Frontline Firepower: Ukrainian and Russian Military Capabilities in 2025
- Matthew Parish
- May 7
- 6 min read
As the war in Ukraine grinds into its third full year, the military balance on the front lines in 2025 reflects deep shifts in doctrine, logistics, manpower and technology. Both Ukraine and Russia have adapted their strategies in response to battlefield realities, sanctions and shifting international support. This essay evaluates the current military capabilities of each side in five key areas: manpower, artillery and missile systems, armoured vehicles, air power, and electronic warfare and drones. It also considers regional variations along the 1,000-kilometre front line and the growing importance of industrial mobilisation.
Manpower and Force Composition
Russia (2025)
Russia’s force structure in Ukraine has solidified into a hybrid model blending regular units, mobilised (i.e. conscripted) personnel, mercenary remnants (post-Wagner), and paramilitary structures like Rosgvardiya (Russia's National Guard, that formally exists to address internal emergencies but has been diverted to frontline roles). Despite staggering losses—over 300,000 casualties cumulatively by Western estimates—Russia retains the strategic depth to regenerate forces. Moscow has recently avoided another formal mobilisation, instead using regional recruitment incentives, nationality-based units (e.g. Chechens, Buryats - ethnic groups in Russia's regions) and expanded prison conscription.
On the front, Russian units are heavily infantry-centric and operate under a doctrine that tolerates high losses to exhaust the Ukrainian defenders. Assault detachments (“shturmoviki”) often engage in repeated small-scale attacks to probe defences and pin down Ukrainian forces. Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), once the core of Russian battlefield manoeuvre, have largely dissolved into ad hoc formations shaped by availability rather than structure.
Ukraine (2025)
Ukraine’s manpower system faced crisis in late 2024 amid recruitment fatigue and demographic strain. The May 2024 mobilisation law lowered the draft age to 25, removed some deferral categories and offered clearer demobilisation timelines for long-serving troops. These changes, while still working through the system, aim to create a more sustainable rotation cycle and reduce over-reliance on worn-out brigades.
Ukrainian brigades along the front increasingly emphasise decentralised command and tactical flexibility. Many operate in “defence-in-depth” patterns, trading territory for attrition and delaying actions. Elite brigades (e.g. 3rd Assault, 47th Mechanised) continue to carry out counterattacks but are increasingly held in reserve for strategic response rather than continuous engagement.
Artillery and Missile Systems
Russia
Russia’s artillery remains the core of its offensive capability. Although shell usage declined from 20,000+ per day in 2022 to around 8,000–10,000 in 2025, that still significantly outpaces Ukraine’s rates. Russian production—buoyed by sanctions evasion through China and North Korea—delivers approximately 2.5 million shells per year, augmented by imports.
Multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) like Tornado-G, BM-27 Uragan, and Smerch dominate Russia’s longer-distance fires. Russia uses Iskander-M ballistic missiles for deep strikes, though with growing selectivity due to reduced inventory and high cost (approximately US$3 million per missile). Notably, Russia has adopted FAB-250/500/1500 bombs fitted with UMPK (unified planning and correction model) glide kits for converting unguided Soviet-era bombs into precision-guided glide bombs), allowing strikes up to 70 km from the front—creating a persistent threat to Ukrainian fortifications even without air superiority.
Ukraine
Ukraine’s artillery has been shaped by NATO standardisation. Despite the smaller total inventory, Western systems offer better accuracy, digital fire control, and rapid displacement capability (the ability to move and avoid counterbattery fire while remaining on-target). The M777 (illustrated in the photo at the beginning of this essay), Caesar, PzH 2000, and Krab howitzers are now operated by dozens of artillery brigades. By spring 2025, the arrival of 155mm shells from expanded US-European production (projected at 2 million/year) is expected to reduce rationing.
ATACMS missiles with cluster warheads, delivered by the United States in late 2024, have proven transformative, targeting airbases, radar sites, and rail junctions deep in Russian-controlled territory. These attacks, coupled with Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG air-launched missiles, have forced Russia to displace key assets further from the front.
Armoured Vehicles and Mobility
Russia
Russia fields a mixture of modern and obsolete armoured vehicles. While some T-90M and upgraded T-72B3 tanks remain in front-line roles, large quantities of Soviet-era T-62s and even T-55s have been recommissioned to offset attrition. Russian armoured thrusts have largely been curtailed to small, localised probes due to minefields, loitering munitions, and limited infantry coordination.
IFVs (infantry fighting vehicles) and APCs (armoured personnel carriers)—such as BMP-2s, MT-LBs, and BTR variants—are often used for transport and indirect fire platforms (i.e. without a direct line of sight to the target) rather than shock manoeuvre. Russian forces are increasingly reliant on mine-clearing vehicles and engineering assets to breach Ukrainian defences, particularly in sectors like Avdiivka and Kupiansk.
