The collapse of the Russian regime (II)

Here we present an elaboration of scenario maps for regime change in Russia. The intention is not to predict a precise chain of events, but to offer plausible contingency models that illustrate how events might unfold in the near term (2025–2026) and in the longer term (2027–2030). These scenarios are informed by the political structures, strategic culture and elite dynamics of contemporary Russia.

Near-Term Scenarios (2025–2026)

In the immediate future, any overthrow or transition is likely to be precipitated by crisis—military, economic, or elite fracture—rather than by gradual liberalisation. The regime still possesses formidable coercive capacity, and the opposition remains fragmented. However recent years (especially since the Wagner mutiny of 2023 and the full-scale war in Ukraine) have exposed deep fissures in Russia’s system of governance.

Scenario 1: Crisis-Driven Elite Coup Following Military Collapse in Ukraine

By late 2025 or early 2026, Russian military positions in Ukraine collapse rapidly under a renewed and well-equipped Ukrainian offensive. Key logistical hubs in occupied Crimea or eastern Ukraine are overrun. Russian casualties rise sharply, and entire units begin deserting or refusing to redeploy.

Putin insists on holding territory “at all costs” and refuses any form of negotiated withdrawal. Senior figures in the General Staff, especially those associated with operational planning and force replenishment, begin to fear both catastrophic military loss and personal accountability.

In Moscow, a covert group of senior officers from the General Staff, supported by elements of the FSB and Interior Ministry, begins quiet coordination. A consensus emerges that the war has become unwinnable and that Putin’s continued presence is an existential threat to the stability of the state.

Simultaneously, oligarchs such as Roman Abramovich or other surviving financial heavyweights, alarmed by deepening Western sanctions and the growing threat of asset seizure or total international pariahdom, begin providing covert financing and diplomatic channels for a transition.

In a swift but surgical manoeuvre, Putin is removed from public view—perhaps under the pretext of illness, or an emergency reorganisation. He is placed under house arrest or exiled to a secure location. A transitional figure (possibly from within the Security Council or a retired military general) is named interim president.

The coup is presented publicly as a necessary act to save the Russian state. Talks with Ukraine and the West are initiated within weeks. The new leadership promises to restore order, end the war, and convene constitutional reforms, but not before securing amnesty for key players in the regime.

This is the “soft military coup for national salvation” scenario. It remains the most plausible path to rapid transition—but is inherently unstable unless followed by some kind of constitutional reckoning and political realignment.

Scenario 2: PMC-Driven Insurrection and Fragmentation of Control

Inspired by the precedent set by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s brief rebellion in 2023, a revived or rebranded paramilitary organisation—possibly a Wagner successor led by disgruntled former officers—mobilises several thousand armed men inside Russian territory.

Simultaneously, local protests erupt in a resource-rich region such as Bashkortostan or Tatarstan over economic hardship and conscription quotas. The rebellion is framed not as a liberal democratic movement, but as a “patriotic correction” aimed at saving Russia from internal decay and betrayal by Kremlin elites.

The paramilitary force marches on regional administrative centres, and mutinies occur in isolated army units sympathetic to the cause. A series of firefights erupt between loyalist Interior Ministry troops and the mutineers. Local governors either flee or switch sides.

In this scenario, the Russian state does not collapse entirely, but enters a phase of territorial fragmentation, reminiscent of the 1990s or even the civil war period after 1917. Control of Moscow may remain nominally with the Kremlin, but multiple power centres begin to emerge. Regional warlords, business-backed militias, and ethno-federalist actors declare “autonomy” under various pretexts.

This “praetorian fragmentation” scenario leads not to liberalisation but to centrifugal instability. The central state becomes a de facto besieged regime, and fears of nuclear instability draw international concern and potential UN Security Council action (perhaps with Chinese and American cooperation).

This is one of the most dangerous paths, and highly dependent upon mismanagement by Putin’s inner circle.

