World War III? Assessing the Prospects of Geopolitical Escalation Among the Major Powers

For decades following the end of the Second World War, the notion of a “World War III” remained a spectral threat—conjured in nuclear nightmares and Cold War scenarios but never materialising. Yet in the third decade of the twenty-first century, the phrase is once again entering public discourse, not as hyperbole but as a legitimate subject of geopolitical analysis. The convergence of high-intensity regional conflicts, sharpening great power competition, and the erosion of arms control regimes has revived the possibility of a systemic global confrontation.

Here we consider whether the current trajectory of international relations amongst major powers—most notably the United States, China, Russia and, to a lesser extent, Iran and North Korea—might plausibly lead to a new world war. We examine the structural conditions, potential flashpoints, escalation dynamics, and the restraining factors that may determine whether such a conflict remains theoretical or becomes tragically real.

Structural Conditions: A Return to Multipolar Competition

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has moved from unipolarity, dominated by the United States, to a more complex multipolar order. China has risen as a near-peer competitor economically and militarily; Russia, although economically diminished, asserts herself militarily and ideologically; and a constellation of regional powers has consequently grown more assertive, often with revisionist agendas.

This distribution of power resembles the pre-1914 or pre-1939 systems of international relations: multiple actors with conflicting interests, lacking effective conflict resolution mechanisms, and operating within a deteriorating normative framework. The United Nations Security Council is increasingly paralysed. International treaties on nuclear arms, such as New START, have either expired or are under strain. The rules-based international order is no longer universally respected.

In this context, the prospect of great-power confrontation no longer seems remote. There is no longer a single global arbiter, and regional conflicts risk cascading into broader wars as alliances are tested and red lines are crossed.

Flashpoints and Escalation Paths

There are currently three major theatres where localised conflict could plausibly escalate into wider war:

1. Eastern Europe (Russia–NATO)

The war in Ukraine has brought NATO and Russia into indirect but existential confrontation. Should Russia escalate with unconventional weapons, or if a NATO member state suffers a direct attack—by missile, drone, or sabotage—the alliance’s Article 5 obligations could trigger a dramatic response. Belarus, the Suwałki Gap (the thin slince of territory between Poland and Lithuania that borders Russian ally Belarus), and the Black Sea are all potential escalatory vectors.

2. East Asia (China–Taiwan–US)

China’s declared intention to reunify with Taiwan, by force if necessary, remains the most obvious scenario for a US–China war. A Chinese invasion would likely draw in the United States, Japan, and possibly Australia. Cyber warfare, space and naval dimensions of such a conflict could rapidly expand beyond the Taiwan Strait.

3. The Middle East (Iran–Israel–US axis)

The convergence of Israeli pre-emption, Iranian nuclear advancement, and proxy warfare across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen creates a powder keg. A regional war involving Iran, Israel, Hezbollah, and US assets could draw in Russian or Chinese interests and lead to an attempt at global realignment in the Middle East.

Other potential flashpoints include North Korea’s nuclear provocations; border tensions between India and China; or the fracturing of fragile states with great-power patronage (e.g. Syria, Libya or Sudan).

The Logic of Escalation

While none of these conflicts must escalate into global war, the risks lie in miscalculation, entrapment, and non-linear escalation. In a fragmented media and intelligence environment, the fog of war descends more quickly. Cyberattacks, for instance, may be misattributed and provoke disproportionate retaliation. Autonomous weapon systems may act unpredictably. Political leaders may face domestic pressure to appear strong and refuse diplomatic off-ramps.

In multipolar conflicts, alliances increase the danger of chain reactions. A regional war between NATO and Russia could see China or Iran adopt opportunistic postures elsewhere. Conversely a US–China war over Taiwan might embolden Russia to act more aggressively in Europe. The simultaneity of pressure across regions could strain Western capacity and push events toward systemic conflict.

Constraints and Deterrents

Despite the risks, several important factors still inhibit the onset of a full-scale world war.

1. Nuclear Deterrence

The logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) remains intact. All major powers understand that direct war among nuclear-armed states could destroy civilisation. The threshold for nuclear use remains high, and strategic restraint has so far prevailed—even in Ukraine, where Russian escalation threats have not yet translated into tactical nuclear use.

2. Economic Interdependence

Globalisation has produced unprecedented economic entanglement. China depends on Western markets and technology; Russia, although decoupling, still needs export income; the US would face supply chain collapse in a decoupled world. A world war would devastate global trade and financial systems.

3. Domestic Costs

Major war requires domestic mobilisation. In most democracies—and even in some autocracies—public opinion remains deeply resistant to prolonged military entanglement. The unpopularity of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars still weighs heavily on American strategic thinking.

4. Strategic Ambiguity and Backchannels

Despite rhetorical brinkmanship, channels for communication and deconfliction persist. US–China military talks, NATO–Russia hotlines, and UN backchannels help to prevent accidents from becoming wars.

A “Grey Zone” World War?

One plausible counterargument is that World War III has already begun, not in traditional military terms but as a global competition in the grey zone: cyber warfare, information operations, economic coercion, sabotage and proxy conflict. In this view, the world is already engaged in diffuse, hybrid struggle, where traditional concepts of war and peace are no longer applicable.

Russian disinformation campaigns, Chinese cyber-espionage, Iranian drone exports and Western sanctions form part of a complex, persistent confrontation that spans the globe. It is slower, more ambiguous, but no less consequential.

This raises the question of whether “world war” must always mean armies crossing borders. If critical infrastructure is paralysed, economies crippled, and democratic societies destabilised, then the absence of open warfare may not mean the absence of war itself.

A Dangerous but Not Inevitable Future

The possibility of a Third World War, in either its conventional or hybrid form, cannot be dismissed in the current strategic environment. The conditions that historically led to world wars—multipolarity, arms races, ideological rivalry and systemic shocks—are once again present. Yet humanity’s capacity for self-destruction has also never been greater, which imposes powerful constraints.

Avoiding world war will require more than caution. It demands renewed diplomacy, stronger international institutions, crisis management architecture, and a shared recognition that in the nuclear age there are no true victors in global conflict.

The future remains uncertain. But history teaches that wars are rarely sought—they are drifted into. The danger is not that someone wants a world war, but that through miscalculation, pride or delay, the world may stumble into one. Only vigilance, restraint, and leadership can keep that possibility from becoming a reality.