The collapse of the Russian regime (I)

Vladimir Putin’s regime is amongst the more durable authoritarian systems in recent memory. It combines control over security services, information systems, elite networks and coercive institutions with an ability to suppress mass dissent. Nonetheless, no regime is immune to stress, fractures, or collapse under sufficient pressure. Over the past decade, observers have often asked: who might topple Putin—by revolution, coup, or elite replacement—and how?

Any plausible overthrow would likely require convergence (even if temporary) of multiple actors with divergent motivations and capacities—military/security elites, oligarchs, opposition movements (both inside and in exile), regional power brokers, and foreign influences. In what follows we categorise and assess these potential actors, their incentives, constraints, and likely interactions.

We also pay attention to how Russian‑language discourse frames potential insiders, dissidents, and power dynamics (drawing where possible on Russian sources and media analysis), which often gives insight into internal elite perceptions and fears.

Major categories of potential actors in a regime shift

We group the possible agents under the following headings:

1. Security and military elites (including factions)

2. Paramilitary and private military companies (PMCs)

3. Oligarchs and business networks

4. Political opposition (inside and in exile)

5. Regional, local, and institutional actors (governors, provinces, siloviki - Russia's security services)

6. Foreign influence and military pressure

These are not wholly distinct; many overlap or might act in shifting coalitions.

1. Security and military elites

One of the most obvious groups is the senior officers in Russia’s armed forces, General Staff, FSB, GRU, or other security organs. In most authoritarian regimes, a “coup from above” is historically amongst the likeliest paths to remove a leader.

Incentives and vulnerabilities

• Performance failures: The Russia–Ukraine war has been a large stress test. Military setbacks, loss of prestige, discontent among field commanders or the ranks, or fear of being scapegoated could produce splits. Some commentary already suggests that certain officers “fear repression or purges if the war ends unfavourably,” and thus might consider a limited power seizure as a survival strategy. 

  
  

• Generational turnover and succession anxiety: As Putin ages or becomes less vigorous, elites may jockey for position—and might prefer a “managed transition” to avoid instability. The loyalty of security services is never monolithic; factions across the FSB, GRU and Interior Ministry may harbour grievances or ambitions.

  
  

• Elite exit or defection: Some in the security apparatus might defect (or semi‑defect) if they believe the regime is terminally weakened, offering insider knowledge or protection to successor factions.

Constraints and risks

• Built-in loyalty structures: The Putin regime invests heavily in ensuring personal loyalty (patronage, meddling in promotions, surveillance). Security agencies are deeply entangled with the presidency.

  
  

• Fear of retaliation: Attempted coups are dangerous and often fail. The risks (imprisonment, execution, loss of status) are high.

  
  

• Coordination difficulties: Even if a faction is unhappy, coordinating across the security apparatus (FSB, GRU, armies, ministries) is difficult, particularly under surveillance and under tight control of the Kremlin.

Evidence / historical precedents

• The mutiny of the Wagner Group in June 2023 is a partial indicator of fissures in military enterprise. Although it was not a coup per se, it demonstrated that paramilitary forces might move (briefly) independently of central command. 

  
  

• Russian and Western analysts have speculated on “certain officers in the General Staff” contemplating a coup‑style operation, though these remain unverified. 

Thus, senior military or security factions are a plausible “centre of gravity” for any overthrow—but only if conditions degrade enough to overcome institutional inertia and fear.

2. Paramilitary and private military companies (PMCs)

Russia’s use of PMCs, especially the Wagner Group (until its demise) and similar entities, introduces a semi-autonomous instrument of force which might become a wild card in any regime contestation.

Incentives and capabilities

• PMCs often operate at the margins of the formal military chain of command and can project force flexibly. If a PMC acquires its own loyal base, logistics and narrative, it might contest central authority.

  
  

• The PMC leadership may have ambitions or grievances, especially if they feel betrayed or constrained by the Kremlin’s strategic or resource decisions (as was arguably the case with Wagner).

  
  

• Their ability to mobilise mercenaries, control battlefield assets, or threaten key nodes (such as command centres or logistical hubs) gives them potential leverage.

Constraints and risks

• PMCs depend on state support (financing, legitimacy, supply lines). Turning against the state often triggers severe reprisals.

  
  

• They might lack the institutional legitimacy or popular backing to transition from mercenary force to governing authority.

  
  

• Internal fragmentation and lack of cohesive chain of command can impede their ability to sustain large-scale operations.

Evidence and status

• The 2023 Wagner rebellion demonstrated that even a powerful mercenary group can mount a direct challenge (seizing cities, advancing toward Moscow) before negotiating a truce. 

  
  

• Some analysts viewed Wagner’s mutiny as a test run or signal to elites of what might be possible. 

Thus future PMCs (or successor groups) could play a catalyst role in a crisis, especially in partnership with dissatisfied security elites.

