Choosing the next Secretary General of the United Nations: Reform

Objectives and constraints

Any workable reform must respect the Charter’s core rule: the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The permanent five hold a legal veto over that recommendation. Full removal of the veto would require Charter amendment, which is improbable. Hence the realistic path is two-track:

1. Immediate changes achievable by General Assembly resolutions, Security Council presidential statements, and publicly subscribed “codes of conduct” that do not amend the Charter but reshape practice.

   
   

2. Longer-term changes that would require Charter amendment if ever there is political will.

The model we propose below combines both tracks. It aims to widen merit competition; increase transparency; give the General Assembly a determinative, visible role earlier in the process; narrow the space for unilateral vetoes; and ensure the appointee carries demonstrable, global legitimacy while remaining acceptable to the Council.

The model, step by step

1. A global search with a published job description

The General Assembly and Security Council jointly constitute a Search and Assessment Panel of nine members: two nominated by each regional group and one independent chair selected by the President of the General Assembly after consultations. The panel publishes a competency-based job description and an evaluation matrix (leadership under crisis; independence of judgement; administrative reform record; geographic and political neutrality; ethical probity; language skills).

Candidates submit manifestos, conflict-of-interest disclosures, and a pledge to serve a single, non-renewable seven-year term. A single term lessens re-election incentives and enhances independence without any Charter amendment.

2. Open hearings and campaign rules

The panel conducts televised, multilingual dialogues with every qualified candidate. Campaign finance and lobbying rules are adopted by the General Assembly: no state may fund public relations for any one candidate above a modest cap; all in-kind support must be disclosed; candidates report meetings with governments and private entities monthly. This curbs covert sponsorship and signals that the office is not for sale.

3. A General Assembly “indicative primary”

After hearings, the General Assembly holds a secret-ballot indicative vote using ranked choice. The results are published: total first-preferences and final ranked standings. The top three constitute the Assembly’s shortlist. A companion resolution commits the Assembly to appoint only a candidate who secures at least a two-thirds majority at the final stage. None of this amends the Charter; it creates political facts that the Council must respect.

4. Security Council recommendation under a suspensive-veto code

The Security Council agrees, by presidential statement and P5 signatures on a public code of conduct, to recommend only from the Assembly’s top three. The code introduces a suspensive-veto practice: any negative vote by a permanent member triggers (a) a mandatory public explanation in open Council; (b) a 30-day cooling-off period for consultations; and (c) an automatic second vote. If the Assembly’s top-ranked candidate won more than, say, 60 per cent of member states in the indicative primary, the P5 commit to abstain rather than veto unless two permanent members object. This does not alter the Charter; it is self-restraint, made visible and therefore costly to break.

5. Final appointment by the General Assembly

Upon a Council recommendation, the Assembly appoints by secret ballot. The Assembly has already pledged a two-thirds threshold, conferring democratic weight on the result. The candidate takes office with both Council acquiescence and documented, broad-based Assembly support.

Safeguards for integrity and performance

1. Ethics and independence. An Independent Integrity Commissioner, elected by the General Assembly for a non-renewable term, receives the Secretary-General’s disclosures annually, audits procurement and appointments, and reports to the Assembly’s Fifth Committee. Whistle-blower protections are extended to all Secretariat staff with an appeal route outside the Secretariat.

   
   

2. Mid-term review. At year three or four, the Assembly convenes an open review: the Secretary-General presents a management scorecard against the published job description. The review cannot dismiss the office-holder, but it creates reputational incentives aligned with performance.

   
   

3. Censure and exceptional removal. A carefully drawn ladder of censure—Assembly warning; Assembly censure by two-thirds; and, in extremis, a joint Council recommendation for termination followed by Assembly decision—would require Charter amendment to become legally binding. As an interim step, the Assembly can adopt a non-binding “vote of grave concern” procedure, raising the political cost of misconduct.

Rotation, diversity and capability

Regional rotation is formalised as a presumption, not a straitjacket: when two finalists are within a narrow band on the panel’s published scoring, preference rotates to the region that has waited longest. Gender parity is given similar effect: in a near-tie, preference goes to the under-represented gender. Merit remains primary; rotation and parity operate only at the margin and are transparent to all.

Preserving consensus while diluting unilateral control

The Council keeps its recommending role and the legal veto. Consensus is preserved because any appointee must still be acceptable to the Council, yet unilateral control is diluted by three forces:

• The Assembly establishes an early, public shortlist with visible global support.

  
  

• The Council’s self-binding suspensive-veto code makes a lone veto politically burdensome.

  
  

• The requirement of a two-thirds Assembly appointment turns legitimacy from rhetoric into arithmetic.

No capital can easily impose its favourite, and none can easily block a broadly supported candidate without public justification.

Implementation without Charter amendment

1. General Assembly resolution on process (search panel, hearings, disclosures, indicative primary, two-thirds appointment pledge, campaign-finance rules).

   
   

2. Joint letter by the Presidents of the Assembly and the Council to invite nominations and codify calendars twelve months earlier than in past cycles.

   
   

3. Security Council presidential statement attaching the suspensive-veto code and the commitment to draw from the Assembly shortlist.

   
   

4. Voluntary P5 letters depositing national adherence to the code with the Secretary-General for public record.

These instruments can be adopted before the next selection cycle without touching the Charter.

The longer arc: what a Charter amendment could achieve

If political will ever matures, a narrow amendment to the UN Charter could hard-wire the best of these practices:

• Transform the Council’s role from a single-name “recommendation” to a shortlist “nomination,” on which the Assembly chooses by two-thirds.

  
  

• Convert the absolute veto into a suspensive veto for this one appointment, expiring if the Assembly re-affirms its preference by a supermajority after a cooling-off period.

  
  

• Codify the single, non-renewable term.

Even modest, targeted language would future-proof gains made through practice.

Risks and mitigations

• Non-compliance by a permanent member. Mitigated by making the code reputationally costly to breach: public explanations, timed re-votes, and the optics of spurning an Assembly supermajority.

  
  

• Fragmentation in the Assembly. Mitigated by ranked-choice balloting and a published scoring matrix that channels debate to capability rather than geopolitics.

  
  

• Tokenism in rotation and parity. Mitigated by publishing the panel’s scores and limiting rotation and parity to near-tie cases.

What success looks like

A Secretary-General chosen through this process would begin with three assets the office presently lacks: a published mandate tied to measurable competencies; an incontrovertible Assembly supermajority; and a Council that has either supported or, at minimum, abstained in deference to global preference. The office-holder’s independence is reinforced by a single term and an integrity regime outside the Secretariat’s control. Consensus is preserved, yet no single capital can quietly negate the world’s choice.

This is the practical route to restoring the moral authority of the United Nations without waiting on an unlikely Charter overhaul: change the incentives, publish the rules, and make the politics of the veto visible.