Wars Are Unpredictable: From Elizabethan Counsel to Ukraine

Few maxims of statecraft have proved so enduring as the observation that wars are unpredictable. The phrase is often attributed to Queen Elizabeth I, who is reputed to have replied to advisers urging her to strike against Scotland that once begun, war may take directions no one can foresee. In her caution lies the recognition that conflict is the most uncertain of human enterprises, and that even the most careful planning is quickly undone by the vagaries of chance, morale, weather, leadership, and unforeseen alliances.

Elizabethan Origins

In Elizabeth’s time, England was fragile: religious divisions ran deep, finances were strained, and enemies abroad were formidable. Her instinct to resist entanglement unless unavoidable reflected a prudence about war’s capacity to spiral beyond its initiator’s control. She had seen it in her father’s reckless French campaigns and in Mary Tudor’s costly involvement in continental battles. To call war unpredictable was both a warning and a defence: counsel rooted in bitter lessons from her dynasty’s own past.

Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Resonances

As Europe industrialised and militarised, the same lesson echoed. In 1870, Bismarck launched a limited war with France, expecting swift success; instead, it set in motion decades of enmity culminating in two world wars. The First World War is perhaps the clearest testimony to unpredictability: what leaders thought would be a short summer campaign became a four-year continental cataclysm that destroyed empires and redrew maps.

The Second World War, too, defied expectations. Hitler’s assault on the Soviet Union was meant to be decisive within months, yet it consumed the Wehrmacht in years of attrition. Japan’s strike on Pearl Harbor, intended to secure strategic freedom, instead awakened American industrial might and ensured her defeat. Leaders discovered again and again that once war begins, events escape calculation.

The Cold War and Beyond

During the Cold War, unpredictability shaped the doctrines of deterrence. Both superpowers avoided direct confrontation precisely because neither could forecast escalation once fighting began. Yet wars at the periphery—in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan—spiralled in ways their instigators never anticipated, costing treasure and legitimacy while yielding few gains.

The United States’ experience in Vietnam illustrates the irony of unpredictability: what began as a limited intervention to contain communism became a decade-long war, undermining American confidence at home and prestige abroad. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was likewise intended to prop up a friendly regime, but it instead drained Moscow’s resources and hastened the collapse of the Soviet state itself.

Modern Case Studies of Irony and Miscalculation

• The US-led invasion of Iraq (2003): Planned as a swift campaign to topple Saddam Hussein and stabilise the Middle East, it instead created a power vacuum that fuelled sectarian conflict, gave rise to insurgencies, and eventually nurtured the conditions in which the so-called Islamic State thrived.

  
  

• NATO in Libya (2011): The intervention, initially framed as a humanitarian mission to protect civilians, escalated into regime change. The overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi destabilised Libya, scattering weapons across the Sahel and worsening insecurity across North Africa.

  
  

• Russia in Georgia (2008): Intended as a demonstration of strength, the brief war deepened mistrust of Moscow and gave impetus to NATO’s renewed focus on collective defence. The long-term consequence was opposite to Russia’s aim of limiting Western influence in her near abroad.

These examples reinforce the Elizabethan warning: wars rarely deliver the ends their authors expect, and often unleash consequences antithetical to their original objectives.

Ukraine’s Extraordinary Reversals

The ongoing war in Ukraine offers the most recent reminder. Russia’s invasion of 2022 was premised on assumptions of rapid conquest; instead, Kyiv stood firm, Russian forces faltered, and international sanctions cut deep. Over the following three and a half years the conflict has veered repeatedly: dramatic Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson; grinding attrition in the Donbas; waves of missile attacks on cities; and, most recently, a renewed shift as Western arms flow to Ukraine, Russian mobilisation difficulties, and unexpected Ukrainian technological innovations—particularly in drones—have once more changed the tide.

The unpredictability lies not only on the battlefield but also in politics: NATO, once accused of decline, has enlarged and re-energised; European publics, initially doubtful, have endured energy shocks in solidarity; Russia, thought to wield unshakeable financial reserves, now faces systemic fiscal and macroeconomic strain. Neither Moscow nor Kyiv could have foreseen the exact course of these events, and Western leaders themselves have constantly recalibrated expectations.

Why Wars Defy Prediction

The enduring unpredictability of war arises from several causes.

• Friction and chance: as Clausewitz observed, even simple plans are disrupted by weather, morale, and individual initiative.

  
  

• Escalation dynamics: what begins as a local war often attracts allies and external patrons.

  
  

• Technology’s surprises: from tanks to drones, innovations alter balances of power more swiftly than strategy can adapt.

  
  

• Human will: leaders’ misjudgements and peoples’ resilience remain incalculable.

Ukraine, NATO and Today’s Strategic Debate

The relevance of Elizabeth’s warning is clear in today’s Western capitals. Only two years ago, serious voices questioned whether Ukraine could hold Kyiv at all; now NATO planners debate how far Ukraine can push Russian forces back. Similarly, Western governments who imagined sanctions would cripple Russia within months must now reckon with a long war economy, buttressed by shadow fleets and Asian markets.

The unpredictability is not only military but political: in Washington, President Trump has shifted from suggestions of Ukrainian concessions to calls for Ukraine to recover all her territory, subject to conditions on European energy imports. In Brussels, EU states once split over sanctions are gradually converging, although still struggling with unanimity rules. In Berlin and Warsaw, military doctrines are rewritten almost yearly in light of the war’s unforeseen demands.

The lesson is sobering. If Ukraine’s resilience has exceeded expectations, so too might Russia’s capacity to adapt. Western policy must therefore remain flexible, avoiding both premature despair and overconfident triumphalism. Wars are unpredictable: that is the only certainty.

Conclusion

Elizabeth I’s maxim remains wise counsel. Wars rarely go as their instigators intend. They grow, stall, rebound, and transform political orders. From Bismarck’s Franco-Prussian gamble to the Somme, from the Ardennes to Iraq and Libya, and now in Ukraine, history confirms the point.

The present conflict on Europe’s eastern frontier illustrates both the danger and the possibility within this unpredictability: Russia’s gamble has faltered, while Ukraine’s resilience has yielded chances few predicted. For Western statesmen, the lesson is constant. Prudence demands that war, once embarked upon, will carry nations down paths no adviser, however learned, can foresee—and that only by building unity and adaptability can democracies weather the storms of uncertainty.