Elections in wartime Ukraine

Sunday 22 February 2026

The question of elections in wartime Ukraine hovers over the country’s political discourse like a constitutional thundercloud. Since the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation in February 2022 Ukraine has lived under martial law, extended at regular intervals by the Verkhovna Rada. The ordinary rhythms of democratic life — electoral campaigns, party congresses, the testing of incumbents at the ballot box — have been suspended in favour of national survival. Yet Ukraine is a constitutional democracy. She is not merely fighting for territory; she is fighting for a political system grounded in popular sovereignty. The longer the war endures, the more pressing becomes the question: when and how should she return to the polls?

Constitutional constraints under martial law

The starting point must be the Constitution of Ukraine, adopted in 1996. Article 83 provides that the powers of the Verkhovna Rada are extended in the event of martial law or a state of emergency until the first sitting of the newly elected parliament after the termination of such a regime. Article 103, concerning presidential elections, stipulates that regular elections are to be held on the last Sunday of March in the fifth year of the President’s term. However under martial law the holding of elections is effectively precluded by statutory legislation implementing the constitutional framework.

The Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” prohibits the holding of presidential, parliamentary and local elections during the period of martial law. The rationale is straightforward: wartime conditions impede the free expression of the people’s will. Campaigning would be distorted by security restrictions; media space is dominated by national defence messaging; and the security of polling stations cannot be guaranteed in many regions.

To hold elections before the end of martial law would therefore require either the lifting of martial law — politically and militarily fraught while active hostilities continue — or an amendment to existing legislation, and perhaps even constitutional amendment. The latter would itself be difficult: constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority of the Verkhovna Rada and are prohibited under conditions of martial law if they affect certain core provisions. The legal pathway to wartime elections is therefore narrow and politically contentious.

The electorate dispersed

Even were the constitutional obstacles surmounted, practical impediments abound. Millions of Ukrainian citizens — estimates range from five to seven million — are presently abroad, primarily in European Union member states. Many remain formally registered at their places of residence within Ukraine. Under pre-war arrangements, external voting was limited and administratively cumbersome, conducted through embassies and consulates. The scale of wartime displacement would overwhelm those mechanisms.

An election in which a substantial proportion of the electorate is effectively excluded risks lacking democratic legitimacy. Expanding overseas voting would require coordination with host states, secure voter identification, and the prevention of fraud. It would also demand political consensus — always delicate in a competitive democracy.

Simultaneously, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens are serving in the Armed Forces or other security formations. They are often deployed at or near the front line, in circumstances incompatible with conventional polling. Military voting mechanisms could be devised — mobile ballot boxes, secure electronic systems, advance voting — yet each introduces vulnerabilities. Ensuring secrecy of the ballot and freedom from coercion in a military hierarchy is a perennial difficulty in wartime democracies.

Front line and internally displaced populations

In front line civilian areas — parts of Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts — the holding of elections may be physically impossible. Shelling, missile strikes and the constant threat of sabotage render public gatherings hazardous. An election confined to relatively secure western and central regions would create a geographic distortion of representation.

Internally displaced persons present another layer of complexity. Millions have relocated from their registered addresses. Although Ukraine has progressively modernised her voter registry, including through digital tools integrated into the Diia platform — the government’s electronic public services application — the accurate assignment of voters to constituencies remains challenging. Parliamentary elections under Ukraine’s mixed electoral system depend in part on single-member districts tied to geography. If voters are displaced en masse, how are constituency boundaries and voter lists to be adjusted without generating claims of manipulation?

Occupied territories and constitutional integrity

The most intractable problem concerns territories under Russian occupation. The Constitution of Ukraine defines her territory as indivisible and inviolable. No constitutional amendment has altered the status of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia or Kherson oblasts, notwithstanding Russia’s purported annexations. Legally, the inhabitants of these territories remain Ukrainian citizens residing within Ukraine’s sovereign borders.

In practice however, they are disenfranchised. Ukraine cannot administer elections in territories controlled by the Russian Armed Forces. To proceed with elections excluding these regions raises a profound constitutional and moral dilemma: does the state implicitly concede the loss of effective sovereignty, or does she simply acknowledge a temporary impossibility while maintaining her legal claim?

