The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Future of the Liberal Order

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is one of the world’s largest but least understood regional groupings. Born in 2001 as a modest security forum for China, Russia and a handful of Central Asian states, it has since expanded to encompass nearly half the world’s population and a territory stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the Persian Gulf. At its most recent summit in September 2025 the SCO has projected itself not merely as a regional bloc but as a player in shaping the very architecture of the global order. For Western democracies, the question is therefore urgent: does the SCO present a realistic threat to liberal democratic values, or is it a hollow institution, more rhetorical than substantive?

To answer this we must examine the SCO’s historical development, its ideological underpinnings, its economic and military dimensions, its internal contradictions, and the broader geopolitical context in which it operates. The conclusion will not be one of imminent confrontation but rather of gradual erosion: the SCO is less a battlefield adversary than a rival narrative, undermining the confidence and universality of liberal democracy.

Historical Origins: From Border Management to Regional Bloc

The SCO traces its roots to the “Shanghai Five” grouping of 1996—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—originally created to resolve lingering border disputes following the Soviet collapse. By 2001, with the accession of Uzbekistan, the bloc institutionalised itself as the SCO.

Its founding declaration highlighted three threats—terrorism, separatism, and extremism—which reflected the domestic anxieties of its principal members. For Beijing, this meant containing unrest in Xinjiang; for Moscow, pacifying the North Caucasus. The language of “counterterrorism” thus served as a convenient cloak for repressing domestic dissent, and it established from the outset a shared authoritarian ethos.

In subsequent years the SCO broadened its remit to economic and cultural cooperation. Membership expanded to include India and Pakistan (2017) and Iran (2023). With observer states such as Afghanistan, Belarus, and Turkey, the SCO now forms a vast geopolitical arc. While its institutional structures remain shallow compared to NATO or the European Union, its sheer scale grants it symbolic weight as an alternative centre of gravity.

Authoritarian Solidarity and the Ideological Challenge

The SCO is not merely a club of convenience. It embodies a particular set of values. Chief amongst these is the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. In practice, this translates into mutual endorsement of regime security and a collective rejection of Western criticisms of democracy, human rights or the rule of law.

The SCO Charter enshrines the idea that each civilisation should choose its own path, implicitly contesting the universality of liberal democracy. This relativist doctrine has been invoked to justify media censorship, state surveillance and the crushing of dissent within member states. Joint SCO statements frequently denounce “hegemonism” and “unilateral sanctions”, positioning the West as an illegitimate enforcer of norms.

Here lies the SCO’s greatest ideological significance: it offers an organised platform for authoritarian regimes to resist liberal norms. By providing a collective legitimacy to repression, it undermines the Western claim that democracy is a universal aspiration.

Central Asia – Stability over Liberty

Central Asia illustrates the SCO’s practical impact. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have long been sites of authoritarian governance, with only sporadic experiments in pluralism. Within the SCO framework these states receive consistent support from both Beijing and Moscow for prioritising stability over reform.

The SCO’s “Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure” (RATS), headquartered in Tashkent, coordinates intelligence-sharing and security cooperation. Ostensibly aimed at countering extremism, it has also been used to track dissidents, suppress NGOs and legitimise crackdowns on political opposition. In this way, the SCO provides Central Asian governments with a veneer of international endorsement for policies that run contrary to Western liberal democratic values.

For the West, this presents a dilemma: while democratic norms struggle to gain traction in Central Asia, SCO frameworks entrench authoritarian resilience.

Iran – An Anti-Western Voice Amplified

Iran’s accession to the SCO in 2023 marked a significant turning point. Long isolated by Western sanctions, Tehran sought inclusion in the organisation as both a symbol of legitimacy and a practical avenue for economic cooperation.

For the SCO, Iran’s membership strengthens its anti-Western profile. Tehran has used the platform to denounce US sanctions and to promote a multipolar order. While some members, such as India, remain cautious about aligning too closely with Iran, its presence nonetheless pushes the SCO further towards ideological confrontation with the West.

Iran also demonstrates how the SCO offers diplomatic refuge to states ostracised by Western institutions. By embracing such members, the organisation creates an alternative community where authoritarian governance is not only tolerated but validated.

Cyber Governance and Information Control

Perhaps the most insidious dimension of the SCO’s influence lies in the digital sphere. As early as 2011, SCO members jointly proposed an “International Code of Conduct for Information Security” at the United Nations, which emphasised state sovereignty over cyberspace and legitimised government control of information.

This model stands in sharp contrast to Western visions of an open internet. By promoting norms of state-centric cyber governance, the SCO advances a framework that enables censorship, surveillance and information manipulation. For authoritarian regimes worldwide, this serves as an appealing template.