Scenario 3: Managed Internal Succession Without Open Coup

In this more technocratic scenario, increasing dissatisfaction among oligarchs, security chiefs and diplomatic strategists leads to a secret pact to convince Putin to “retire with dignity”.

Health rumours and physical frailty (whether genuine or manufactured) provide a pretext for a “transfer of power”. An anointed successor, perhaps from the Presidential Administration or the Security Council (such as Dmitry Patrushev, Sergei Kiriyenko, or another figure with dual loyalty to both siloviki - intelligence officials - and technocrats), is gradually promoted as a stabilising figure.

Putin gives a final televised address, framing his departure as “mission accomplished” and invoking the protection of Russia’s sovereignty. In return, he receives a lifetime guarantee of immunity, a ceremonial title, and secure residence.

The new leadership initiates modest reforms—perhaps lifting some censorship, engaging in prisoner releases, and exploring low-key negotiations on Ukraine, but avoiding full systemic change.

This scenario—“succession within the fortress”—is modelled on the Chinese transition from Mao to Deng, or even Soviet handovers from Brezhnev to Andropov. It maintains system continuity but tries to reduce temperature and recalibrate foreign policy.

It is less likely while the war in Ukraine remains active and unresolved.

Long-Term Scenarios (2027–2030)

Beyond the immediate crisis period, structural pressures—economic decline, generational shifts, regional assertiveness, and war fatigue—will increasingly shape the trajectory of the Russian state. These long-term scenarios are more dependent on systemic drift than on acute crisis.

Scenario 4: Constitutional Transition Driven by Generational Pressure

By 2027 or 2028 a younger generation of officials, technocrats and regional leaders—born after the Cold War—begins to assert itself in domestic policymaking circles. Many are educated abroad or linked to newer industries (IT, biotech, private finance) and find the stagnation of Putinism intolerable.

They begin to form informal discussion circles, think-tanks, and eventually a quasi-legal political reform coalition within the boundaries of the current system.

As Putin ages or fades into ceremonial irrelevance, the new generation leverages accumulated goodwill among mid-level bureaucracy and business networks to call for a constitutional reform conference, citing historical Russian traditions of “sovereign assemblies.”

Over 18 months, a new constitution is drafted and ratified through a controlled referendum. It introduces term limits, semi‑competitive legislative elections, and a reduction of presidential powers.

This scenario resembles “controlled liberalisation from within”, akin to the Gorbachev experiment—but without the ideological baggage of communism. However the success of this transition depends heavily on external conditions: absence of war, tolerable economic stability, and a Western willingness to recognise gradual reform.

Scenario 5: Failed Reforms and Collapse into Prolonged Authoritarian Civil War

Alternatively efforts at liberalisation—whether in 2025 or 2028—may provoke resistance from unreformed siloviki factions, ultra-nationalists, and revanchist elements in the military.

This scenario sees Russia split between competing visions of the state: technocratic modernisers (perhaps aligned with Europe or China), populist-nationalist movements, and hardline militarist elites.

Over time, the country enters a new “Time of Troubles”, marked by periodic violence, massive migration, collapse of the central budget, and the rise of regional de facto autonomous zones. Political assassinations and propaganda wars become the norm. Foreign powers play proxy games in key regions (Kaliningrad, North Caucasus, Far East).

This path is most likely if early regime change is mishandled, if security institutions are split, or if the war in Ukraine results in territorial reversals that humiliate the national psyche.

Scenario 6: National Reconciliation via International Guarantees

Following a series of transitions (perhaps a coup in 2025, reforms in 2027, and negotiations in 2028), a political compact is achieved in which former regime loyalists, moderate opposition, and regional representatives agree on a “new start for Russia.”

Western powers, China and multilateral institutions (UN, OSCE, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) provide guarantees of neutrality, recognition of new borders, and financing for postwar reconstruction and institutional reform.

