Venezuela's rare earth elements

Friday 6 February 2026

In the evolving geometry of contemporary geopolitics, Venezuela has once again re-entered Washington’s strategic field of vision with its removal from office of the Venezuelan President by force. While hydrocarbons remain central to this renewed attention, there is increasing discussion of the country’s endowment of rare earth elements and associated critical minerals, and of the extent to which these resources may be shaping American calculations. The issue invites two related enquiries: whether Venezuela’s mineral potential is materially influencing Washington’s geopolitical posture, and whether large-scale extraction of rare earth elements sufficient to meet the needs of the United States and her allies is, in economic terms, a plausible undertaking.

Venezuela’s resource wealth has long been central to her international significance. Beyond oil the geological formations of southern Venezuela, particularly those associated with the Guiana Shield, are known to contain deposits of coltan, rare earth-bearing minerals, nickel and other strategically valuable resources. During the presidency of Hugo Chávez, coltan was publicly elevated to the status of a national strategic asset, emblematic of a broader ambition to diversify the country’s extractive economy beyond hydrocarbons. This ambition was formalised in the creation of the Orinoco Mining Arc in 2016, an immense zone intended to unlock mineral wealth and alleviate chronic fiscal pressures.

In practice however these plans have delivered little in the way of sustainable or formalised mineral development. Weak institutions, the erosion of regulatory capacity, and the proliferation of informal and often violent mining economies have meant that Venezuela’s mineral sector remains under-developed and poorly documented. The country’s rare earth potential, while frequently invoked, has not been substantiated by the sort of comprehensive, transparent geological surveys that underpin commercial development elsewhere.

Against this backdrop, rare earth elements have assumed heightened strategic importance in Washington. These materials are indispensable to a wide range of advanced technologies, from renewable energy systems to sophisticated weapons platforms. Global supply chains however are heavily concentrated, with processing capacity in particular dominated by China. This concentration has come to be viewed in Washington as a strategic vulnerability, especially in light of Beijing’s demonstrated willingness to deploy trade and export controls as instruments of state power.

It is within this strategic frame that Venezuela’s mineral resources have acquired renewed salience. Recent diplomatic signals and limited commercial re-engagement between Washington and Caracas have prompted speculation that access to critical minerals may complement more familiar energy considerations. From an American perspective, any opportunity to diversify sources of strategically sensitive materials aligns with a broader effort to reduce dependence on a single dominant supplier and to strengthen supply chain resilience amongst allies.

Yet there is a risk that geopolitical narratives are running ahead of geological and economic realities. Venezuela does not currently feature prominently in authoritative global assessments of rare earth reserves. While occurrences of rare earth-bearing minerals are known to exist, their scale, grade and commercial viability remain uncertain. Unlike in jurisdictions such as Australia or Brazil, where deposits have been extensively characterised and integrated into global markets, Venezuela’s rare earth potential is still largely conjectural.

The economic hurdles to meaningful development are formidable. Rare earth extraction is capital-intensive and technologically demanding, and profitability depends as much on processing capacity as on mining itself. It is processing, rather than extraction, that has historically represented the critical choke-point in the global rare earth industry. Venezuela presently lacks the industrial infrastructure, skilled workforce and regulatory environment required to support such operations at scale.

More broadly, the country’s economic condition presents a structural impediment. Years of crisis have degraded transport, energy supply and basic services, all of which are prerequisites for large-scale mining. The prevalence of illegal mining and armed groups in mineral-rich regions further undermines investor confidence. Even assuming the identification of commercially attractive deposits, the scale of investment required to bring Venezuelan rare earths into competitive global production would be measured in billions of dollars, with long lead times and significant political risk.

Environmental considerations add an additional layer of complexity. Rare earth processing is environmentally intrusive, and advanced economies are increasingly sensitive to the ecological costs embedded in their supply chains. Establishing a Venezuelan rare earth industry that meets the environmental and regulatory expectations of Western markets would substantially increase costs and further challenge economic viability.

Taken together, these factors suggest that Venezuela’s rare earth elements are best understood as a secondary, rather than primary, driver of Washington’s renewed interest. They complement, but do not displace, more immediate concerns relating to energy security, regional stability and great-power competition. While Venezuela’s mineral endowment enhances her strategic profile, the prospect of her emerging in the near term as a major supplier of rare earth elements to the United States and her allies remains remote.

The renewed geopolitical attention, therefore, reflects less a concrete commercial strategy than a broader strategic imagination, in which access to critical resources symbolises influence in an increasingly fragmented international order. Venezuela’s rare earths add another dimension to her geopolitical significance; but without profound changes in governance, investment conditions and industrial capacity, they are unlikely to reshape the global rare earth landscape in any decisive way.