Frozen or Finished? The Strategic Calculus of a Protracted Conflict

The war in Ukraine, now deep into its fourth year of full-scale hostilities, poses a dilemma that neither Kyiv, Moscow nor the international community has yet resolved: is this a conflict destined to be frozen, as in so many other post-Soviet theatres, or can it be finished on terms that meaningfully restore Ukraine’s sovereignty and Europe’s stability? The question is not one of semantics but of strategic calculus, for the consequences of each outcome would reverberate far beyond the battlefields of Donbas or the occupied ports of the Azov.

The Anatomy of Frozen Conflicts

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated a preference for “frozen conflicts” as instruments of influence. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh all illustrate Moscow’s readiness to sponsor secessionist movements, sustain them militarily, and then offer mediation that ensures no final settlement is reached. These zones of manufactured ambiguity serve three purposes: they prevent the states concerned from joining Western alliances; they preserve Russia’s leverage; and they offer platforms for covert military, economic and political pressure.

Ukraine already experienced the first stage of this strategy in 2014, when the annexation of Crimea and the creation of separatist “republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk left her sovereignty fractured. The full-scale invasion of 2022 was intended to convert that fracture into collapse. Its failure leaves Russia returning to her traditional repertoire: to secure enough territory to impose a stalemate, and then to freeze.

Why Ukraine Cannot Accept a Freeze

For Ukraine, the prospect of a frozen conflict is existentially dangerous. A ceasefire that cements Russian control of occupied territories would validate aggression, deprive Kyiv of economic assets in the east and south, and condemn millions of Ukrainians to live under occupation. Moreover such an outcome would leave Russia free to rearm, regroup and attack again at a moment of her choosing, just as the Minsk Agreements of 2014 and 2015 proved to be staging posts rather than solutions.

A frozen line of contact would also undermine Ukraine’s European trajectory. The European Union has made clear that territorial disputes and uncertain borders complicate, if not preclude, accession. NATO membership would remain improbable so long as active hostilities or unresolved territorial claims persisted. Thus “freezing” would not mean stability but indefinite limbo.

Russia’s Calculus

For Moscow, the war is costly but still tolerable. The Kremlin’s economy is re-orienting towards China, India and the Middle East; oil and gas exports continue to finance the state; and repression at home suppresses dissent. While Russia cannot easily finish the war in the sense of achieving regime change in Kyiv or domination over the whole of Ukraine, she can sustain attritional fighting that prevents Ukraine from finishing it either.

A protracted stalemate, accompanied by intermittent negotiations and Western fatigue, serves Russia’s purpose. It signals to other post-Soviet states that Western guarantees are unreliable; it compels Ukraine to drain resources indefinitely; and it offers the Kremlin the prospect of eventual sanctions erosion as international attention shifts.

The Western Dilemma

The West’s calculus is conflicted. On the one hand, the United States and Europe have invested enormous political capital in Ukraine’s defence. To allow the conflict simply to freeze on Russia’s terms would embolden authoritarian revisionists worldwide. On the other hand, sustaining military and financial aid at current levels is politically contentious. Electoral cycles in Washington, Berlin and Paris make indefinite commitments fragile. The temptation to declare victory by rebranding a frozen line as a “peace” will grow as the war grinds on.

Comparative Lessons: Cyprus

Cyprus demonstrates how a frozen conflict can harden into permanence. After Turkey’s 1974 intervention, the island was partitioned between the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognised only by Ankara. Nearly fifty years later, the “Green Line” remains policed by UN peacekeepers, negotiations have stalled repeatedly, and the island functions under de facto division. While the Republic of Cyprus entered the European Union, the unresolved conflict paralyses regional cooperation and gives Ankara a lever over Brussels. For Ukraine, such a scenario would mean Western integration only in truncated form and perpetual vulnerability to external manipulation.

Transnistria

Transnistria illustrates Moscow’s playbook most clearly. After a short war in 1992, Russian troops remained in the strip of Moldovan territory along the Dniester River. Thirty years on, they still have not left. The enclave functions as a Russian protectorate, sustaining smuggling networks, laundering funds and constraining Chisinau’s foreign policy. Moldova’s European ambitions remain hostage to this unresolved status. For Ukraine, the risk is obvious: any Russian-held enclave, even if nominally quiet, becomes a platform for hybrid pressure and a permanent veto over sovereignty.

