The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant: a realistic assessment and practical proposal for its post-conflict status
- Matthew Parish
- Mar 28
- 5 min read
The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), located in Enerhodar on the south bank of the Dnipro River, stands as Europe’s largest nuclear facility. Before the onset of the conflict, it significantly contributed to Ukraine’s energy sector, supplying some 7,500 Megwatts, approximately 20% of the nation’s electricity. This made it the second largest nuclear power plant in the world, after Kashawazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant in Japan with a net capacity of some 7,965 Megawatts.
In the early stages of the second Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian forces seized control of the ZNPP. This occupation has raised profound concerns regarding nuclear safety, operational integrity, and the well-being of the plant’s personnel. Reports indicate that Ukrainian staff continue to operate the facility under duress, with instances of coercion and mistreatment by occupying forces.
IAEA’s Involvement and Oversight Challenges
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957, serves as the global authority promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy while ensuring safety and compliance with international standards. Following the occupation of ZNPP, the IAEA has endeavoured to monitor the situation, conducting inspections and assessments inside Russian-occupied territory to evaluate the plant’s safety and security. However, these efforts have been impeded by access restrictions and the complex dynamics of the conflict. The IAEA has called for the withdrawal of military personnel from the plant and the cessation of hostilities in its vicinity to mitigate the risk of a nuclear incident.
Despite these initiatives, the IAEA’s capacity to oversee operations at ZNPP remains constrained. The agency’s limited mandate and expertise, primarily focused on nuclear safety and security, do not encompass the enforcement capabilities necessary to manage a facility effectively under military occupation. Furthermore the IAEA’s perceived impartiality has been questioned, with Ukraine urging the agency’s leadership to avoid actions that could be interpreted as siding with the aggressor state.
It is not really clear how many IAEA staff are present at the Enerhodar site at any one time, or how they get to and from their duty stations given conditions on the front line that lies between them and the nearest city in free Ukraine, Zaporizhzhia, some 60 kilometres northeast. However as of 25 March 2025 it is estimated that there are 11 or 12 IAEA staff at the site, which seems very few. Before the war, the ZNPP employed about 11,000 people, although it is thought that the current staffing levels are around 5,000. It is not known what has happened to the other staff, and it is not publicly known what the nationalities of the IAEA staff are. In March 2025 a rotation of three new IAEA staff members arrived through Moscow (i.e. via Russian and Russian-occupied territory) for the first time, causing an outcry from the Ukrainians who consider entry to occupied Ukraine from Russia to be a crime under Ukrainian law.
It does not seem that the very limited IAEA presence under Russian military conditions and constant FSB observarion is likely to present an accurate picture of the state of the facilities. The IAEA has reported the ZNPP as "professionally run", but it seems unclear given their grossly diminished manpower how they might establish this. Presumably their every move is monitored and they feel constantly under threat from the Russian military and intelligence services.
US-Mediated Negotiations and Proposals
Recent US-mediated negotiations have brought renewed attention to the status of ZNPP. Discussions between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have explored the possibility of transferring control of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, including ZNPP, to American oversight as a means of ensuring their security. While this proposal aims to protect the plants from further aggression, its feasibility is highly questionable given the current occupation of ZNPP by Russian forces.
The Kremlin has firmly rejected any notion of relinquishing control over ZNPP, asserting its strategic importance and integrating it into Russia’s energy infrastructure plans. This stance underscores the geopolitical complexities surrounding the plant and diminishes the prospects of implementing US-led initiatives without significant shifts in the conflict’s dynamics. A novel and different approach may be required.
Operational Status and Safety Concerns
Currently, ZNPP remains connected to Ukraine’s energy grid but is not producing electricity. The world's second biggest nuclear power station has effectively been turned off, causing fundamental challenges to the economy of the entirety of southeastern Ukraine, both free and occupied. The plant’s operational status has deteriorated under Russian control, with maintenance challenges and forced staff changes compromising its integrity. The militarisation of the facility, including the stationing of troops and equipment, has further exacerbated safety concerns, with reports of certain areas being mined. By Ukrainian estimates, some 1,000 Russian soldiers have occupied the facility together with their armour and materiel; and without an agreement for them to leave it is difficult to see the ZNPP operating in any capacity or to any side's benefit. Nor is it possible to force those soldiers out using military means due to the danger of causing damage to the reactors that might create a massive nuclear health hazard.
Path Forward: International Oversight and Security Measures
Given the limitations of the IAEA and the contentious nature of the conflict, establishing effective oversight of ZNPP necessitates a multifaceted approach. One potential avenue is the deployment of a civilian international peacekeeping force, supported by adequate military backing, to secure the plant and its surroundings. Such a force could facilitate the withdrawal of military personnel, ensure the safety of nuclear operations, and create a conducive environment for technical experts to restore and maintain the facility. International scientific and nuclear experts would be needed in significant numbers (not just 11-12), drawing on the global community of nuclear scientists, to restart Enerhodar safely and increase its level of energy production to pre-war levels.
Additionally revitalising the city of Enerhodar into a vibrant, multinational hub could foster international cooperation and investment, contributing to the stabilisation and economic development of the southern Dnipro region. This endeavour would require substantial resources and a coordinated effort from the international community to rebuild infrastructure, support local populations, and promote a culture of peace and collaboration. It would also require an open border between free Ukraine and occupied Ukraine in the Zaporizhzhia region, as international personnel (or at least some of them) would want to pass through free Ukraine, not Russia and then Russian-occupied personnel. This would surely lead to the rejuvenation of Zaporizhzhia as a commercial hub, the city currently standing in a sorry state after extensive Russian bombing and destruction.
Conclusion
The oversight and operation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant amid ongoing conflict present significant challenges. While the IAEA plays a crucial role in promoting nuclear safety worldwide, its capacity to manage a facility under military occupation is inherently extremely limited. Comprehensive solutions involving international peacekeeping forces, diplomatic negotiations, and substantial investment in regional development are essential to ensure the safe and effective operation of ZNPP and to mitigate the broader risks associated with its current precarious status. This issue alone would require an international summit at which willing countries with the requisite skilled nuclear scientists agree to collaborate on such a project.