A truth and reconciliation commission is established. Military reform, constitutional federalism and reparations policies are put in place. Sanctions are lifted in exchange for irreversible democratic benchmarks.

This scenario—“managed national recovery under global supervision”—is rare, but not impossible. It would require immense coordination, elite buy-in, and favourable global circumstances.

Concluding Thought

The most probable short-term path to regime change in Russia remains a partial elite coup from within, triggered by wartime failure or elite fear. But the long-term evolution of Russia will depend upon whether new generations of Russians—both inside the country and in exile—can articulate a national idea that escapes both the prison of Putinism and the trauma of liberal failure in the 1990s.

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Below is a profiling of individual figures who might emerge as transitional leaders, power-brokers, or pivotal actors in the event of regime change in Russia. These figures are grouped under four categories, corresponding to their likely role or sphere of influence:

1. Inner-circle successors and regime technocrats

2. Siloviki and military-security figures

3. Exiled political opposition and dissidents

4. Wildcard actors, paramilitary or nationalist figures

In each case we consider their background, current position, loyalties, and potential role in a transitional or post‑Putin scenario. The profiles are realistic rather than idealistic; not all are liberal democrats, and many would likely represent continuity or compromise rather than rupture.

Inner-Circle Successors and Regime Technocrats

These figures are within the current elite, especially in the presidential administration or federal government. In a managed transition, one of them could be elevated to the presidency or premiership to preserve stability while negotiating elite consensus.

● Dmitry Patrushev

Position: Minister of Agriculture; son of Nikolai Patrushev (Secretary of the Security Council and close Putin ally).

Profile: Patrushev is young (born 1977), competent, and well-connected. He is considered a potential dynastic successor within the siloviki wing. If a conservative elite-led transition were orchestrated, he might serve as a compromise figure—a technocrat with a security lineage.

Role: Figurehead president in a siloviki-controlled interim government.

● Sergei Kiriyenko

Position: First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration.

Profile: Former liberal-leaning prime minister under Yeltsin (1998), now a key architect of domestic political control and “ideological management”. Oversees youth indoctrination and electoral processes.

Role: Transitional technocratic premier, if elites seek a more competent public face for regime continuity. He may also attempt to reposition himself as a “reformer” in a post‑Putin environment.

● Alexei Kudrin

Position: Former Finance Minister; close to Putin but with liberal credentials.

Profile: A long-time advocate of economic reform, Kudrin left formal government roles but maintained ties through the Audit Chamber. He has high credibility in business circles and abroad.

Role: Potential transitional finance minister or “economic face” of a post‑Putin technocratic reform cabinet. Could be brought back to placate the West or oligarchs.

Siloviki and Military-Security Figures

These are actors with command over the coercive organs of the state. If a coup or elite transition were driven by the security services or the General Staff, one of these figures could become a strongman leader—or kingmaker.

● Nikolai Patrushev

Position: Secretary of the Security Council; former FSB Director.

Profile: One of the most ideologically committed anti-Western figures in the regime. He has long been a chief architect of Russian strategic doctrine and internal repression. A “KGB elder.”

Role: Possible interim leader in a security-dominated transition; more likely to play role as power behind the throne than public face. If he installs his son Dmitry as successor, this would represent a dynastic variant of Putinism.

● Alexander Bortnikov

Position: Director of the FSB (Federal Security Service).

Profile: Long-time head of the domestic security agency. Conservative, loyal, opaque. He has the capacity to neutralise internal opposition and to manage elite defections.

Role: Organiser or facilitator of an elite transition; likely to operate in the shadows, approving or vetoing successors.

● Sergei Shoigu

Position: Minister of Defence (but reputation damaged).

Profile: Once a political survivor and loyalist, Shoigu’s credibility suffered badly from military failures in Ukraine. He may be sacrificed in any serious transition.

Role: Unlikely to lead, but might serve as a ceremonial stabiliser in early stages of a crisis.

