Yemen's Houthis and closure of the Bab el-Mandeb

Tuesday 31 March 2026

The missile launches by Yemen’s Houthi movement against Israel on 28–29 March 2026 marked not merely the widening of a regional war, but the re-emergence of a classical instrument of geopolitical coercion: the maritime choke point. At the centre of this unfolding drama lies the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a narrow corridor between Yemen and the Horn of Africa through which passes a significant proportion of global trade and energy flows. What had once been a peripheral theatre of asymmetric harassment now threatens to become a decisive front in the confrontation between Iran and her adversaries.

The Bab el-Mandeb as a strategic fulcrum

The Bab el-Mandeb is not merely another maritime passage; she is one of the world’s indispensable arteries of commerce. Approximately 12 per cent of global trade transits the strait, linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal. A disruption here does not simply delay shipments; it forces vessels to circumnavigate Africa, adding weeks to transit times and dramatically increasing costs.

Historically the strait’s vulnerability has lain in its geography. At its narrowest it is only some 32 kilometres wide, easily surveilled and within reach of shore-based missile systems, drones and fast attack craft. The Houthi movement, with Iranian support, has spent years refining precisely these anti-access capabilities — transforming Yemen’s coastline into a platform for maritime denial operations.

This is the context in which recent statements by Houthi officials must be understood. Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb has been explicitly identified as “amongst our options” in response to escalation by the United States and Israel. Iran, for her part, has signalled that the strait may become a secondary front should pressure on her intensify.

The mechanics of closure — and its plausibility

It is important to clarify what “closure” of the Bab el-Mandeb would mean in practice. Unlike a formal blockade enforced by a conventional navy, an Iranian proxy closure would likely take the form of persistent threat rather than absolute interdiction. Missile strikes, drone swarms and sporadic attacks on commercial vessels would raise insurance premiums to prohibitive levels and compel shipping companies to reroute voluntarily.

This model has precedent. Between 2023 and 2025 Houthi attacks on commercial vessels were sufficient to disrupt Red Sea traffic significantly, despite the presence of Western naval forces. Even limited strikes — including missile attacks on individual cargo ships — proved enough to alter global shipping patterns.

The present escalation raises the stakes considerably. With the Strait of Hormuz already under severe pressure or partial closure in the broader conflict, the simultaneous disruption of Bab el-Mandeb would create a dual chokepoint crisis — effectively severing the principal maritime corridor between Europe and Asia. Analysts have warned that such a scenario could “cripple trade towards Europe”.

In short, full physical closure is unnecessary. Perception of risk alone may suffice.

The capacity of the United States and Israel to prevent closure

The United States retains overwhelming naval superiority in conventional terms. Carrier strike groups, guided missile destroyers and maritime patrol aircraft provide her with the ability to escort shipping and strike Houthi launch sites. Israel, although more geographically constrained, possesses sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and missile defence capabilities.

Yet the record of recent years demonstrates the limits of such power against decentralised, land-based threats. Western operations in the Red Sea — including multinational escort missions — have mitigated but not eliminated Houthi attacks. The underlying problem is structural: it is far easier to launch a missile from a concealed coastal position than to guarantee the safety of every vessel across a vast maritime corridor.

Moreover the Houthis do not need to win a naval battle. They need only sustain a credible threat. Even a small number of successful strikes can trigger cascading economic decisions — insurers withdrawing coverage, shipping firms diverting routes, ports losing throughput.

There is also the question of escalation dominance. A sustained campaign to neutralise Houthi capabilities would require extensive strikes inside Yemen — risking civilian casualties, regional backlash and further entrenchment of Iranian influence. In a conflict already stretching from the Levant to the Gulf, the United States may find her capacity for decisive action constrained by political and logistical overextension.

Israel’s emerging relationships across the Bab el-Mandeb — including reported diplomatic and intelligence ties with Somaliland — may offer limited strategic depth, particularly in surveillance and early warning. However such partnerships cannot substitute for control of the Yemeni littoral, which remains firmly in Houthi hands.

The scale of potential economic shock

The economic implications of a Bab el-Mandeb closure are profound. The strait handles not only containerised goods but also a substantial share of global energy flows. When combined with disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, the result would be a systemic shock to both supply chains and energy markets.

Energy analysts have warned that a prolonged disruption could produce “the most severe oil disruption in history”. Even short-term interruptions would drive up freight costs, increase insurance premiums and generate volatility in commodity markets. Longer-term closure could lead to:

• Sharp increases in oil and gas prices, particularly in Europe

• Disruption of just-in-time manufacturing systems reliant on Suez transit

• Food supply instability in import-dependent regions

• Inflationary pressures across global economies

The rerouting of shipping around the Cape of Good Hope — already observed during earlier Red Sea disruptions such as the Suez Crisis in 1956 — adds not only time but also fuel costs and logistical complexity. The cumulative effect is not linear but multiplicative: delays in one sector propagate through entire supply chains.

Crucially the psychological dimension of markets amplifies the impact. The perception that two of the world’s principal maritime chokepoints — Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb — are simultaneously insecure may trigger capital flight, currency volatility, and a broader retreat from risk assets.

A knife-edge moment

The events of late March 2026 place the Bab el-Mandeb at the centre of a widening geopolitical contest. The Houthis, acting as an Iranian proxy, possess both the capability and the incentive to threaten the strait. The United States and Israel, despite their military superiority, face structural limitations in guaranteeing maritime security against asymmetric threats.

What emerges is a precarious equilibrium. Full closure of the Bab el-Mandeb is not inevitable — but nor is it improbable. Much will depend on the trajectory of the wider conflict with Iran, and on whether escalation reaches a threshold at which Tehran judges the economic leverage of maritime disruption to outweigh the risks of further confrontation.

For the global economy, the stakes are stark. The Bab el-Mandeb is no longer a peripheral concern; it is a potential fault line upon which the stability of global trade itself may hinge.