Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure

Ukraine’s campaign against Russian energy infrastructure has matured from sporadic symbolic pin-pricks into a sustained, multi-vector strategy that combines long-range uncrewed aircraft, sea-borne drones, and strikes on pipelines and pumping stations. The aim is plain: degrade the Kremlin’s capacity to refine, move, and export fuels that bankroll its war; complicate logistics for the armed forces; and raise domestic political costs by creating visible shortages far from the front. Over the course of 2024–2025 this effort has moved deeper into Russia, reached new types of targets, and produced measurable economic effects inside the Russian Federation. 

How the attacks are possible

Ukraine has invested heavily in inexpensive, long-range “one-way” drones that fly low, navigate with satellite and inertial guidance, and can be launched in numbers from small improvised sites. Open-source assessments list several families now used routinely: the UJ-22 (roughly 800 km), the UJ-26 “Bober/Beaver” (often cited at 600–1,000 km and fielded by Ukraine’s military intelligence), and newer airframes such as AQ-400 “Scythe,” with profiles optimised for range rather than speed. These air vehicles approach at treetop height to reduce radar detection, can be routed around known air-defence belts, and are frequently employed in salvoes to saturate point defences. In mid-2025 Ukrainian outlets showcased an upgraded UJ-26 with catapult launch, removing landing gear to improve range and speed—an apparently minor design change that matters when one is trying to reach refineries that sit 700–1,000 km from Ukraine. 

Along the coast, uncrewed surface vessels—typified by the Magura family—carry large explosive loads at high speed and low silhouette to strike oil piers and loading arms. In late September 2025, such naval drones, attributed to Ukraine’s HUR, hit oil-logistics facilities in Novorossiisk and Tuapse on Russia’s Black Sea, with OSINT teams geolocating damage to oil loading piers; within days a damaged Magura hull washed up on Turkey’s coast. These attacks are enabled by the predictable geometry of port approaches and the difficulty of defending sprawling offshore terminals against small, fast boats presenting minimal radar cross-section. 

At what range, and how deep

Through 2025, the depth of Ukrainian strikes has widened rather than merely shifted. In August, Russian officials acknowledged fires at Novatek’s Ust-Luga fuel-export complex on the Baltic after a Ukrainian drone attack; industry and shipping sources noted consequent cuts to naphtha exports. Earlier, the same site had suffered an externally-caused fire in January 2024. In September 2025, one of Russia’s largest refineries—Kirishinefteorgsintez near St Petersburg—was hit; regional officials reported production stoppages and reduced capacity thereafter. In Bashkortostan, the Salavat petrochemical complex—over 1,300 km from Ukrainian-held territory—was also set ablaze by drones. Those distances imply dependable Ukrainian strike reach well beyond 1,000 km for certain airframes and profiles. 

Pipelines and pumping nodes have not been immune. On 27 September 2025 Ukrainian long-range drones set fire to an oil pumping station in Chuvashia, temporarily halting operations—an illustration that Ukraine can interdict not only end-points (refineries and ports) but also the connective tissue that feeds them. Such nodes are attractive: they are fixed, lightly defended relative to strategic airbases, and any outage ripples along the network. 

What damage is being done—military, economic and political

By late summer 2025 Russia’s idle refining capacity hit record levels in the wake of Ukrainian attacks, according to industry tallies, and the pattern has persisted into the autumn. The immediate paradox is that refinery outages can push more crude oil to export terminals even as domestic fuel tightens: in September Russia shipped roughly 2.5 million barrels per day from western ports—about 25% more than August—because crude that could not be processed at damaged refineries was re-routed to export. But that same shortage of domestic refining capacity has forced the government into market-distorting countermeasures. On 30 September Moscow announced a partial diesel export ban and extended an existing gasoline export ban through year-end to stabilise internal supply. The Deputy Prime Minister insisted matters were “under control,” yet regions from the Far East to Nizhny Novgorod and occupied Crimea reported persistent shortages, with Crimea imposing fuel rationing and price freezes. 

Independent market watchers and Ukrainian reporting converge on the same headline effect: cuts to exportable fuels and visible domestic strain. Argus-tracked flows cited by Ukrainian media suggested diesel and gasoline exports down by roughly thirty percent during the heaviest strike periods in late summer; other coverage has highlighted Russia’s need to source supplementary gasoline from Asia to ease shortages. While precise figures vary, the direction is consistent—less refined product available for export, longer queues and intermittent pump closures at home, and a forced policy response in Moscow. 

At the ports, maritime strikes have both direct and indirect consequences. Damage to loading arms and piers creates safety bottlenecks that cannot be resolved with a simple patch; repairs require specialist equipment and shutdowns. September’s naval-drone raids prompted local states of emergency and temporary disruption at Novorossiisk and Tuapse—chokepoints for Black Sea product shipments. Even short suspensions at these terminals compound the effect of refinery outages, adding demurrage and uncertainty that bleed into prices and schedules down the supply chain. 

