The Pentagon’s ATACMS Review for Ukraine: Does It have any Real Impact?

On 23 August 2025, the Wall Street Journal reported that since late spring, the Pentagon has put in place a new, high‑level approval mechanism that effectively blocks Ukraine from using US-supplied long‑range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) to strike inside Russian territory. This review system, crafted under Pentagon Policy Undersecretary Elbridge Colby and making Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth the ultimate decision‑maker, applies not only to ATACMS but also to certain European weapons like Britain’s Storm Shadow, which rely on US intelligence.

Under the previous Biden administration, Ukraine had been authorised to carry out ATACMS strikes inside Russia from November 2024. According to the Wall Street Journal report, although there is no formal policy change, the new review process has in effect denied approval in at least one documented instance.

The stated rationale behind this restriction is rooted in President Trump’s posture—seeking to encourage peace talks with Moscow and expressing concern that deep strikes escalate the conflict. At the same time, the US continues to supply Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) missiles (with a 280-mile range) as part of a European‑funded arms package—though these also require US approval.

Impact on Ukraine’s Operational Reach

Historical Context: Ukrainian ATACMS Strikes

Before this new restriction, Ukraine had successfully employed ATACMS for high-value strikes inside Russian-controlled territory:

• October 2023: During Operation Dragonfly, ATACMS were used against Luhansk and Berdiansk airports, destroying helicopters, runways, supply depots, and possibly air defence systems.

  
  

• March–May 2024: Longer-range ATACMS hits were recorded in Crimea, including strikes against a communications centre. These strikes, and the October 2023 strikes, were all in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory.

  
  

• November 2024: Under Biden’s authorisation, Ukraine struck targets within mainland Russia—destroying an ammunition depot in Bryansk and hitting an S‑400 radar base in Kursk.

These operations demonstrated Ukraine’s enhanced ability to disrupt Russian logistics, air defences and military infrastructure, hundreds of kilometres behind the front lines.

Spring–Summer 2025: A Shrinking Envelope?

Since late spring 2025, the Pentagon-level review has curtailed further ATACMS strikes inside Russia. While exact targeting requests and denials remain undisclosed, the restriction signals a significant reduction in Kyiv’s capacity to conduct such deep strikes with this platform.

• Ukraine’s ability to continue its earlier pattern of deep strikes into Russian territory is now subject to individual US authorisation, reducing operational autonomy and tempo.

  
  

• The availability of stockpiled ATACMS appears limited, and a new green-yellow-red ammunition precedence system, introduced to prioritise US domestic stockpiles, further ties usage to broader US inventory concerns and strategic priorities, including deterrence of China.

  
  

• Though Ukraine is developing domestic long-range systems—like the Flamingo cruise missile and expanded drone capabilities—that may partially offset the restriction, these systems are not yet equivalent in range or demonstrated effectiveness.

Balancing the Strategic Scales

1. What are the Practical Tactical Limitations?

At the time of writing Ukraine’s operational envelope into Russia has not obviously been significantly reduced, because the ATACMS and similar missiles have been replaced with drone strikes on the part of Ukraine with extraordinary effectiveness. We believe the following to be a complete (or near-complete) list of all Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory since 20 January 2025:

• Late January (26–27 January) – Major drone strikes on the Ryazan oil refinery and a Russian oil pumping station at Ust‑Luga, causing operational shutdowns and fires.

• 29 January – Drone attacks on Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, and Novgorod oblasts; impacted oil facilities and industrial areas; fires in Murmansk.

• 3 March – Drone strike ignites fire at Ufa refinery in Bashkortostan.

• 4 March – Drones hit oil refinery in Syzran, Samara Oblast, industrial complex in Rostov Oblast, plus a strike near Troitskoye, Kursk Oblast killing up to 30 Russian soldiers.

• 9 March – Drone attack on an oil refinery in Chuvashia, marking first reported strike in the republic.

• 10 March – Novokuybyshevsk oil refinery (Samara Oblast) struck by drones.

• 14 March – Drone hit on Tuapse Refinery, Krasnodar Krai, causing a large fire.

• 22 March – Promsintez explosives factory in Samara Oblast hit, although minor damage reported.

• 23 March – Drone strike near Volgograd oil refinery; railway sabotage in Smolensk Oblast.

• 24 March – Missile/HIMARS strike on Russian helicopters (Ka-52 and Mi-8) at a landing site in Belgorod Oblast.

• 25 March – Precision strike killing ~30 soldiers in Kondratovka, Kursk Oblast.

• 9 April – Massive drone assault across 13 Russian regions, including strikes on Orenburg Air Base, Mozdok in North Ossetia, Engels‑2 air base, and even an incident near Moscow where a helicopter was mistakenly shot down.

