Friedrich Merz and the Recasting of Europe’s Strategic Posture

The ascent of Friedrich Merz to the leadership of Germany, and by extension to a position of disproportionate influence within the European Union, marks a turning point in the continent’s strategic imagination. After years in which German policy was defined by mercantilism, energy interdependence with Russia and a reliance upon American security guarantees, Merz is attempting to re-engineer the philosophical foundations of European defence policy. The task is immense. Europe confronts a Russia driven by imperial nostalgia and a United States whose long-term commitments to Europe cannot be taken for granted. Merz is therefore one of the first post-Cold War European leaders to articulate openly a future in which Europe may need to stand alone. His project is neither flamboyant nor revolutionary. It is a gradual redirection of strategic thought, undertaken through economic realism and a sober assessment of the balance of power.

At the centre of his emerging doctrine lies an implicit admission that Germany’s long experiment in change through trade has failed. The idea that Russia might be softened, modernised or constrained through commercial ties collapsed with the second invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In its place, Merz is advancing a view of Russia as a structurally revisionist power, whose political elite has welded her economic resources, demography and culture to a project of militarised expansion. Merz perceives that this ideological and institutional configuration will endure long after the present Russian leadership. Therefore Europe’s policy cannot focus solely upon the collapse or moderation of Russia’s current rulers. It must address the deeper currents of Russian statecraft, and prepare for decades of confrontation.

His approach rests upon two linked premises. First, deterrence is only credible if European states bear a far larger share of the military burden. Secondly, deterrence cannot be credible if Europe’s industrial base is eroded by regulatory complexity, energy insecurity and insufficient capital investment. Merz therefore conceives defence policy and economic policy as inseparable. A continent that cannot manufacture munitions at scale, finance armaments domestically or guarantee uninterrupted energy flows cannot credibly confront Russia. In this respect he rejects both the austerity instincts of certain northern states and the fiscal caution that has long constrained German public finance. Under Merz, rearmament is being repositioned as an economic necessity, and the rebuilding of European industry is presented not as protectionism but as a precondition for survival.

Merz’s efforts to reshape Europe’s approach to the United States follow from this logic. He acknowledges that American power remains indispensable in the short term. Yet he is acutely conscious that the United States is entering a phase of internal division, strategic overextension and increasing focus upon China. Even administrations that are rhetorically committed to NATO have shown fatigue in underwriting Europe’s defence almost single-handedly. Merz’s objective is therefore not to distance Europe from the United States but to make the alliance more symmetrical. A Europe that can defend herself is one that can negotiate with Washington from a position of equality rather than dependence. This shift is subtle. It avoids the language of autonomy, which often implies that the United States is the problem. Instead it emphasises responsibility and burden-sharing, presenting Germany’s rearmament as a means of stabilising NATO rather than diluting it.

Nevertheless there is a quiet recognition in Merz’s thinking that the coming century may expose Europe to periods of American disengagement. His strategic horizon stretches beyond electoral cycles. He views the continent as having entered a prolonged era in which the United States may oscillate between involvement and isolation, depending upon domestic politics and the pressures of the Indo-Pacific. Europe must therefore acquire the capacity to withstand Russian aggression even in the absence of consistent American guarantees. This vision recalls the early decades of the Cold War, when western Europe accelerated her rearmament in fear that the United States might withdraw once the memory of the Second World War faded. The difference today is that Europe faces a Russia more reckless and less predictable, and a United States more fragmented and less patient.

Merz’s stance towards Russia is accordingly unyielding. But it also rejects impulsive escalation. He understands that Russia’s leadership treats compromise as weakness. Yet he also recognises that miscalculation in a nuclear-armed confrontation can be catastrophic. His doctrine therefore centres upon strategic endurance. Europe must outlast Russia in economic resilience, industrial capacity and political cohesion. This requires a dual effort: strengthening the eastern front through forward deployments and infrastructure, and rebuilding Europe’s defence industries so that they can match Russia’s mobilisation of her war economy. In this context, Merz has encouraged the expansion of joint procurement schemes, a more integrated command structure and the creation of a European munitions production base insulated from global supply shocks.

A central component of his project is to shift European opinion. Merz speaks frequently of the need to prepare European societies for a long contest, in which deterrence is not a temporary emergency but a normal condition of statecraft. His rhetoric seeks to reconcile two fears that have long paralysed European politics: fear of provoking Russia, and fear of standing alone. Merz argues that the former risk is overstated and the latter unavoidable. Europe’s vulnerability derives not from boldness but from hesitation. Only a continent that signals clearly its readiness to defend herself can prevent Russian adventurism from creeping ever westward. He often frames this as a cultural challenge: Europeans must rediscover the virtues of seriousness, endurance and strategic patience.

Whether Merz succeeds in reshaping Europe’s security architecture remains uncertain. Germany’s political landscape is fractious, and her institutions move slowly. Some European partners remain sceptical of any German leadership in defence policy, while others doubt that Germany will sustain higher defence spending once the shock of the war in Ukraine recedes. Yet Merz’s influence lies not only in what he does but in what he articulates. He is providing Europe with a strategic vocabulary that rejects illusions about Russia, recognises the limits of American reliability and admits the scale of the challenge ahead.

In so doing, Merz is amongst the first major European leaders of the twenty-first century to treat Russia’s imperial ambitions not as an episodic crisis but as the defining strategic condition of the era. His project is nothing less than the intellectual rearmament of Europe. If he succeeds, Europe may emerge as a continent capable of standing alone should the tides of history require it. If he fails, she risks drifting into a century shaped by Russian coercion and American absence. The stakes are immense, and Merz appears to understand that he is governing in the shadow of a future that demands more from Europe than she has been willing to give since the end of the Cold War.