The new United States National Security Strategy

The new United States National Security Strategy published by the Trump administration in early December 2025 marks a sharp and deliberate break with the traditional language of transatlantic partnership. It does not merely criticise individual European policies. It describes Europe as on the verge of “civilisational erasure”, adopts ideas close to the “great replacement” conspiracy theory (the notion that that white people are being deliberately replaced in western countries by people of other ethnicities), and explicitly proposes that Washington should “cultivate resistance” inside European democracies by supporting nationalist forces hostile to the European Union. 

In consequence it is reasonable for Europeans to ask three questions. First, what exactly is this document and where does it come from. Secondly, to what extent should it be treated as a serious statement of United States foreign policy rather than as ideological theatre. Thirdly, what a prudent European answer ought to look like.

Origins and character of the new strategy

Formally the document is the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, issued by the White House as the overarching guide to American foreign and security policy. Every administration since the end of the Cold War has produced such a strategy, but most have reaffirmed a core consensus that the European Union is a democratic partner and that European integration is broadly in the United States’ interests. By contrast the December 2025 strategy describes the EU as a source of censorship, over-regulation and demographic decline and identifies EU institutions as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. 

In its European chapter the document asserts that Europe faces “civilisational erasure” caused by low birth rates, migration and the erosion of national identity. It predicts that some European NATO members may soon be “majority non-European”. It condemns EU migration and speech policies, and concludes that the United States should “cultivate resistance” within Europe by working with nationalist forces that oppose Brussels and seek to reassert national sovereignty. 

This language is not accidental. Analysts have noted clear echoes of the “great replacement” narrative that circulates on the European and American far right, in which liberal elites are alleged to be deliberately replacing indigenous European populations through migration. The strategy packages this as official concern about European democracy, but its vocabulary and framing, including references to “civilisational erasure”, come straight out of the ideological arsenal of European radical right parties. 

Institutionally, the strategy emerges from a Trump White House that has placed America First nationalism at the centre of foreign policy. It builds on the earlier populist critique of “globalism”, but goes further by treating the European Union not just as an over-bureaucratic partner but as an ideological rival and, at times, an adversary to be contained. Commentators at the Atlantic Council and elsewhere have pointed out that, for the first time, an American security strategy assigns ideological hostility, rather than partnership, to Europe as such. 

The document also links its European agenda with a broader repositioning of American grand strategy. It calls for a re-focusing of US power on the Western Hemisphere under a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine; a reduction of expensive commitments elsewhere; and a recalibration of posture towards Russia that places more weight on “stability” and an early end to the war in Ukraine. Unsurprisingly this has been warmly received in Moscow, which regards the paper as tacit support for Russian interests if not for Russia herself. 

Is this really United States foreign policy

There is a temptation in European capitals to dismiss the document as ideological posturing that will be diluted in practice. That would be unwise, but nor should Europeans treat every phrase as an immediate operational instruction.

A National Security Strategy is not a mere campaign leaflet. It is an official White House document intended to guide the bureaucracy, signal priorities to Congress and allies, and frame how the United States explains herself to the world. Previous strategies have often been taken seriously as statements of intent, not least because they shape subsequent defence reviews, budget requests and diplomatic talking points. The Trump document therefore matters, if only as an indicator of how the administration wishes agencies, ambassadors and envoys to think about Europe. 

At the same time, United States foreign policy is not made by the White House alone. Congress controls the purse strings for military aid and many forms of democracy promotion; the Pentagon, intelligence community and State Department have their own institutional interests and world views; courts can constrain executive action; and public opinion can punish costly adventurism. In the days after publication the strategy has already attracted criticism from senior members of Congress, including Senator Jeanne Shaheen, who accused it of undermining Europe whilst still expecting her to shoulder a larger burden for defence. 

There is also internal incoherence. The Atlantic Council has highlighted that whilst the document denigrates the EU and toys rhetorically with European “civilisational decline”, it simultaneously acknowledges that the United States will need strong European partners to balance China and manage a dangerous world. The idea that Washington can simultaneously encourage the weakening of the EU, cultivate far-right forces that are often pro-Russian and Eurosceptic, and still rely upon a robust European pillar within NATO is logically contradictory. 

Moreover some of the more radical ambitions, such as overt American intervention in European electoral politics in favour of nationalist parties, would run into legal and reputational obstacles. The Guardian’s reporting that the strategy envisages US support for far-right movements and even interference in forthcoming elections, for example in Hungary in 2026, has already prompted warnings from European leaders that such behaviour would be unacceptable. 