Ukraine
Ukraine’s armoured forces are technologically superior, though constrained by quantity and maintenance issues. Leopard 2A6 tanks have proven effective in static defence and counterattack roles, especially near Robotyne and Krynky. However American Abrams M1A1 SA tanks, delivered in late 2024, have had limited frontline use due to logistics, targeting concerns, and battlefield vulnerability to drones.
Infantry fighting vehicles like the M2 Bradley and CV90 have bolstered Ukraine’s mechanised infantry, especially when integrated with Western-style combined arms tactics. However Ukrainian operations remain cautious due to the density of Russian minefields (up to 5–10 mines per square metre in some areas) and pervasive drone surveillance.
Air Power and Air Defence
Russia
While Russia has failed to establish strategic air dominance, she holds local tactical superiority in frontline airspace. Aircraft like the Su-34 and Su-35 fly hundreds of sorties weekly, delivering glide bombs and launching Kh-59/Kh-31 cruise missiles from stand-off positions (i.e. outside the range of regular Ukraine air defence systems). Russia’s ability to operate from bases in occupied Crimea and near the Sea of Azov extends her operational reach.
Russian air force doctrine has adapted to focus on massed standoff fires, avoiding direct penetration of Ukraine’s hardened air defence zones. Notably Russian tactical aviation is increasingly paired with reconnaissance drones and loitering munitions ("suicide drones", that loiter in an area for an extended period waiting for a target) for strike coordination.
Ukraine
Ukraine maintains an increasingly layered air defence network. Patriot and SAMP/T batteries protect major cities and critical infrastructure, while NASAMS, IRIS-T, and Crotale systems cover frontline brigades. Ukraine’s interception rate for ballistic and cruise missiles in 2025 remains high — 75–90% for most types, though some hypersonic and manoeuvring missiles still penetrate defences.
Ukraine’s own air force is expected to receive further F-16s in summer 2025 from Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. These fighters will likely be used in limited roles (e.g. SEAD - suppression of enemy air defences: knocking out ground-based air defence missiles and their command, control and communication (C3) infrastructure), interdiction of enemy aircraft, and air patrols) due to the need for hardened bases (not susceptible to missile strikes) and trained pilots. Nonetheless they represent a symbolic and tactical upgrade.
Drones, Electronic Warfare, and Innovation
Russia
Electronic warfare (EW) is one of Russia’s most effective force multipliers. EW systems deployed in depth deny GPS, jam communications, and disrupt UAV datalinks. Krasukha-4, Tirada-2, and Zhitel units are deployed with both artillery brigades and forward battalions.
Russia’s drone fleet is large, varied, and state-backed. Iranian Shahed-131/136 drones remain a strategic nuisance, saturating Ukrainian air defences. Lancet-3 and Orlan-10 drones are used extensively for tactical strikes and artillery spotting. Russia is experimenting with AI-assisted targeting and drone swarms, though at early stages.
Ukraine
Ukraine has pioneered asymmetric drone warfare. From cheap FPV drones with RPG (rocket propelled grenades) or shaped-charge warheads (designed to concentrate the explosive charge of the warhead in a particular direction, typically to pierce armour) to long-range strike UAVs like Bober and UJ-26 Beaver, Ukraine integrates drones across all levels of combat. The Ukrainian military deploys up to 20,000 drones per month, a number expected to double in 2025.
Ukrainian startups and defence firms produce diverse platforms ranging from anti-tank FPVs to maritime drones. The Sea Baby naval drone programme has damaged or destroyed several Russian naval assets in the Black Sea. Ukraine’s drone innovation has begun influencing NATO doctrine on swarming, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), and loitering munitions.
Regional Variations and Operational Outlook
Donbas (Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk): Russia focuses on grinding infantry assaults and high-volume artillery. Urban combat dominates, with minimal territorial shifts but high attrition.
Zaporizhzhia Front (Robotyne-Orikhiv): Ukraine continues shaping operations and limited mechanised attacks. Terrain, minefields and Russian entrenchments prevent large breakthroughs.
Kherson/Dnipro River: Ukraine conducts cross-river raids and drone strikes on Russian rear positions. Russia struggles to hold riparian areas under constant surveillance and shelling.
Northeast (Kupiansk-Svatove): Russia pushes offensives using armoured thrusts and elite VDV (Russian Airborne Forces, similar to paratrooper) units. Ukraine defends with elastic lines (i.e. constant movement back and forth) and counter-battery fire.
Conclusion
In 2025, the front line in Ukraine is defined by entrenched warfare, technological adaptation, and mutual attrition. Russia maintains an edge in manpower and artillery volume, but Ukraine’s strengths in innovation, drone warfare, and Western-backed precision strikes create space for asymmetric responses. The war remains a contest not just of armies, but of industrial capacity, societal resilience and global will. The next phase will likely be shaped as much by logistics and drone production lines as by tanks and trenches.
