War Cabinets and Emergency Powers: Rethinking Ukrainian Governance Under Fire

The war against Russian aggression has forced Ukraine to reinvent many of her governing institutions at speed, often under extreme duress. The challenge of defending a democratic nation while managing the logistics of total war has led to unprecedented centralisation of authority, swift institutional reform, and the evolution of new mechanisms for accountability and control. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s leadership has been central to this transformation. Widely admired both at home and abroad for his courage and communication, he has steered the country through the gravest of storms while maintaining the foundations of a free society.

Yet as Ukraine’s war continues into its fourth year, and with no immediate resolution on the horizon, a quiet but important conversation has begun: how should emergency governance evolve in wartime Ukraine, and what should be preserved, adapted or relinquished in the name of democracy and integrity? This is not a critique of the wartime presidency, which by necessity has acted decisively and often effectively. Rather it is an invitation to consider how best to balance concentrated executive power with institutional resilience, especially when the stakes are existential.

Presidential Leadership and the Centralisation of State Power

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine rapidly consolidated power within the executive. The President’s Office became the fulcrum of all major decision-making: military strategy, economic policy, international diplomacy and domestic governance. In practice, this has meant that President Zelenskyy and a tight circle of advisers assumed control over most state functions, working closely with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the head of the Security Service of Ukraine.

The rationale was clear: unity, speed, and coherence were essential. Parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) has continued to meet, but in a vastly reduced legislative role, primarily endorsing presidential decrees and emergency measures. The judiciary has operated under martial law restrictions. Local authorities and civil society have continued to function but often deferred to Kyiv in operational matters of defence and security. These emergency powers have been renewed repeatedly, with parliamentary approval, since the start of the war.

Institutional Integrity in Wartime

What is remarkable is how this centralisation has often been accompanied by real strides in state integrity. The Zelenskyy administration has removed scores of senior officials implicated in corruption, both under media scrutiny and via internal controls. One of the principal pre-war Ukrainian oligarchs, Ihor Kolomoisky, previous close to the president, was arrested in September 2023 and remains in custody on money laundering and other charges, and under a US Government extradition request. The president has maintained a clear message of reform and transparency even during martial law—a notable departure from previous wartime governance models in post-Soviet or even Western history.

Anti-corruption bodies such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) have remained active. Public procurement systems have been adapted to war conditions but not entirely suspended. Investigative journalists, while operating under limitations, have continued to break stories about irregularities—many of which have been followed up by action from law enforcement. Such developments underscore the government’s commitment to accountability, even in wartime.

The Case for Institutional Balance

Nevertheless, centralisation carries long-term risks. War creates an imperative for control, but that control must be reversible, lest it become entrenched. The challenge is not Zelenskyy’s leadership per se—which remains widely trusted—but the structural realities of how power is used and might be passed on. Should the war last for years, or should another crisis emerge, the risk is that temporary concentration of power becomes a precedent.

To prevent this, Ukraine may benefit from gradually rethinking the structure and scope of her war cabinet. One possibility would be to formalise the role of a National Security Council with clearer legal mandates, fixed term appointments, and oversight mechanisms. Another would be to empower a special parliamentary committee on wartime governance, composed of representatives from across the political spectrum and civil society, tasked with reviewing executive decisions and proposing legal reforms for the transition to post-war government.

Planning for Transition

At some stage, Ukraine will need to transition from wartime emergency governance to a peacetime constitutional order. The contours of that transition—how fast, through what mechanisms, with what safeguards—should be part of the national conversation now. Planning ahead is not a sign of division; it is a mark of state maturity. It is also a form of resilience, ensuring that democracy survives not just because of individuals, but through institutions.

Ukraine’s wartime governance has been far more accountable and transparent than many would have predicted. This is to the credit of the President, his advisers, and a wide range of public servants. But as martial law enters its third year, the country must look ahead. The continuation of emergency powers should be accompanied by a framework for eventual rollback and institutional recalibration. It is not a question of diminishing the presidency, but of reinforcing the republic.

The road ahead

The survival and flourishing of Ukraine’s democratic institutions during the greatest trial in her modern history is already a significant achievement. The task now is to ensure that the balance of power, the rule of law and public trust are not just sustained, but strengthened. War has shown Ukraine what she is capable of under pressure. Peace, when it comes, will ask even more of her. A successful transition from emergency powers to democratic consolidation will be one of the defining legacies of this war—and of President Zelenskyy’s leadership.

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Institutional Roadmap: From Emergency Powers to Resilient Governance in Ukraine

I. Guiding Principles

1. Legitimacy through Law: All wartime and post-war transitions must be rooted in the Ukrainian Constitution and parliamentary process, even if temporary amendments are required.

2. Continuity of Government: Emergency governance should gradually transition, not abruptly dissolve, to avoid vacuums or political instability.

3. Trust through Transparency: Strengthening public communication, independent oversight, and anti-corruption mechanisms is key to institutional trust.

4. Inclusivity: Civil society, political opposition, and local governments must be part of the reform process, not merely observers.

II. Phase One: Institutional Safeguards During Wartime (0–12 Months)

Objective: Reinforce checks within the emergency framework without undermining executive authority during conflict.

Measure	Responsible Institution	Timeline	Notes
Establish an independent War Governance Oversight Commission, under parliamentary authority	Verkhovna Rada	Immediate	Comprised of MPs, civil society, legal scholars
Mandate quarterly reporting by the President’s Office on key wartime decisions (classified summary)	President’s Office	Quarterly	Subject to internal parliamentary committee review
Expand the mandate of the Accounting Chamber and Anti-Corruption Court to include emergency procurement auditing	Verkhovna Rada, NABU, HACC	6 months	New emergency audit procedures and whistleblower protections

III. Phase Two: Transition Architecture (12–24 Months)

Objective: Design and implement a transition plan from martial law to constitutional normalcy.

Measure	Responsible Institution	Timeline	Notes
Appoint a Special Constitutional Commission on Transition Governance	President + Parliament	12 months	Modelled on Croatia’s 1990s transition structures
Draft a “Wartime Governance Exit Framework” including step-by-step rollback of emergency decrees	Constitutional Commission	18 months	Prioritise judiciary independence, electoral functions
Pilot a hybrid defence-civil coordination council in 3 liberated oblasts	Cabinet of Ministers	12–24 months	Local governors, civil society, military liaison officials

IV. Phase Three: Post-War Consolidation and Reforms (24–36 Months)

Objective: Normalise the constitutional order, integrate reforms into national law, and decentralise power to rebuild trust and resilience.

Measure	Responsible Institution	Timeline	Notes
Lift martial law and restore full parliamentary and judicial powers	Verkhovna Rada + President	30 months or post-armistice	Conditional upon stabilisation of front and rear
Introduce a “War Accountability and Integrity Act”	Verkhovna Rada	30–36 months	Codifies lessons learned, preserves temporary reforms that worked
Launch a national consultative process on post-war constitutional reforms	Civil society-led, with government facilitation	Ongoing	Broad inclusion, especially from liberated territories

V. Long-Term Measures for Democratic Resilience (Beyond 36 Months)

• Constitutional amendment to define emergency powers and time limits more clearly

• Codification of transparent wartime procurement and logistics chains

• Institutionalisation of war veterans’ rights and participatory governance mechanisms

• Strengthening local government autonomy in liberated and front-line territories

VI. Conclusion

Ukraine’s extraordinary resilience under fire has preserved not just her sovereignty but the foundations of her democratic order. As the war evolves, so must the state. This roadmap offers a pathway from extraordinary measures to enduring governance, from war to law, and from crisis to constitutional maturity.