

Terrorism as Strategic Communication

The use of terrorism must be understood within this broader strategic framework. Terrorism, in the Iranian context, is rarely an end in itself. Rather it functions as a form of political communication.

From a psychological perspective, terrorism operates by amplifying fear beyond the immediate physical damage caused by an attack. A small act of violence can generate disproportionate political effects if it undermines public confidence, polarises societies or forces governments to respond emotionally rather than rationally.

Iranian-aligned militant organisations have frequently employed this logic. Attacks against civilian targets, kidnappings, and spectacular acts of violence are designed not merely to destroy but to send messages. These messages may be directed at multiple audiences simultaneously: enemy governments, local populations, rival political factions, and Iran’s own domestic supporters.

Three psychological mechanisms are particularly important.

The first is deterrence through uncertainty. By demonstrating that attacks can occur anywhere—from urban centres to critical infrastructure—terrorist tactics create an atmosphere of unpredictability that complicates military planning.

The second is symbolic confrontation. Terrorist acts often target symbols of power—embassies, military bases, or political leaders—in order to challenge the legitimacy of an adversary.

The third is mobilisation. Violent acts framed as resistance against powerful enemies can strengthen ideological cohesion among supporters.

For Iran, terrorism and proxy warfare are therefore intertwined with political identity. Violence becomes a tool of narrative construction as much as military strategy.

The Limits of Asymmetric Power

Yet the effectiveness of this strategy remains contested. Proxy warfare can create influence, but it also generates instability that may ultimately harm Iran’s own interests. Some analysts argue that the reliance on irregular warfare reflects structural weakness rather than strength. 

Moreover the geopolitical environment of the Middle East is changing. Arab states that once viewed Iran primarily as a partner against Western influence have increasingly perceived her as a destabilising actor. Regional coalitions, advanced missile defence systems and expanding intelligence cooperation among Iran’s rivals have gradually eroded the advantages of asymmetric warfare.

Economic constraints also limit Iran’s strategic options. Decades of confrontation with the West have imposed severe costs on the Iranian economy, reducing investment and long-term growth. 

The paradox of Iranian strategy is therefore that it simultaneously strengthens and isolates the regime. Proxy networks extend influence across the region, yet they also provoke counter-coalitions that restrict Iran’s freedom of action.

Conclusions

Iran’s foreign policy and defence doctrine emerge from a complex combination of ideology, historical memory, and strategic calculation. The Islamic Republic sees herself as both revolutionary vanguard and besieged state. Her response to this dual identity has been the construction of a defence system built on asymmetric power: missiles, proxies and the strategic use of terror.

From a psychological perspective, terrorism within this framework is not merely violence but a language of political signalling. It communicates defiance, deters adversaries through uncertainty, and reinforces the ideological narrative of resistance.

Yet the very methods that give Iran strategic reach also expose her vulnerabilities. Proxy warfare can spiral beyond control, regional rivals can adapt, and economic isolation can undermine long-term stability.

Iran’s strategic imagination therefore remains caught between two impulses: the revolutionary ambition to reshape the Middle East and the pragmatic necessity of surviving within a hostile international system. After the current war is finished, however long it lasts, understanding this tension will be essential for interpreting her behaviour in the years ahead.