Nevertheless history suggests that even partially implemented strategies matter. The first Trump administration did not withdraw from NATO or dismantle the world trade system, yet its rhetoric and unilateral decisions altered the tone of transatlantic relations, emboldened anti-EU forces and created enduring mistrust. In the same way, the new strategy is likely to influence personnel choices, embassy priorities and quiet funding decisions, even if many of its ambitions are watered down in practice. It should therefore be taken seriously as an attempt to redefine the American approach to Europe, even if it will not be implemented in full.

Strategic implications for Europe

If one reads the strategy literally, the United States now regards the European Union less as a pillar of a liberal order than as a problematic experiment in supranational governance that has gone too far. The EU’s policies on migration, digital regulation and climate change are castigated as “anti-democratic”, the Commission is presented as an overmighty censor, and the Union’s integrationist ethos is treated as a threat to the survival of Western civilisation. 

The proposed remedy is to work with those Europeans who share the administration’s view, meaning nationalist parties and movements that oppose further integration and seek to subordinate EU law to national constitutions. In practical terms this means that Washington might cultivate relationships with far-right and radical right parties that are currently on the margins of government in several member states, or encourage intra-European blocs of “sovereigntist” governments that can obstruct common EU positions on Ukraine, Russia, digital regulation or climate policy. 

The timing is sensitive. Across the continent, nationalist and populist parties are either in government or enjoy significant parliamentary representation. Many of them are sharply critical of EU support for Ukraine and have advocated accommodation with Russia. Others oppose climate and migration policies that lie at the heart of current EU programmes. American rhetorical support may embolden such forces, give them international legitimacy and help them claim that they are the authentic voice of a new transatlantic right. 

A further implication lies in the war in Ukraine. The strategy calls for a swift end to the conflict, is notably more relaxed about Russian influence in Europe than previous American doctrines, and has been publicly welcomed by the Kremlin. If this orientation is translated into policy, Ukraine risks facing a United States that seeks a rapid settlement on terms favourable to Russia, while simultaneously encouraging European forces that are sceptical of continued military aid to Kyiv. 

Finally, the strategy opens the door to a new pattern of triangular manipulation. Russia has long tried to exploit ideological and political divisions inside Europe; now Moscow can potentially benefit from a United States that amplifies similar narratives about migration, culture and sovereignty. This risks placing Europe in the uncomfortable position of confronting destabilising influence operations supported, or at least echoed, by two great powers at once.

How seriously should Europe take this

The prudent answer is that Europe should take the document very seriously as an indication of intent and tone, but recognise that it does not instantly transform every aspect of United States foreign policy.

On the one hand, it is an official text signed off at the highest political level. European Council President António Costa and other leaders are right to say that it marks a qualitative change in how the United States speaks about Europe, and that it signals a willingness to interfere directly in European domestic politics. 

Yet Europe should remember that there are many Americas. Congress, governors, city mayors, business leaders, civil society, the permanent bureaucracy and allied communities within the United States may all resist, dilute or reinterpret aspects of the strategy. The paper itself is full of contradictions, not least between its denunciation of the EU and its acknowledgement that the United States will need European partners. These tensions give Europe some room for manoeuvre.

The correct lesson is not that the transatlantic alliance has ceased to exist. It is that the alliance is now contested inside Washington, and that part of the White House is prepared to treat the European Union not as a privileged partner but as a useful ideological target and bargaining chip.

A prudent European response

A sensible European response should be firm, calm and strategic. Hysterical denunciations will feed the narrative that European elites are panicking because their “project” is being challenged. Equally, denial or wishful thinking will leave Europe vulnerable to an adversarial policy that she has failed to anticipate. Several lines of action suggest themselves.

1. A clear political line on interference

European leaders should speak with one voice that external interference in European electoral processes, whether by Russia or by the United States, is unacceptable. Costa’s insistence that only European citizens should determine their political leaders, and that allies ought not to meddle in one another’s domestic politics, is a good starting point. That message should be reiterated in every transatlantic forum, including NATO and the G7. 

This does not require an anti-American turn. It simply insists that friendship cannot include attempts to “cultivate resistance” to constitutional institutions such as the European Parliament or Commission.

After all, there is a statutory mechanism for leaving the European Union: you serve two years' notice. The United Kingdom has already done it, and it was a catastrophe for that country. Not even Hungary, the most accommodation EU member with Moscow, is contemplating doing that, for fear of the economic and political fall-out for the country. Otherwise the legal position is that member states agreed voluntarily to join the EU; for as long as they voluntarily remain in the system, they are bound by its rules.

2. Strengthening democratic and informational resilience

If part of the new strategy is to provide encouragement and perhaps resources to far-right movements, Europe should ensure that her defences against opaque foreign funding and disinformation are robust. That includes:

• Tightening and enforcing rules on foreign donations to parties, campaigns and political foundations, including those routed through front organisations or online platforms.

