Who Controls Ukraine Policy After the Midterms?

By Maryyum Masood
Monday 16 November 2026
On Nov 10, Russian, Ukrainian, and US delegations sat down in Abu Dhabi for the first US-mediated talks on the war in nine months, a week after Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner led the American side. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the process has a ways to go. The election changes the incentives of every party at that table before it changes a single law. The new Congress does not convene until January 3, 2027. Until then, Trump keeps the executive powers that matter most, and he has used them. According to AFP, he has halted direct military aid to Ukraine, and in October he waived the sanctions Congress passed against Russia’s energy trade. A senior European official told AFP to expect two difficult months until lawmakers take their seats.
This piece argues that the midterms give Ukraine a floor under US support but no new policy. The decisions that matter most come before January, and they belong to the White House, a lame-duck Congress, and Kyiv.
Congress and the Money
American support has shrunk to a fraction of its peak. From October 2025 to March, Kyiv received $8.2 billion in military aid, all of it through Biden-era pipelines. Europe provided $83 billion in 2025, though the Kiel Institute estimates that almost a third of Ukraine’s weapons still come from US companies.
Democrats are preparing to change that. The Financial Times reported on Nov. 7 that they are drafting a package of up to $15 billion and changes to Russia sanctions law. Brian Taylor of Syracuse University told AFP he expects Democrats to attach assistance to must-pass legislation, which would put the United States back into the picture as a supplier.
The sanctions law is the more immediate fight. Trump signed the Graham Act on Sept. 18. It authorized tariffs of up to 100 percent on the largest buyers of Russian oil and gas. After a diesel deal with Putin as fuel prices rose, he used the law’s national-interest clause on Oct. 16, two days before the first tariffs were due, to waive most of its sanctions and duties. Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer said the waiver was giving the Russian economy life support. From January, a Democratic House can put questions about it to the administration under subpoena.
Some limits are physical. Yuriy Boyechko of Hope for Ukraine told Newsweek that new aid would not end the shortage of Patriot interceptors, because Congress cannot manufacture weapons. Some are political. The wave unseated Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, co-chair of the Congressional Ukraine Caucus, and other Republicans who backed Kyiv. Ukraine also has no ambassador in Washington, after Olha Stefanishyna was dismissed in August during a probe into alleged illegal enrichment.
Trump’s Window
Abu Dhabi shows what Trump might try to close before the new Congress arrives. A US official said both sides had privately shown some flexibility on an exchange of territory and that security guarantees would be central, including a possible commitment modeled on Article 5 of the NATO treaty. The gap is wide. Ukraine wants Russia pushed back to the pre-invasion border, and Putin wants all of the Donbas. Zelenskyy called the first day constructive and said it dealt mostly with humanitarian issues, such as prisoner exchanges and children taken from Ukraine.
Trump has reasons to move fast. Liana Fix of the Council on Foreign Relations wrote that he may try to end the war on terms unfavorable to Ukraine. The Kyiv analyst Igar Tyshkevych said the quickest route to a truce, when Russia will not concede, is to twist Kyiv’s arm. Some pro-Kremlin commentators cited by the Jamestown Foundation urge Russia to use the weeks before Jan. 3.
The case that Trump lacks leverage is also strong. Carrie Lee of the German Marshall Fund told AFP that Putin is uninterested in negotiating because he expects a better deal after a major offensive, and that Ukraine is uninterested because it expects one from the new Congress.
How Moscow, Kyiv, and Europe Read the Result
Moscow’s official line is calm. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia hopes Trump will continue his peacemaking efforts, and the Foreign Ministry said Moscow’s policies do not depend on fluctuations in other countries’ politics. Commentators are less relaxed. Andrey Kortunov wrote in Kommersant that Democrats will demand a return to direct military aid and propose new sanctions on Russia and its main trading partners.
Kyiv sees an opening. Zelenskyy told ZDF that Democrats speak clearly about supporting Ukraine and that strong congressional support would influence Putin. Volodymyr Fesenko of the think tank Penta said Ukraine’s position may become stronger, but only if bipartisan support holds.
Europeans are divided. Kaja Kallas hopes the new Congress will press Russia harder. Chancellor Friedrich Merz asked why Trump, who has largely governed by bypassing Congress, would behave differently now.
What the Midterms Do Not Change
The first limit is the veto. Congress needs a two-thirds majority to override Trump, which is hard to reach. The Graham Act passed the Senate 86 to 11, but the House vote of 262 to 159 was about 62 percent of those voting, short of two-thirds by my arithmetic. The Senate’s negotiated text also included the waiver authority Trump used, so closing that gap requires new legislation he would have to sign.
The second limit is the cause of the Republican losses. Hromadske quoted the historian Allan Lichtman saying the Iran war had eclipsed Ukraine as a voting issue. Higher fuel prices from that war produced the diesel deal and the sanctions waiver. If Trump escalates against Iran again, the pressure to ease Russian energy sanctions returns, whoever chairs the committees.
The third is that Democratic support has conditions. Democrats have said they will subpoena executive branch records, including on Ukraine. Fesenko warned that an impeachment centered on Ukraine would hurt Kyiv, because the 2019 episode left Trump with a lasting negative attitude toward the country.
What Should Happen Before January
First, Congress should move a bridge package during the lame-duck session. According to the Financial Times, Democrats are looking for ways to provide immediate support before the new Congress takes office, starting with protection for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of winter. The Graham Act’s passage by wide bipartisan margins suggests Republicans who backed it have reason to support funding that enforces its purpose. The package should include reporting requirements on delivery dates for air-defense interceptors, since the Pentagon has already held back authorized aid once.
Second, Congress should narrow the sanctions waiver. The October order says the waivers remain in place until Trump or the secretary of state decides further action is warranted, which leaves no end date. A requirement that the administration certify and report every 30 days, together with the stricter standard House Democrats proposed in September, would turn an open-ended exemption into a decision the administration must keep defending.
Third, the White House should spend the window on terms that survive a change in Congress. A US official said territory would be settled last. The earlier items on the agenda, such as an energy and maritime pause, prisoner exchanges, and the return of Ukrainian children, are humanitarian measures that both sides can accept without conceding land. A security guarantee modeled on Article 5 would need the same durability. It will last longer if senators of both parties see the text before it is signed than if they first read it in a news story.
Fourth, Kyiv should appoint an ambassador to Washington, build ties with both parties, and avoid concessions made only to beat a deadline. Fesenko’s advice is to protect bipartisan support, and the loss of Republican friends such as Fitzpatrick and Bacon makes that harder. Europe should keep a presence around the talks even though Russia has refused it a seat. Its envoys already meet the Ukrainians and Americans before each session, and that channel is how European positions on security arrangements reach the table.
Who controls Ukraine policy after the midterms? Until January 3, 2027 the answer is the White House. After that, policy will be set by a president and a Congress that disagree about Russia, and the first test will be what happens to the Graham Act waiver. The next two months decide how much of Ukraine’s position is settled before that disagreement begins.
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Maryyum Masood is Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad.