3. Oligarchs and business networks

The wealth-holding elite in Russia—the “oligarchs” and corporate networks—are critical because they control resources, media, global connections, and possibly coercive assets. They also have repeated histories of alignment, realignment, or exit.

Incentives

• If the cost of regime loyalty becomes too high (through Western sanctions, domestic chaos, or expropriation risks), oligarchs might support or finance an alternative elite coalition.

  
  

• Many oligarchs already manage cross-border operations; they have escape valves and can hedge bets.

  
  

• Some may prefer a “soft transition” that protects their assets, avoid mass disruption, and maintain economic continuity.

Constraints

• Oligarchs are vulnerable: they depend on the regime’s protection for their holdings and can themselves be targeted.

  
  

• Their interests are heterogeneous; some have deep links to the regime, others are wary of overt political engagement.

  
  

• They often lack direct command of military force, making them reliant on security or military actors to act.

Evidence and illustrative actors

• After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many oligarchs came under Western sanctions and domestic pressure. Some have moved capital or operations abroad, giving them the possibility of disengagement.

  
  

• Exiled oligarchs such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky have engaged in anti-Putin efforts, such as through the Russian Action Committee (RAC), which is a coalition of exiled opposition and liberal figures. 

  
  

• The RAC has sought to provide intellectual, organisational and media preparation for a post‑Putin regime. 

Oligarchs would likely not act alone in overthrowing Putin, but their financial and information resources could be decisive in sustaining alternative power centers.

4. Political opposition (inside Russia and in exile)

Beyond elites, the grassroots, civic and political opposition—although much diminished by repression—constitutes the ideological and mobilising side of any regime replacement.

Domestic opposition

Inside Russia, the opposition is fragmented and heavily suppressed. Many leading dissidents are in prison, in exile, or declared “extremists”. There are both “systemic opposition” parties tolerated by the regime (e.g. marginal Communist Party, LDPR) and “non‑systemic opposition” (liberals, nationalists, environmentalists, civil society groups). 

Leading individuals include:

• Vladimir Kara-Murza, a liberal opposition figure who has survived poisonings and imprisonment. 

• Marina Litvinovich, a veteran opposition activist, though sidelined by repression. 

• Alexey Gaskarov, a left-wing social activist and organizer. 

• Sergei Udaltsov, a long-time leftist activist. 

These actors are more likely to play roles as moral voices, mobilisers or symbolic agents, rather than direct wielders of force. Their constraint is extreme repression and lack of mass reach.

Opposition in exile and networks abroad

Russian exiles (journalists, intellectuals, former politicians) have more freedom to organise, connect with foreign governments and media, and plan for post‑Putin transition.

• The RAC, mentioned above and co-founded by Kasparov and Khodorkovsky, is a coalition moving toward a “free Russia agenda”.

• Exiled media and civic platforms can provide channels for information, mobilisation, coordination and symbolic legitimacy.

  
  

• The (alleged) National Republican Army (NRA) is a clandestine inside-Russia group claimed to pursue violent opposition, allegedly connected to Ilya Ponomarev (a Russian born Ukrainian politician, formerly a member of the Russian State Duma, now in exile in Ukraine). 

However exile actors often struggle to influence on-the-ground Russian politics. Their legitimacy inside the country is contested, and they lack coercive instruments of power.

5. Regional, local, and institutional actors

Russia is a federation, and governors, regional elites, city administrations, or local security officials may hold influence in their domains. In a regime crisis, their alignment or defection could matter.

Incentives

• If the central authority weakens, regional governors could assert autonomy.

  
  

• Local elites may align with challengers to protect local interests or avoid repression, especially in resource-rich or strategic regions (Siberia, Far East, border areas).

  
  

• Disgruntled regional strongmen might cultivate local security forces or paramilitaries to resist central directives.

Constraints

• Russian federal institutions are highly centralised, and governors are mostly beholden to Moscow (by appointment, resource dependency, or oversight).

  
  

• The capacity of regional actors to mobilise significant force is limited, unless they already control local militia or police arms.

One might also consider institutions such as the Duma, constitutional court, or judges as potential pivot points. In many transitions, elites in such institutions re-legitimise a new order. But in Russia these institutions are mostly captive to the Kremlin, with limited autonomy.

6. Foreign influence and military pressure

Although the regime change is fundamentally a domestic process (unless through invasion - something that both Hitler and Napoleon came to regret), foreign actors can help tip balance via diplomatic, intelligence, financial or military means—especially in a state at war.

Possible roles

• Ukraine / NATO / Western powers: If Russia suffers decisive military defeat in Ukraine, the resulting collapse of confidence and control could cascade internally. Some analysts argue that Western influence is more potent vis-à-vis toppling Putin than in many other regimes, precisely because the war is so central to the regime’s legitimacy. 

  
  

• Sanctions and financial pressure: Continued economic contraction and isolation may delegitimise the regime and encourage defections amongst elites.