While such proposals have not supplanted Western-led models, they signal a persistent challenge: the SCO is actively shaping debates over the rules of the digital age in ways that undermine liberal democratic values.

Economic Dimensions: Between Opportunity and Dependency

Economically, the SCO lacks the integration of the European Union or the institutional muscle of the World Trade Organisation. Nevertheless it plays an important role in supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Many SCO members host critical BRI corridors, from Central Asian pipelines to railways linking China to Europe.

By linking infrastructure development to SCO cooperation, Beijing ties member states more closely into her economic orbit. Russia, meanwhile, uses the organisation to resist Western sanctions and to sustain trade flows eastward. For weaker members, the SCO provides opportunities for investment and markets, but also risks deepening dependency on China.

For the West the danger lies not in the SCO replacing Western financial institutions but in its normalisation of opaque, state-driven development models that sideline liberal norms of transparency and accountability.

Internal Contradictions: Limits of Cohesion

For all its ambitions the SCO faces severe internal contradictions. India and Pakistan remain locked in conflict, often obstructing consensus. China and Russia cooperate within the SCO but compete for dominance in Central Asia: Beijing wields overwhelming economic influence, while Moscow clings to security primacy. Iran’s membership exacerbates tensions, pulling the organisation towards anti-Western rhetoric that not all members embrace.

These contradictions prevent the SCO from becoming a fully-fledged alliance. Unlike NATO, it has no mutual defence obligations. Unlike the EU, it lacks supranational governance. Its communiqués are often long on slogans and short on practical commitments.

This fragmentation limits the SCO’s ability to act decisively. It is unlikely to launch coordinated military operations or to construct a unified economic bloc. The threat it poses to the liberal order is therefore less immediate and more diffuse.

Non-Aligned Movement and Warsaw Pact

To assess the SCO’s place in history, it is useful to compare it with two earlier groupings: the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Warsaw Pact.

The NAM, established during the Cold War, brought together states that sought to avoid alignment with either Washington or Moscow. It was a forum for asserting sovereignty, resisting neo-colonialism, and advocating economic justice. Yet its diversity of membership prevented it from becoming a coherent alternative order. In some ways, the SCO echoes the NAM’s emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference, but with a sharper authoritarian edge: while the NAM was ideologically diverse, the SCO is dominated by regimes united in their suspicion of liberal democracy.

The Warsaw Pact, by contrast, was a hard security alliance binding Eastern Europe to Soviet control. Its cohesion was enforced by military occupation and ideological conformity. The SCO lacks such mechanisms. It does not impose collective defence obligations, nor can it compel obedience. Yet like the Warsaw Pact, it offers a counterweight to Western security structures, conducting joint exercises and projecting solidarity against NATO.

The SCO thus falls somewhere between these two historical models: less cohesive than the Warsaw Pact, but more ideologically defined than the Non-Aligned Movement. Its uniqueness lies in blending elements of both—an authoritarian solidarity without binding structures, and a multipolar rhetoric backed by the economic gravity of China and the residual military clout of Russia. This hybrid form makes it harder to confront, as it does not fit neatly into familiar categories of alliance or movement.

The SCO in the Emerging Global Order

The SCO’s significance must be viewed within the broader contest over global order. China and Russia use the organisation to promote multipolarity: a vision of international politics divided into spheres of influence rather than governed by universal rules.

For Beijing, the SCO reinforces her image as the leader of an Asian-centric order, promoting the Belt and Road Initiative and rejecting Western interference. For Moscow, it offers a way of demonstrating that Russia remains a global power despite her isolation in Europe. For smaller members, it provides diplomatic shelter from Western pressure.

The SCO thus functions as a counter-narrative. It does not challenge Western liberal democracy through tanks or treaties, but rather through ideas: that sovereignty trumps rights, stability outweighs liberty, and regimes should not be judged by external standards. If widely accepted, these principles could erode the very foundations of the liberal international order.

A Subtle but Real Threat

Does the SCO present a realistic threat to Western liberal democratic values? Not in the sense of a rival alliance capable of global dominance. Its internal divisions and lack of institutional depth preclude such a role.

But in another sense, the threat is real. The SCO offers a collective legitimacy to authoritarian governance. It entrenches repression in Central Asia, amplifies anti-Western voices like Iran, and promotes alternative norms in cyberspace. It provides regimes across the developing world with a narrative that democracy is optional, rights are relative, and sovereignty is absolute.

For the West, the challenge is therefore not to outmatch the SCO militarily but to counter its ideological influence. This requires renewed confidence in liberal democratic values, greater investment in development models based upon liberal democratic values, and sustained engagement with the Global South. The SCO may not be a new Warsaw Pact, but it is a persistent force chipping away at the universality of the liberal order. Its danger lies not in confrontation but in gradual corrosion of what the West stands for.