From Necessity to Export Power: Lessons for Ukraine from Israel and South Korea

History suggests that countries forced to fight for survival often turn necessity into innovation. Two prominent examples—Israel and South Korea—developed arms industries under siege conditions, and then parlayed those capabilities into global export sectors. Ukraine, facing her own existential war against Russia, now confronts a similar question: can she transform her rapidly growing defence industry into a permanent export base? A comparative examination reveals both striking similarities and important differences.

Origins in Necessity

All three nations began their arms industries from the same starting point: an existential threat.

• Israel was subject to embargoes after 1948, compelling her to improvise rifles, armoured vehicles, and eventually tanks and aircraft.

  
  

• South Korea, devastated after the Korean War, relied upon US military aid until President Park’s industrialisation strategy in the 1970s mandated domestic production of artillery, small arms and tanks.

  
  

• Ukraine, attacked by Russia in 2014 and again in 2022, was forced to revive Soviet-era factories and mobilise small-scale drone workshops, turning garages and start-ups into Europe’s fastest-growing arms producers.

The shared pattern is clear: when foreign suppliers cannot or will not deliver, countries in crisis turn to their own ingenuity. Ukraine, like Israel and South Korea before her, has found war to be the most powerful stimulus for domestic arms development.

Innovation and Niche Technologies

Each country found success by specialising in areas where they could outpace larger powers.

• Israel focused on electronics, missile guidance, drones, and later integrated air defence. These were domains where agility and creativity mattered more than industrial mass.

  
  

• South Korea leveraged her heavy industry to produce reliable artillery, howitzers, and later cost-competitive tanks and aircraft, targeting markets priced out of US and European systems.

  
  

• Ukraine has followed both paths: her cheap, rapidly iterated drones mirror Israel’s focus upon innovative niches, while her efforts to restore heavy artillery and missile production echo South Korea’s reliance on industrial scale.

The implication is that Ukraine must refine her export identity: should she become the “Israel of drones,” emphasising cutting-edge battlefield software and unmanned systems, or the “South Korea of Eastern Europe,” supplying large but affordable conventional arms? In practice, she may attempt both, but balancing these paths requires strategic clarity.

State Coordination and Industrial Integration

Neither Israel nor South Korea left defence to chance; both integrated arms into national industrial strategy.

• Israel has maintained close ties between military, government, and private companies, ensuring that battlefield lessons were rapidly translated into new products.

  
  

• South Korea directed her chaebols (family-owned business conglomerates) to expand into defence manufacturing, linking it with shipbuilding, steel and electronics, thereby embedding defence into her broader economic model.

  
  

• Ukraine currently relies on a hybrid model: large state enterprises such as Ukroboronprom co-exist with small, agile private workshops. This fragmentation promotes innovation but risks inefficiency and corruption. To emulate Israel and South Korea, Ukraine will need mechanisms to consolidate production, ensure quality control, and align civilian industry with military demand.

Export Markets and Diplomacy

Arms exports serve not only economic goals but also diplomatic ones.

• Israel sold to Africa, Asia and Latin America, sometimes controversially, but always with the aim of building political relationships.

  
  

• South Korea positioned herself as a reliable supplier to NATO members such as Poland and Norway, offering quick delivery at lower cost than Western rivals.

  
  

• Ukraine could follow both examples. Low-cost drones and artillery could appeal to developing countries, while European allies may source Ukrainian systems as part of NATO integration. However Ukraine’s dependence upon Western finance may restrict to whom she can sell, and she must tread carefully to avoid clashing with US or EU export controls.

The lesson is that export strategy is inseparable from diplomacy. Israel and South Korea used arms to anchor alliances. Ukraine has the same opportunity, provided she manages external political constraints.

Constraints Unique to Ukraine

Despite similarities, Ukraine faces harsher circumstances than either model country.

• Demographic strain: millions displaced or in exile reduce the available workforce.

  
  

• Infrastructure destruction: unlike South Korea and Israel, Ukraine’s industrial base remains under bombardment.

  
  

• Ongoing war: both Israel and South Korea built export industries during relative stability; Ukraine must do so while fighting continues.

Nevertheless these pressures may accelerate innovation. Distributed production, resilient supply chains and rapid adaptation under fire may become Ukrainian trademarks—features that themselves can form part of the country’s export brand.

A future for Ukrainian arms exports

Israel, South Korea and Ukraine all reveal the same paradox: the direst insecurity can create the foundations of industrial strength. Israel demonstrated the value of technological niche innovation, South Korea the importance of scale and integration, and Ukraine is now blending both approaches under unprecedented pressure.

If Ukraine can combine her battlefield-tested ingenuity with institutional reforms, quality control and diplomatic foresight, she may indeed join Israel and South Korea as a nation that turned survival into export power. The question is not whether she can produce arms—she already does—but whether she can channel that production into a coherent export strategy that both sustains her economy and strengthens her alliances.