The decision of the United Arab Emirates to leave OPEC and OPEC+

Tuesday 28 April 2026

The decision announced today by the United Arab Emirates to withdraw from both Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the broader OPEC+ represents one of the most consequential shocks to the global energy order in decades. It is not merely a technical adjustment in oil policy. Rather it is a strategic rupture — one that reflects deep tensions in the Middle East, structural changes in global energy markets, and the emergence of a more assertive Emirati foreign policy.

To understand the significance of this moment, one must first consider what OPEC — and later OPEC+ — were designed to achieve.

The origins of OPEC and OPEC+

OPEC was founded in 1960 in Baghdad by a small group of oil-producing states — notably Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela — with the aim of asserting sovereign control over natural resources and coordinating oil production to influence global prices.

Over time it evolved into a cartel capable of shaping the world economy — most dramatically during the oil crises of the 1970s.

The UAE joined OPEC in 1967 through Abu Dhabi and remained a member after federation in 1971.

Yet OPEC’s power has never been static. The rise of non-OPEC production — particularly in the United States through shale extraction — eroded its market dominance. In response the cartel expanded into OPEC+, an alliance formed in 2016 that included major non-members such as Russia. This broader grouping sought to stabilise markets through coordinated production cuts, particularly during periods of oversupply.

At it core OPEC+ has functioned as a mechanism of discipline — constraining production in order to maintain prices. That discipline however has increasingly come into conflict with the ambitions of certain members — none more so than the UAE.

The reasons for the UAE’s departure

The Emirati decision is rooted in a convergence of economic, political and strategic considerations — each of which has been building for years, but has now crystallised under the pressures of war and market instability.

There is the issue of production quotas. OPEC’s system of output limits has long constrained the UAE’s ability to exploit her expanding production capacity. Analysts have noted that such quotas have left significant Emirati capacity idle, limiting potential revenues and undermining investment returns.

Then there is the question of strategic autonomy. The UAE has framed her departure as a sovereign decision aligned with a “long-term strategic and economic vision”, emphasising the need for flexibility in production policy. In practical terms this means the freedom to increase output, diversify energy partnerships and respond independently to global demand.

Perhaps most important are geopolitical tensions — particularly with Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of OPEC. Relations between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have cooled amidst economic rivalry, divergent foreign policy priorities and disagreements over regional conflicts. The Emirati leadership has grown increasingly unwilling to subordinate its economic ambitions to a Saudi-led consensus.

The broader regional security environment has deteriorated sharply. The ongoing conflict involving Iran — with threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz — has disrupted energy markets and exposed vulnerabilities in Gulf cooperation. The UAE has reportedly expressed frustration at insufficient support from regional partners in the face of these threats.

Finally there is a global dimension. The United States has long criticised OPEC as a price-manipulating cartel, and the weakening of OPEC aligns with Washington’s preference for lower oil prices and freer markets. The UAE’s move may therefore be read as a subtle realignment towards Western economic interests — even as she maintains a multi-vector foreign policy.

Immediate consequences: a weakened cartel

In the short term the UAE’s departure represents a blow to OPEC’s cohesion and credibility. She has been one of the cartel’s more reliable and capable producers; her exit signals that the internal discipline of the organisation is fracturing.

Analysts already suggest that the move could create “disarray” within the group and weaken its ability to present a united front. If other members — particularly those with growing production capacity — follow suit, OPEC could enter a period of gradual decline reminiscent of earlier eras of fragmentation.

Yet the immediate impact on oil prices may be limited. The current disruption to supply caused by conflict in the Gulf — including constraints on shipping through strategic chokepoints — is likely to outweigh any near-term changes in production policy.

Medium-term consequences: a shift towards competitive production

Over the medium term however, the implications are more profound. Freed from OPEC quotas, the UAE will be able to pursue a more aggressive production strategy — increasing output when market conditions permit and leveraging her significant reserves to maximise revenue.

This introduces a more competitive dynamic into global oil markets. Rather than coordinated restraint, the system may tilt towards individual optimisation — with producers seeking market share rather than collective price stability.

Such a shift could exert downward pressure on oil prices over time — particularly if combined with continued growth in non-OPEC production. For major importers this may be beneficial; for exporters dependent on high prices, it may prove destabilising.

Geopolitical consequences: fragmentation in the Gulf

Perhaps the most significant consequences are geopolitical.

The UAE’s exit underscores a broader fragmentation within the Gulf monarchies — once seen as a relatively cohesive bloc. Rivalry between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh is no longer merely economic; it is increasingly strategic, encompassing foreign policy, investment flows and regional influence.

The move weakens the ability of oil producers to act collectively as a geopolitical force. During the twentieth century OPEC could deploy oil as an instrument of diplomacy — or even coercion. That capacity diminishes as internal divisions deepen.

For the United States and her allies, this fragmentation may be advantageous. A weaker OPEC reduces the risk of coordinated supply shocks and price manipulation. Conversely for states such as Russia, whose influence within OPEC+ has been an important lever of global power, the implications are less favourable.

A longer view: the decline of cartel power

In historical perspective the UAE’s decision may come to be seen as part of a broader trend — the gradual erosion of commodity cartels in an increasingly complex and diversified global economy.

OPEC emerged in an era when oil production was concentrated, state-controlled and geopolitically centralised. Today the landscape is far more diffuse. Technological change, alternative energy sources and shifting patterns of demand have all reduced the effectiveness of collective supply management.

The UAE — with her emphasis on diversification, innovation and strategic autonomy — appears to have concluded that the benefits of cartel membership no longer outweigh the constraints.

Where next?

The UAE’s departure from OPEC and OPEC+ is not an isolated event. It is a symptom of deeper structural changes — in energy markets, in regional politics, and in the nature of global power.

For OPEC it represents a loss of unity at a moment of crisis. For the UAE it is a declaration of independence — an assertion that she will chart her own course in a turbulent world.

And for the global economy, it marks the beginning of a new phase — one in which coordination gives way to competition, and where the balance of power in energy markets becomes more fluid, more fragmented and more uncertain than at any time in recent decades.