• Enhancing the capacity of national security services and EU bodies to monitor and expose influence operations that originate abroad, whether in Moscow, Washington or elsewhere.

• Investing in independent media, public service broadcasting and civic education so that citizens can recognise conspiratorial narratives about “replacement” or “civilisational erasure” for what they are.

Such measures are not aimed at suppressing legitimate conservative opinion, but at ensuring that political competition within Europe remains transparent and genuinely domestic. Research on the radical right shows that, whilst these parties have a right to participate like any others, their foreign policy positions often diverge from mainstream European security interests, particularly regarding Russia and Ukraine. This is the fundamental reason why they have proven incapable of governing without adopting the European consensus towards Russia.

3. Advancing European strategic autonomy in security

The new strategy confirms what many in Europe have long feared. The United States may no longer be willing, or politically able, to underwrite European security in the way she did after 1945. Whether the rhetoric about “civilisational erasure” is believed in Washington or not, it will be difficult for any administration that has framed Europe as decadent and ungrateful to sell costly European commitments to the American electorate.

Europe therefore needs, at last, to make real progress towards defence autonomy, not as a replacement for NATO but as an insurance policy and a source of leverage. That means higher and better coordinated defence spending; serious investment in shared capabilities such as air defence, munitions stockpiles and cyber security; and a willingness to plan for scenarios in which US support is reduced or conditioned on political concessions. Analysts have already warned that Europe’s near total dependency on the United States for key enablers is unsustainable in an era of “America First” populism. 

4. Protecting economic and technological sovereignty

Some of the tensions highlighted in the strategy concern digital regulation, online speech and industrial policy. The Trump administration has already clashed with the EU over fines imposed on major technology firms, including the recent penalty on X for anti-competitive practices. In the arbitrary environment of Washington's executive politics, events like this may have fed into the contents of the national security strategy. 

Europe should hold her nerve in enforcing her own competition, privacy and content moderation rules, whilst remaining open to transatlantic dialogue on how to protect free expression and innovation. At the same time, she should accelerate efforts to reduce critical dependencies on any single external supplier, whether in energy, digital infrastructure or defence procurement. A Europe that can credibly say that her regulations are backed by indigenous technological capacity will be less vulnerable to accusations that she is using regulation as a disguised form of protectionism.

5. Engaging the whole of the United States

Finally, European diplomacy should adapt to the reality of a polarised America. It is no longer sufficient to treat the US president as the sole or even primary channel for transatlantic relations. European governments and EU institutions should deepen links with Congress, state governments, cities, think tanks, universities and business associations. Many of these actors will resist an ideologically anti-European turn, and they may become important allies in moderating or reversing the course set out in the current strategy.

This is not a matter of “going around” the White House so much as recognising that American power is plural. Just as the Trump administration is trying to “cultivate resistance” within Europe, Europeans can and should cultivate relationships within the broad American mainstream, which still includes many people who value a united and democratic Europe.

6. Preserving European unity, including the United Kingdom

A central objective of the strategy is to pit different European governments against one another, rewarding those that align with Washington’s nationalist agenda and punishing those that defend the EU as a political project. The best antidote is European unity.

Within the Union, that means resisting attempts to use security or trade deals to separate “good” and “bad” Europeans and maintaining common positions on sanctions, Ukraine and digital regulation so far as possible. With the United Kingdom, it means building a pragmatic security and foreign policy partnership that is resilient to fluctuations in White House rhetoric. A Europe that presents herself as divided will invite more external manipulation; a Europe that speaks with reasonable but firm unity will be harder to play off against herself.

Calm and prudent determination

The new United States National Security Strategy represents a serious attempt by the Trump administration to recast Europe from partner into problem and to legitimise American support for far-right and nationalist forces that oppose the European Union. It is rooted in ideological currents that pre-date Trump, but it is unprecedented in the history of official US doctrine towards Europe. It should neither be dismissed as mere rhetoric nor treated as an all-powerful blueprint; it has not translated into any new anti-Ukrainian policies as yet; American sanctions against Russia remain as strong as they have ever been. Rather this document should be read as a warning that the transatlantic relationship has entered a period in which one pole of American politics may be prepared to experiment with destabilising Europe in order to reshape her.

A prudent European response is not to retaliate in kind, but to strengthen her own democratic resilience, accelerate genuine strategic autonomy, engage constructively with the many parts of America that still want a strong Europe, and insist calmly that friendship does not extend to the deliberate cultivation of internal enemies. If Europe can do that, she will weather this storm. If she cannot, then the narrative of “civilisational erasure” that now circulates in Washington may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, not because Europe is too weak but because she failed to take seriously the need to defend herself politically as well as militarily.