Strategic implications

First, the attacks compel Russia to choose between exporting crude for hard currency and refining domestically to keep shelves stocked and military logistics supplied. The Kremlin can juggle barrels, but it cannot conjure replacement distillation towers or hydrocrackers quickly; repairs measured in months leave a persistent vulnerability. Second, dispersal of air defences to protect energy nodes widens Russia’s already stretched point-defence problem—precisely the asymmetry Ukraine seeks with low-cost, long-range drones and USVs (unmanned sea vehicles). Third, Ukraine has demonstrated a capacity to hit almost anywhere west of the Urals with domestically-built systems, giving it a lever it can dial up or down in response to battlefield or diplomatic developments. The cumulative picture—export bans, rationing, and recurring fires—is no mere media spectacle but a structural pressure on Russia’s war economy. 

Case studies that mark the evolution

• Ust-Luga (Baltic): Strikes in January 2024 and again in August 2025 forced shutdowns and cuts to naphtha exports at Novatek’s complex, demonstrating both recurrence and Ukraine’s reach to Russia’s Baltic energy gateway. 

• Kirishi (Leningrad Oblast): One of Russia’s largest refineries was set ablaze on 14 September 2025, with authorities acknowledging production disruption; the facility normally produces significant volumes of diesel and fuel oil. 

• Novorossiisk & Tuapse (Black Sea): Naval drones and UAVs struck oil piers and logistics infrastructure on 24 September 2025, briefly halting operations and underlining the vulnerability of Russia’s maritime energy nodes. 

• Chuvashia pumping station (Volga network): A late-September drone attack ignited a fire and stopped operations—evidence that pipeline arteries are now within Ukraine’s target set. 

Limits and Russian adaptation

Russia retains substantial crude production, can re-route flows between rail, pipeline and ports, and has shown an ability to restart damaged units, sometimes within weeks. Increased crude exports from Primorsk, Ust-Luga and Novorossiisk in September illustrate this adaptability. Yet constantly rotating maintenance crews, improvised repairs, and the need to guard hundreds of miles of pipeline and dozens of facilities impose real costs. Moreover export bans and rationing are the Kremlin’s own acknowledgement that refinery outages are biting the home front—politically salient in a country where motorists expect cheap, available fuel. 

Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy facilities are feasible because long-range, low-cost drones—air and sea—can slip past layered defences and strike large, flammable, and only partly protected targets at ranges often approaching or exceeding a thousand kilometres. The material damage is cumulative: fires and shutdowns at refineries and export terminals; pipeline nodes taken offline; record idle refining capacity; and a domestic market that has been tight enough to force rationing, price freezes, and formal curbs on exports. Moscow can offset some pain by exporting more crude when refineries are down, but doing so does not refill empty pumps in Nizhny Novgorod or Crimea—and it does not remove Ukraine’s new, repeatable lever against the heart of Russia’s war economy. 

Annex: Strikes on Russian Energy Facilities, 2024–2025

January 2024 – Ust-Luga (Leningrad Oblast, Baltic coast)

• Target: Novatek’s fuel-export complex.

• Effect: Major fire at a fuel terminal; temporary disruption to naphtha exports.

• Significance: First confirmed long-range Ukrainian drone strike on a Baltic energy hub.

Summer 2024 – Multiple refineries in southern Russia

• Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast reported strikes on refinery sites.

• Damage levels varied; most fires were contained, but operations paused in several facilities.

January 2025 – Volgograd refinery (southern Russia)

• Target: One of the largest refineries in the south.

• Effect: Drone attack caused a fire; refining temporarily halted.

March–April 2025 – Tatarstan (Taneco refinery and Yelabuga plant)

• Target: Major refining and petrochemical assets.

• Effect: Fires and significant operational disruption.

• Significance: Strikes confirmed Ukrainian drone reach beyond 1,000 km.

June 2025 – Salavat Petrochemical Complex (Bashkortostan)

• Target: Large integrated petrochemical plant.

• Effect: Fire and shutdown; facility lies 1,300 km from Ukrainian territory.

August 2025 – Ust-Luga (second strike)

• Target: Fuel terminals at Novatek’s export hub.

• Effect: Cuts to naphtha exports; Russia diverted cargoes to other ports.

14 September 2025 – Kirishi Refinery (Leningrad Oblast)

• Target: One of Russia’s largest refineries.

• Effect: Fire and production stoppage.

• Significance: Facility normally supplies large volumes of diesel and fuel oil.

24 September 2025 – Novorossiisk & Tuapse (Black Sea)

• Target: Oil logistics facilities, loading piers.

• Effect: Damage to oil piers; temporary suspension of operations; Magura USVs confirmed.

• Significance: Demonstrated Ukraine’s naval-drone reach against Russia’s main Black Sea energy ports.

27 September 2025 – Chuvashia (Volga region)

• Target: Oil pumping station.

• Effect: Fire and operations halted temporarily.

• Significance: First confirmed Ukrainian strike on a pipeline node in central Russia.