Can Trump negotiate peace for trade with China?

The forthcoming meeting between United States President Donald Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping in Seoul on 30 October 2025 has revived speculation that economic diplomacy might be harnessed to achieve broader geopolitical ends. Trump, always a transactional negotiator, is said to be considering a trade arrangement with China in which tariff relief and market access are offered in exchange for Beijing’s cooperation in bringing pressure upon Moscow to end hostilities in Ukraine. The proposal is unorthodox but strategically intriguing. It combines two of the world’s most intractable disputes—trade imbalance and the war in Ukraine—under the same diplomatic umbrella.

Strategic Context

The global backdrop is tense. Washington and Beijing remain locked in disputes over tariffs, technology exports and supply-chain security. The United States has threatened new 100 per cent tariffs on Chinese goods, while China continues to retaliate in kind. The world’s two largest economies are therefore approaching their next summit not as friends but as adversaries seeking temporary truce. Meanwhile the war in Ukraine has settled into a grinding stalemate. Western sanctions have isolated Russia from most global markets, yet Moscow continues to finance its war through partnerships with states such as China, Iran and North Korea. Beijing’s formal position remains neutral. Her 2023 “peace proposal” for Ukraine advocated respect for sovereignty but conspicuously avoided demanding Russian withdrawal from occupied territories. This ambiguity allows China to posture as a mediator while remaining Russia’s lifeline for trade and technology.

For Trump, the linkage between trade and Ukraine is self-evident. He regards leverage as fungible: economic concessions can yield geopolitical results. If China depends on access to the American market, then perhaps she can be induced to use her influence over Moscow to push for peace. It is a bold idea, but the balance of incentives is delicate.

The Logic of Linkage

The rationale for tying trade to diplomacy lies in mutual dependency. The United States holds powerful economic cards: tariffs, export controls and sanctions upon advanced microchips and technologies. China, for her part, possesses leverage over Russia. Since 2022, trade between Russia and China has expanded to record levels, providing Moscow with semiconductors, vehicles and alternative financial networks. Should Beijing choose to restrict this flow—even partially—it could inflict serious pressure upon Russia’s war economy. Thus, in principle, Trump might offer to reduce tariffs or ease restrictions in return for verifiable Chinese restraint on commerce with Russia or for a public Chinese commitment to urge peace negotiations.

Beijing’s Interests and Constraints

Yet China’s interests are complex. Economic stabilisation is attractive to Xi Jinping, who faces a slowing domestic economy and dwindling investor confidence. A partial trade détente with Washington would relieve stress on China’s export sector and improve international perceptions of her economic governance. Moreover Beijing seeks to appear as a responsible great power capable of mediating crises.

But these incentives confront profound constraints. The Sino-Russian partnership, strengthened since 2014, is founded upon shared resistance to what both perceive as Western hegemony. Russia provides energy security, military technology and a strategic counterweight to the United States. To pressure Moscow would be to risk undermining that partnership and to concede influence to Washington. China also prizes strategic autonomy: she cannot be seen to yield to American coercion. Any step interpreted domestically as bending to US demands could threaten Xi’s carefully cultivated image of national resilience. Hence Beijing’s willingness to pressure Russia will be modest, symbolic, or at best indirect.

The United States’ Leverage and Limitations

Washington’s leverage is real but not decisive. Trump can threaten tariffs and promise relief, yet his credibility is uncertain. China recalls how abruptly American trade policy shifted under previous administrations. Furthermore any promise by Trump to relax restrictions might encounter resistance from Congress or the national-security establishment, which views China as a systemic rival. The United States must therefore offer a package both sufficiently attractive and politically sustainable—no easy feat. And even if Beijing agreed to the principle of conditioning her support for Russia, she might interpret the commitment loosely. The complexity of verifying reductions in dual-use trade or military technology transfers would make enforcement problematic.

Possible Outcomes

Several outcomes are conceivable. The most probable is a limited trade accommodation—perhaps a suspension of new tariffs—in return for vague Chinese assurances about promoting peace. This would allow both leaders to claim success without altering the strategic landscape. A somewhat more ambitious outcome might involve modest Chinese steps, such as curbing exports of specific microchips or limiting financial transactions with sanctioned Russian banks. That could mildly constrain Russia’s war capacity but would not end the conflict. The least likely, though most consequential, scenario would see China decisively reduce her economic ties with Russia or use her diplomatic weight to force Moscow towards a settlement. Such a breakthrough would require unprecedented trust between Washington and Beijing and a willingness by Xi Jinping to redefine China’s alignment—a step few analysts believe likely.

The most plausible scenario remains the first: a modest trade deal coupled with token gestures regarding Russia. China’s deep strategic partnership with Moscow, her suspicion of US motives and the limited credibility of Trump’s commitments all militate against major concessions. Beijing’s peace rhetoric will continue, but it will not translate into coercive leverage upon the Kremlin. Trump may obtain limited trade relief and a symbolic diplomatic statement, but the war in Ukraine will not turn upon the outcome of his meeting with Xi Jinping.

Nevertheless should China apply even limited pressure, the humanitarian dividends could still be meaningful. A temporary de-escalation in Ukraine, reduced supply flows to Russia, or renewed diplomatic contact might all contribute to fewer civilian casualties and an opening for negotiation. Conversely a failed or purely transactional deal could breed cynicism, reducing the moral authority of peace diplomacy and reinforcing the impression that Ukraine’s fate is being traded for tariff concessions. The challenge lies in designing a linkage that aligns moral purpose with economic interest—a rarity in contemporary geopolitics.

Conclusion

Donald Trump’s ambition to intertwine trade diplomacy with war termination is an imaginative revival of classical Realpolitik. It seeks to convert economic pain into political gain, binding the world’s three most powerful states in a triangle of mutual restraint. Yet the structural impediments are formidable: China’s alliance with Russia, America’s domestic divisions, and Russia’s own determination to continue fighting. The Trump–Xi meeting may yield temporary relief from economic hostilities, but the guns of Ukraine are unlikely to fall silent as a consequence. The pursuit of peace through commerce remains a noble idea, but in this case it is more likely to generate headlines than history.