• 2 May – Drone attacks on Crimean airbases, S-300V air defence systems, and a GRU-operated space-intelligence facility in Stavropol Krai; naval drone strike downing two Russian Su‑30 aircraft off Novorossiysk.

• 21 May – Drone waves cause explosions in Tula, Ryazan, and Oryol Oblasts, targeting military-industrial facilities; Moscow airports closed temporarily.

• 22 May – Targeted drone strike in Kamensky Khutor, Bryansk Oblast, resulting in one civilian death and one injury.

• 28 May – Drone strike on Zelenograd technopark, Moscow Oblast; also reported drone hit on a Russian tank ~42 km from front line.

• 1 June – Operation “Spiderweb”: Coordinated drone strikes on five deep Russian airbases—including Belaya, Dyagilevo, Ivanovo‑Severny, Olenya, Ukrainka—hitting 20–40 aircraft and destroying up to 13 strategic bombers (Tu‑95 and Tu‑22M3).

• 9 June – Ukrainian drones and HIMARS rockets strike:

  • Rylsk, Kursk Oblast: duty station/centre hit.

  • Savasleyka air base (Nizhny Novgorod Oblast): damaged MiG‑31 and Su‑30/34 jets.

  • Cheboksary factory (Chuvashia): drone debris caused a fire at a drone-parts plant.

• 19 June – Drones strike Volgograd, disrupting airports in Volgograd, Saratov and Kaluga.

• 25 June – Drone strikes hit a drone production facility in Taganrog; explosions in Crimea (Dzhankoi, Kerch, Cape Chauda).

• 26 June – S-400 missile system in Crimea damaged by drone attack; incident in Kursk (details unclear but a Chinese journalist was apparently injured).

• 5 July – Drone strikes on:

  • Cheboksary: causing industrial fire.

  • Engels: explosions heard; flights canceled in Saratov, Ulyanovsk, St Petersburg.

  • Borisoglebsk air base: fire following drone attack.

  • Vladivostok region: pipeline sabotage hit military installations' supply lines.

• 7 July – Drone strike on Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant, Moscow Oblast; strike at Ilsky oil refinery, Krasnodar Krai.

• 17 July – Drone attacks on Moscow and St. Petersburg (flights delayed); casualties in Belgorod, Smolensk, Voronezh; HUR (Ukrainian military intelligence) cyberattack on Gazprom.

• 20 July – Sabotage in Tula Oblast targeting railway; flights to Moscow halted; strike destroyed S‑300P and Nebo‑M air defence systems in Belgorod Oblast.

• 8 August – Drone strike hits 90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in Krasnodar Krai, with casualties reported; longest recorded one-way drone strike (1,800 km) targeting the “Voronezh‑M” radar near Orsk, Orenburg Oblast.

• 24 August (today, Independence Day) – Large drone assault across Russia:

  • Kursk Nuclear Plant: reactor output reduced by 50%.

  • Ust‑Luga fuel terminal: massive fire at Novatek export site.

  • Industrial targets in Syzran, St. Petersburg airport disruptions, injuries reported.

  
  

These strikes suggest that Ukraine's capacity to strike deep inside Russia - even as far as the fear-eastern port of Vladivostok - has not been significantly affected by the Pentagon's restrictions on the use of ATACMS missiles.

2. Political and Strategic Constraints

The move to restrict the use of ATACMS missiles apparently reflects a broader calculation: the US is attempting to walk a tightrope between supporting Ukraine’s defence and de-escalating tensions with Russia. Trump’s calls for peace talks and criticism of “long‑range strikes” have influenced the Pentagon’s more cautious posture. However this may be pure optics, given Ukraine's persistence in striking deep inside Russia notwithstanding the Pentagon's restrictions.

Does the Pentagon's Stance make any Real Difference?

It seems not. In a war characterised on Ukraine's part by the increased use of long-range drones to attack Russian military facilities, Ukraine's reliance upon ATACMS and related US missiles to wage a war against Russia's military structures is minimal. Notwithstanding the headline news, as a practical matter Ukraine has developed her own methods of striking Russian assets, often far deeper inside Russia than an ATACMS missile would allow. Russia remains on the defensive in terms of attacks upon her military infrastructure, and the Wall Street Journal and other media outlets seem to be overstating the limitations on Ukraine's capacity to defend herself from Russian aggression that result from the Pentagon's edicts.

Even without American missiles, Ukraine is defining a new form of long-distance warfare using the latest drone technology. This represents a revolution in contemporary conflict, questioning the value of expensive missile technology in the face of far cheaper drone swarm and other similar techniques in conducting long-range strikes on enemy positions.