● Valery Gerasimov

Position: Chief of the General Staff.

Profile: An experienced strategist, responsible for military operations and doctrine. Like Shoigu, tarnished by the war’s poor outcomes. However if he defects, he may carry institutional legitimacy.

Role: Possible interim military governor or security coordinator in an emergency.

Exiled Political Opposition and Dissidents

These figures are mostly in exile or under imprisonment but would likely be crucial in legitimising any post‑Putin regime from the outside—or negotiating with international actors on Russia’s behalf. Their influence inside Russia remains limited, but they may gain traction after a collapse.

● Mikhail Khodorkovsky

Position: Exiled oligarch, founder of the Open Russia movement.

Profile: Once Russia’s richest man, imprisoned for a decade after challenging Putin. Now based in London, Khodorkovsky finances opposition initiatives and advocates for federalism, decentralisation and liberal reform.

Role: Transitional advisor or power-broker in exile; financier of new political platforms; might return as constitutional reform negotiator in a post‑coup context.

● Garry Kasparov

Position: Former world chess champion, democracy activist.

Profile: Charismatic and widely known in the West. Advocates for uncompromising resistance to Putinism and supports Ukrainian victory. Leads the Free Russia Forum.

Role: Moral voice and potential exile presidential candidate in a democratic Russia. But may be seen as too radical by insiders.

● Ilya Ponomarev

Position: Exiled former MP; claimed spokesman for the National Republican Army (NRA).

Profile: Only Duma deputy to vote against Crimea annexation. Now aligned with more militant resistance movements; supports targeted sabotage and internal insurgency.

Role: Possible intermediary between armed resistance and Western actors; unlikely to be accepted by elites, but may shape narratives in the event of partial collapse.

● Vladimir Kara-Murza

Position: Imprisoned liberal politician and writer.

Profile: Survivor of two poisonings; advocate of Magnitsky sanctions and democratic reform. Maintains moral authority.

Role: Posthumous symbol of resistance, or possible transitional leader if released and regime collapses entirely. Might serve in a new constituent assembly.

Wildcard Actors, Paramilitary and Nationalist Figures

These figures sit on the edge of the system—partially loyal, partially insurgent. In a chaotic transition, they could play disruptive or catalytic roles, especially in regions with weak Kremlin control.

● Ramzan Kadyrov

Position: Head of the Chechen Republic.

Profile: Maintains a personal militia (the “Kadyrovtsy”) and semi-autonomous rule in Chechnya. Professes loyalty to Putin but may pivot rapidly to self-preservation.

Role: Regional kingmaker, or independent strongman if Russia fragments. Could launch a power bid in the North Caucasus or act as mediator among security factions.

● Viktor Zolotov

Position: Director of the National Guard (Rosgvardiya).

Profile: Putin’s former bodyguard, now commander of Russia’s internal military. Controls troops stationed in key cities.

Role: Could enforce martial law, or refuse to suppress protests in a crisis. A potential enforcer or spoiler depending on loyalty.

● Andrei Turchak

Position: Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council; pro-war ideologue.

Profile: Young, ambitious, part of the “war generation” of political climbers. May pivot to nationalism if Putin falls.

Role: May lead an authoritarian-populist revival or attempt to control narrative in a transitional legislature.

Final Observations

A successful and stable transition would likely require a coalition across several of these figures or factions. For instance:

• A military-backed provisional government led by someone like Gerasimov or Patrushev, with technocratic legitimacy from figures like Kiriyenko or Kudrin, and international engagement with Khodorkovsky or Kara-Murza, is plausible.

  
  

• Alternatively a revanchist counter-elite could emerge, led by figures like Zolotov or Kadyrov, attempting to restore authoritarian order with nationalist populist rhetoric.

  
  

• Most dangerous would be a vacuum in which none of these figures gains dominance, leading to fragmentation, insurgency, or the rise of unknown populists with no institutional base.