Ukraine’s Winter Campaign Against Russian Rear Areas, 2025–2026

Friday 16 February 2026

As the winter of 2025–2026 settles across the Ukrainian theatre of war, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have intensified a campaign that is no longer defined primarily by trench lines and contested villages but by distance, precision and attrition behind the front. Strikes deep into Russian rear areas have become a central feature of Ukraine’s operational art, aimed not at dramatic territorial breakthroughs but at the systematic degradation of Russia’s capacity to sustain fighting through the cold months. Operations, logistics and energy supplies have emerged as the principal targets of this winter campaign, reflecting a sober assessment of how wars are won when manoeuvre is constrained by weather, terrain and manpower.

Winter has always favoured defence on the Eastern European plain. Frozen ground stabilises supply routes but also exposes them, while leafless trees and snow-covered fields reduce concealment. For Ukraine, whose strategic priority remains the preservation of her manpower and the erosion of Russia’s material advantage, winter offers an opportunity to apply pressure where Russia is most vulnerable, namely in the complex systems that keep armies fed, fuelled and powered. Rather than attempting costly frontal assaults, Kyiv has chosen to make Russia’s rear areas increasingly inhospitable to sustained military operations.

A defining feature of the 2025–2026 winter campaign has been the expansion and refinement of long-range strike capabilities. Ukraine’s growing family of domestically produced drones, complemented by modified missiles and special operations raids, has enabled repeated attacks against targets hundreds of kilometres from the front line. These strikes are rarely decisive in isolation. Their significance lies in accumulation. Each damaged depot, disabled rail junction or destroyed transformer compounds existing strains within the Russian system, forcing Moscow to devote ever greater resources to repair, protection and redundancy.

Logistics has been the most consistent target. Russia’s war effort remains heavily dependent upon rail transport, a legacy of Soviet-era military planning and a reflection of the vast distances involved. Winter strikes against rail infrastructure in occupied Ukraine and across Russia’s border regions have sought to interrupt this advantage. Marshalling yards, switching stations and bridges have been attacked not necessarily to render them permanently unusable, but to create recurring disruption. Even short interruptions force rerouting, delays and congestion, all of which reduce the tempo at which ammunition, fuel and replacements can reach the front.

Fuel logistics are particularly exposed during winter. Russian armoured vehicles and generators consume vast quantities of diesel to remain operational in sub-zero temperatures. Ukrainian strikes against fuel depots and pumping stations have therefore had an outsized effect. The destruction of a single depot can require fuel to be hauled from far greater distances, often by road, where it becomes more vulnerable to further attack. This increases costs, slows delivery and heightens the risk of shortages at critical moments, particularly during offensive or defensive surges.

Energy infrastructure has become an equally important battlefield. Russia’s military-industrial base depends upon a fragile balance between civilian and military energy consumption. Winter increases demand across both sectors, leaving little margin for disruption. Ukrainian attacks against power substations, gas distribution nodes and oil processing facilities have sought to exploit this vulnerability. The objective is not to plunge Russian cities into permanent darkness, but to force hard choices. Electricity diverted to sustain factories producing ammunition or drones is electricity unavailable to households and regional economies. Conversely, prioritising civilian supply risks slowing military production.

The psychological dimension of these strikes should not be underestimated. Repeated attacks deep inside Russia undermine the Kremlin’s long-standing narrative that the war can be contained geographically and socially. When residents of regions far from the front experience power outages, fuel shortages or disrupted transport, the war intrudes into daily life. For the Russian state, this necessitates greater expenditure on internal security, air defence and information control, all of which divert resources away from the battlefield.

Operationally, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have demonstrated an increasing sophistication in target selection. Rather than focusing exclusively on high-profile facilities, many winter strikes have been directed at less visible but equally critical nodes, such as maintenance workshops, spare parts warehouses and command-and-control relays. These targets are harder to replace quickly and often lack robust protection. Their loss degrades Russia’s ability to adapt, repair and coordinate, effects that are magnified during winter when repair work is slower and more resource-intensive.

This campaign has also been shaped by an acute awareness of escalation management. Ukrainian planners appear intent on maintaining military pressure without crossing thresholds that might provoke unpredictable responses from Moscow’s most powerful allies or justify broader retaliation. The emphasis on military and dual-use infrastructure, rather than purely civilian targets, reflects both ethical considerations and strategic calculation. By framing these strikes as necessary measures to limit Russia’s ability to wage war, Kyiv reinforces her case for continued Western support.

For Ukraine herself, winter deep strikes serve an additional purpose. They compensate, in part, for limitations in artillery ammunition and manpower by substituting reach and precision for mass. Each successful strike extends the effective depth of Ukraine’s defensive zone, pushing the consequences of the front line deeper into Russian-held territory. In doing so, Ukraine seeks to shape the conditions of the war in advance of future campaigning seasons, weakening Russia’s capacity to regenerate forces and rebuild stocks.

The winter of 2025–2026 is therefore not a pause in the conflict but a distinct phase of it. Behind the frozen trenches and static lines, a quieter but relentless contest is underway, one fought with drones, intelligence and careful calculation. Ukraine’s strikes behind Russian front lines are not designed to deliver immediate victory. They are intended to make continued aggression increasingly costly, logistically fragile and politically uncomfortable for Moscow.

In the long war that has defined Ukraine’s modern history, winter has often been associated with endurance. This season, endurance is being tested not only at the front, but deep in the rear. By attacking the systems that sustain Russia’s war effort, Ukraine is seeking to ensure that when the thaw eventually comes, it is Russia, not Ukraine, who finds herself exhausted, constrained and strategically diminished.