  
  

• Support to opposition and intelligence leaks: Provision of communication tools, safe havens, training, clandestine funding, or asylum to opposition figures.

  
  

• Direct military intervention: This is unlikely (for sovereignty and risk reasons), but a decisive external military collapse or internal rebellion supported by foreign military forces might precipitate regime change.

Thus foreign actors are facilitators or accelerants, but not the primary overthrown force. In the words of Winston Churchill, "If Russia is to be saved, as I pray she may be saved, she must be saved by Russians." He also famously observed, "Russia is never as strong as she looks; she is never as weak as she looks".

Interactions, sequences and plausible scenarios

To move from mere possibility to a plausible path, we need to see how these actors might combine or sequence their action.

A stylised scenario

1. Crisis stress: A major military defeat in Ukraine or massive societal shock (economic collapse, mass protests, elite fracture) undermines the regime’s aura of invincibility.

   
   

2. Elite fracture: Some military or security officials, fearing purge or ruin, quietly coordinate with oligarchs or exiles. They may agree on a transition framework or removal of Putin.

   
   

3. Trigger via paramilitary or local action: A PMC or rebellious security unit seizes crucial nodes (communications hub, military command centre) or arrests key regime figures.

   
   

4. Institutional legitimation: The defecting security/military coalition demands acknowledgment from institutions—Duma, courts, governors—or forces a transition by winning over or neutralising those bodies.

   
   

5. Post‑seizure consolidation: Oppositional and business cadres (especially exiles) move in to propose a new constitutional order, governance and international recognition.

Alternatively, in a more gradual or “soft landing”, insiders might replace Putin with a successor as a managed transition, forestalling collapse but reshaping leadership.

Risks, uncertainties and countermeasures

• The regime might preemptively purge or decapitate factions.

  
  

• Fear and loyalty can inhibit defectors.

  
  

• Coordination challenges across different agencies.

  
  

• Mass mobilisation is uncertain: the population might abstain, be suppressed, or back the regime out of fear.

  
  

• External intervention might backfire or generate nationalist backlash.

Russian‑language discourse and perceptions

In Russian internal discourse (in exile media, dissenting blogs, interviews), several themes and figures emerge that help illuminate elite perceptions:

• Some Russian commentators emphasise that losing the loyalty of just a few hundred elite insiders (in the military and FSB) might be enough to bring down the regime.

• Dissident analysts speak of inside vs. outside opposition—from those still in Russia versus exiles—as key to understanding post‑Putin transitions. 

  
  

• The formation of coalitions such as the RAC in exile is explicitly framed as preparing intellectual and organisational ground for post‑regime Russia. 

  
  

• The narrative of “colour revolutions” is deeply embedded in Kremlin thinking; Putin frames internal dissent as externally orchestrated coups. 

  
  

• The ongoing mystery of groups like the “National Republican Army” in Russian-language circles reflects the blurred line between real underground resistance and propaganda, making it hard to gauge the actual strength of clandestine opposition. 

Hence amongst Russian audiences, regime change is often viewed through the lens of elite betrayal, palace intrigue, or external manipulations, rather than mass uprising.

Assessment: Which actors are most critical?

Given the constraints discussed above, the best assessment may be:

• Security/military elites are the most critical lever. If a faction of the armed forces or the security apparatus defected or coordinated a seizure of power, that is the most plausible direct path to regime collapse or transition.

  
  

• Paramilitary/PMC forces represent a wild-card amplifier: they might provoke or catalyse splits; but lacking institutional grounding, they are unlikely to succeed on their own.

  
  

• Oligarchs and exiled opposition networks are crucial support pillars—they provide money, legitimacy, connections, alternative governance ideas, and can help in post‑transition stabilisation.

  
  

• Domestic political opposition will likely not be the triggering force (given repression), but can provide the ideological and mobilisation framework in the aftermath.

  
  

• Foreign influence is secondary but can accelerate timing and provide leverage, especially by pressuring the regime militarily or economically.

In sum, a “regime change coalition” would likely require a key defection or coup from within the security/military apparatus, supported discreetly by oligarchs and exiles, catalysed perhaps by paramilitary action or a shock event, and bolstered by external pressures.

Caveats and concluding reflections

• Russian authoritarian regimes are notoriously adept at co-option, surveillance and repression. They anticipate coups and dissent.

  
  

• Transition does not necessarily mean liberal democracy. A successful overthrow could lead to another authoritarian variant, a military junta, or a managed authoritarian liberalisation.

  
  

• Legitimacy and governance capacity matter: a successful coup that cannot build administrative order, legitimacy or international recognition is unstable.

  
  

• Many predictions of Putin’s collapse have proven premature; regime resilience is high.

Finally any discussion of possible overthrows is speculative. Nevertheless by analysing the constellation of possible actors and their constraints—and by listening to Russian discourse itself—one can outline plausible contours of how a Putin successor regime might emerge.