Compounding this difficulty is the reported coercion of residents in occupied territories to accept Russian passports and identity documents. The forced substitution of Ukrainian documents with Russian ones not only violates international humanitarian law but also creates evidentiary problems for any future electoral process. How is citizenship to be verified? Should those who accepted Russian documents under duress be treated as having altered their civic status? The Ukrainian state has thus far maintained that such acts have no legal effect upon citizenship, yet administratively the reconstitution of voter rolls will be formidable once occupation ends.

Corruption, scrutiny and trust

Ukraine’s electoral history since independence has been turbulent. She has experienced both egregious fraud — most notoriously in the 2004 presidential election that precipitated the Orange Revolution — and significant improvements in transparency, particularly after 2014. The presence of international observers, notably from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has been central to enhancing confidence.

Yet concerns remain, especially in certain regions where patronage networks are entrenched. Wartime conditions — centralised media messaging, restrictions on political activity, limitations on assembly — risk reinforcing incumbency advantages. An election perceived as unfair, whether or not fraud occurred, could fracture wartime unity. Robust independent scrutiny would be indispensable. However, inviting large international observation missions into a theatre of war raises security concerns and logistical constraints.

Digital voting and the promise — and peril — of Diia

The rapid expansion of digital governance in Ukraine has been one of the state’s most striking achievements since 2019. The Diia application integrates identity documents, tax records and public services in electronic form. In theory such infrastructure could facilitate remote or online voting, both for displaced persons and citizens abroad.

Yet digital voting introduces acute cybersecurity risks. Ukraine is a primary target of Russian cyber operations. An online voting system would be an irresistible objective for sabotage or disinformation. Even unsubstantiated allegations of hacking could delegitimise results. Furthermore digital exclusion — older voters, rural populations with limited connectivity — could distort participation.

Hybrid models might be conceivable: digital registration updates, postal ballots for citizens abroad, mobile polling for military units. Each however would require meticulous legal design, cross-party agreement and technical resilience.

Elections after the war — and constitutional reform?

One argument holds that Ukraine should defer national elections until after the cessation of hostilities and the lifting of martial law. This would allow refugees to return, territories to be liberated — if that proves achievable — and voter rolls to be reconstructed. It would also create space for constitutional reflection.

Since independence in 1991, Ukraine has oscillated between presidential and parliamentary emphases, with recurrent constitutional amendments altering the balance of power. Political life has tended to centralise around Kyiv, often at the expense of regional autonomy. Some analysts argue that a more federal or deeply devolved structure — empowering oblasts or larger regional units — might stabilise the polity, diffuse tensions and reduce the stakes of presidential contests that have historically polarised the country.

Constitutional reform prior to elections could therefore reset the institutional framework. Yet reform processes are themselves politically fraught and time-consuming. They require broad consensus and may reopen divisive debates about language, decentralisation and relations with Europe. Undertaking such reform in the fragile aftermath of war would demand extraordinary political maturity.

Overcoming the challenges

Whether elections occur during the war or after it, several principles will be essential.

First, legality must be scrupulously observed. Any deviation from constitutional norms must be grounded in transparent legislative amendment and, where required, constitutional procedure. Expediency cannot substitute for legality in a democracy fighting for its constitutional identity.

Secondly, inclusivity must be maximised. Mechanisms for overseas voting, military participation and internally displaced persons must be devised with cross-party oversight. Where occupied territories remain inaccessible, the state must articulate clearly that exclusion is temporary and does not diminish sovereign claims.

Thirdly, transparency and international scrutiny are indispensable. Even under constrained conditions, observation missions, domestic monitoring organisations and open publication of results at polling-station level should be maintained.

Fourthly, digital innovation must be tempered by prudence. Diia and other electronic tools may support the process, but core voting mechanisms should remain resilient against cyber interference.

Ukraine’s war has been fought not only with artillery and drones but with institutions — courts that continue to function, a parliament that continues to legislate, and a civil society that remains vigilant. Elections are the culminating expression of that institutional life. To hold them prematurely, without the conditions for fairness and inclusivity, would risk undermining what Ukraine seeks to defend. To postpone them indefinitely would equally corrode democratic legitimacy.

The path forward will therefore require patience, legal rigour and political consensus. Whether in wartime or peace, Ukraine must ensure that when her citizens next go to the polls, they do so not merely as survivors of invasion but as participants in a constitutional order strengthened — not weakened — by the ordeal through which she has passed.