Witkoff's sixth visit to Moscow

The apparent imminence of a sixth visit by Trump's envoy Steven Witkoff to Moscow invites cautious analysis. Such repeated journeys, undertaken by a figure who has become an unlikely intermediary between Washington and the Kremlin, raise questions about intent, capability, and the sheer limits of personal diplomacy at a moment when the war in Ukraine has entered its most attritional and ideologically entrenched phase. This is not classical shuttle diplomacy conducted by a seasoned envoy on behalf of a sitting administration. Rather it is an irregular line of communication, shaped by personal networks, a shifting political landscape in the United States, and Moscow’s persistent search for channels through which to influence Western policy. Because of these structural constraints, expectations of what might realistically be achieved must remain modest.

To begin with it is important to situate Witkoff’s role within the broader context of United States domestic politics. He operates without formal diplomatic authority. His apparent proximity to the US President and his circle grants him utility to Moscow, not as a deal-maker but as a barometer of political possibility. The Kremlin understands that the United States is approaching another polarised election cycle, and it is probing whether the US President supervised by a future Congressional formation might be more receptive to a ceasefire or a negotiated settlement that entrenches Russian territorial gains. Witkoff’s visits are therefore likely to be treated by Moscow as exploratory conversations designed to test assumptions about American political currents rather than substantive negotiations.

Therefore the first realistic outcome of a sixth trip is informational rather than diplomatic. He may convey to Moscow a clearer sense of the views that prevail within parts of the Republican Party, particularly the faction that advocates a more isolationist foreign policy. In return he may return with a more granular appreciation of what Russia claims it might accept under a future deal. Yet these mutual briefings do not constitute progress towards peace; they simply reduce informational asymmetry between political actors whose formal engagement remains suspended.

A second, more limited hope concerns the management of escalation risks. Although the conflict in Ukraine has become entrenched, channels that allow misperceptions to be corrected and intentions to be clarified hold genuine value. Private envoys can, at the very margins, lower the temperature by conveying warnings or limits which states are unwilling to articulate publicly. For example messages about the consequences should Russia intensify attacks on critical Ukrainian infrastructure, or about the risks of nuclear sabre-rattling, can be transmitted through such informal intermediaries and thereby reduce the likelihood of catastrophic miscalculation. Realistically any such achievement would be invisible by design and would not amount to a diplomatic breakthrough, yet it might help stabilise an otherwise febrile environment.

A third area in which a small degree of movement is conceivable lies in humanitarian matters. Historically, even at moments of high tension adversarial powers have used unofficial channels to explore narrowly defined humanitarian exchanges. These might involve prisoner swaps, the return of civilian detainees, or the facilitation of independent access to certain occupied territories for humanitarian agencies. Moscow may view Witkoff’s visits as an opportunity to float limited gestures that generate political credit without undermining its military posture. Kyiv, however, has understandable reasons to treat any such overtures with suspicion, and the United States does not have the authority to negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf. Hence the scope for concrete humanitarian outcomes remains tightly circumscribed.

The largest limitation upon any realistic achievement stems from the strategic positions of the principal actors. Russia seeks security guarantees and territorial concessions which Ukraine cannot accept without imperilling her sovereignty. Ukraine insists upon the restoration of her borders and the withdrawal of Russian forces. The United States and her European partners remain committed to Ukraine’s defence while maintaining sanctions on Russia that will not be lifted without substantial concessions. No unofficial envoy can bridge gaps of this magnitude. Even if Witkoff were to return with creative proposals or Moscow’s hints of flexibility, it would not shift the hardened positions of states whose interests are defined by war aims, alliance politics, and domestic legitimacy.

Moreover Moscow has a long tradition of using unofficial visitors to signal divisions within Western societies. A sixth visit may hold propaganda value. Russian officials may present it as evidence that influential Americans are quietly receptive to Russia’s narratives, even if the visitor carries no mandate. This signalling effect may suit Russia’s information strategy, but it produces no diplomatic deliverable and risks misleading audiences about the prospect of an imminent settlement.

Lastly, the war’s current dynamics matter. Russia believes she has strategic momentum; Ukraine is fighting for survival amidst significant casualties and infrastructure destruction. Neither side perceives itself as sufficiently vulnerable to compel negotiations, nor sufficiently dominant to dictate terms. Under such conditions, informal diplomacy can prepare ground for future talks, but it cannot itself generate the moment at which talks become possible.

The realistic expectations for Witkoff’s sixth visit are therefore modest. At best he may contribute to the maintenance of minimal communication between two nuclear powers, reduce the scope for miscalculation, and gather political insights of interest to Washington’s future decision-makers. He might explore the outer edges of humanitarian gestures, although without authority to conclude any. What he cannot achieve is a breakthrough in the war itself or a substantive recalibration of Russian policy. Personal diplomacy of this sort functions on the margins of great-power conflict. It can illuminate, clarify or stabilise, but it cannot resolve. The hard work of peace, when it eventually comes within reach, will be the task of governments, not private intermediaries.