Nagorno-Karabakh

The Caucasus offers a different lesson. Armenia’s decades-long control of Nagorno-Karabakh, sustained by a Russian-mediated “frozen” arrangement, unravelled abruptly in 2020 and again in 2023. Azerbaijan, better armed and wealthier, seized the territory by force, displacing its Armenian population. The collapse of the “freeze” revealed what had always been true: a frozen conflict is not a settlement but a delayed war. Applied to Ukraine, the warning is stark. What looks frozen today may thaw violently tomorrow if balance shifts.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia

These Georgian regions epitomise Russia’s willingness to transform frozen conflicts into instruments of occupation. After secessionist wars in the 1990s, Russian “peacekeepers” remained. In 2008, Moscow recognised both territories as independent states, stationed troops there permanently, and effectively annexed them into her sphere. Georgia’s sovereignty was amputated, her NATO bid paralysed, and her domestic politics distorted. A similar outcome in Ukraine—acquiescence in Russian recognition of puppet authorities in parts or all of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson—would serve the same purposes.

Strategic Options: Protracted but Not Paralysed

The path forward, if Ukraine is not to be condemned to limbo, lies in resisting the false dichotomy of “frozen” or “finished.” A protracted conflict need not be paralysing if it is accompanied by Western policies that tilt the balance towards eventual Ukrainian restoration. These include:

• Sustained and predictable military aid, sufficient not only to defend but to retake ground.

  
  

• Clear conditionality tying reconstruction funds to Ukraine’s governance reforms, ensuring that Western investment reinforces the rule of law.

  
  

• Long-term security guarantees short of NATO membership, binding the West to Ukraine’s defence through bilateral and multilateral commitments.

  
  

• Escalating sanctions that reduce Russia’s capacity to rearm and disrupt her energy revenues.

Scenarios for the Next Five Years

Frozen

The fighting subsides into a stalemate by 2026, with a de facto line of control running through eastern Ukraine and Russia retaining Crimea. Western aid wanes as political attention turns elsewhere. Ukraine becomes a divided state, nominally sovereign but unable to reclaim her territories. Russia consolidates her hold on occupied regions, integrates them administratively, and uses them as levers against Kyiv’s Western ambitions. The conflict is not finished but institutionalised, smouldering and ready to reignite.

Finished

Through sustained Western military aid, tightening sanctions on Moscow, and political will in Kyiv, Ukraine retakes significant territory in 2026–27. A collapse of Russian morale, economy or political upheaval in Moscow forces negotiations on terms broadly favourable to Ukraine. A security settlement, backed by Western guarantees, stabilises borders. Ukraine enters the European Union within the decade, NATO ties deepen, and Russia retreats into isolation. The war is finished—not without scars, but with sovereignty largely restored.

Indeterminate Drift

Neither side achieves decisive advantage. Russia continues attritional offensives; Ukraine defends but cannot decisively counterattack. Western aid fluctuates with electoral cycles. The war persists at varying intensities through 2030, consuming resources and attention. Ukraine survives but cannot integrate fully into the EU or NATO; Russia sustains her war economy but gains no decisive prize. The conflict becomes Europe’s chronic wound, producing instability, fatigue, and a sense of unfinished business that corrodes trust in Western leadership.

The Price of Avoiding Ambiguity

The tragedy of Ukraine’s position is that a frozen conflict offers Moscow a sustainable instrument of domination, while a finished war on just terms requires levels of Western commitment not yet forthcoming. The choice before Europe and America is therefore stark. To falter is to consign Ukraine to the grey zone of other post-Soviet “frozen” cases, breeding instability and rewarding aggression. To persevere is to accept years of costs in the service of a Europe that is whole and free.

History teaches that frozen conflicts never remain truly frozen. They smoulder, destabilise, and erupt again. For Ukraine, to freeze is to prepare for another war. For the West, to finish—on terms that restore sovereignty and security—remains the only strategy worthy of the sacrifices already made.