The Authoritarian Axis That Might Be: Xi, Putin, Kim and Lukashenko

In the age of resurgent authoritarianism, it is tempting to imagine a consolidated bloc of autocratic leaders united in opposition to the United States and Europe. A hypothetical alliance with Xi Jinping at its head, and Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-Un, and Alexander Lukashenko as his lieutenants, crystallises such fears. Together, they embody vast populations, nuclear weapons, formidable military power, and a shared contempt for liberal democracy. Yet the question remains: could this grouping form a credible geopolitical counterweight to the Western alliance system, or would internal contradictions and structural weaknesses doom it to fragility?

The answer requires a long view. Superficially, this quartet would appear to offer a Eurasian counter-order stretching from the Pacific to Europe’s eastern border. Yet a closer examination—of their strengths, weaknesses, history, and the behaviour of states caught between—reveals why such a bloc would alarm but not outlast the combined power of the United States and Europe.

The Apparent Strengths of an Authoritarian Alliance

China under Xi Jinping is the obvious centre of gravity. Her economy, although slowing, remains the second largest in the world. She is the largest trading partner for most of Asia and Africa, and her Belt and Road Initiative ties dozens of states to Chinese finance and infrastructure. Militarily, Beijing has built a vast navy, expanded her missile forces, and modernised the People’s Liberation Army into a force capable of contesting US power in the Western Pacific. Xi’s rule also epitomises the authoritarian turn: centralised, nationalist, and hostile to liberal influence.

Russia under Vladimir Putin supplies brute force and raw materials. Though diminished by her war in Ukraine, Russia retains one of the two largest nuclear arsenals on earth, immense reserves of hydrocarbons, and a demonstrated willingness to use military power regardless of cost. Putin positions himself as the ideological standard-bearer of anti-Western defiance.

North Korea under Kim Jong-Un adds disruption value. A small and impoverished state, Pyongyang nevertheless possesses nuclear weapons, intercontinental missiles, and the capacity to destabilise East Asia at will. North Korea also offers a testing ground for new military cooperation, having already supplied Russia with munitions in exchange for food and technology.

Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko is the weakest link, but strategically significant. Geographically embedded in Europe’s heartland, Belarus provides Russia with forward basing against NATO and insulation against regime change pressures. Lukashenko’s loyalty to Moscow has turned his country into an extension of Russian power.

In aggregate, such an alliance projects:

• A combined population exceeding 1.5 billion.

• Nuclear weapons across three states.

• Control of vast energy reserves and critical supply chains.

• Military presence spanning Eurasia.

• A shared ideological narrative of sovereignty against Western “hegemony”.

On paper, this would seem a daunting counterweight to the free world.

The Structural Weaknesses Beneath the Surface

Yet beneath these strengths lie deep fissures.

Divergent interests: China seeks global economic integration, needing markets, technology and stability to sustain her development. Russia, by contrast, thrives on disruption; her influence depends upon destabilising Europe and leveraging military adventurism. North Korea survives by provocation and brinkmanship, often embarrassing even Beijing. Belarus, economically dependent, has little autonomy beyond Moscow’s orbit. These strategies clash: China’s long-term interests are undermined by Russia’s short-term chaos and North Korea’s unpredictability.

Economic fragility: China’s growth is slowing, hampered by demographic decline and debt. Russia faces long-term isolation, reliant on energy exports increasingly sold at a discount. North Korea is destitute, dependent upon smuggling and Chinese patronage. Belarus survives only with Russian subsidies. By contrast, the United States and Europe together command over half of global GDP. Authoritarian economies may support military coercion, but they lack the resilience, innovation and institutional depth of liberal democracies.

Legitimacy and cohesion: Each regime rules through repression. Xi silences dissent with mass surveillance and censorship. Putin sustains himself through propaganda and coercion. Kim governs by terror. Lukashenko clings to power through election-rigging and Russian protection. These systems are brittle. Crises can spark instability quickly, as they lack mechanisms for peaceful succession or adaptation. By contrast, Western democracies regenerate legitimacy through elections and enjoy the soft power of attraction.

Geographic overextension: The bloc would stretch from the Pacific to Eastern Europe, covering hostile terrain and diverse theatres. Coordinating strategy across such distances—against NATO in Europe and US allies in Asia—would be logistically and diplomatically daunting.

Military Capabilities and Their Limits

A central question is whether such an alliance could match Western military strength.

Nuclear deterrence: China and Russia together field the most formidable nuclear arsenal outside the United States. North Korea adds ambiguity. Collectively, they could credibly deter or complicate Western interventions.

Conventional power: China’s military modernisation is impressive, particularly her navy and missile forces. Russia retains large but overstretched land forces. North Korea fields vast armies but with obsolete equipment. Belarus adds little beyond geography.

Interoperability problems: unlike NATO, which trains and operates to common standards, authoritarian militaries rarely exercise meaningfully together. Russia and China conduct occasional drills, but coordination remains superficial. North Korea operates in secrecy, while Belarus is integrated only into Russian command structures. The absence of trust limits joint action.

Comparative weakness: NATO and US-led alliances in Asia maintain technological superiority, global logistics networks, and experience in multinational operations. While the authoritarian bloc could challenge the West regionally—China around Taiwan, Russia in Eastern Europe—it lacks the ability to project power globally on a sustained basis.

Ideological and Diplomatic Appeal

For an alliance to threaten liberal democracy, it must also win adherents abroad. Here the bloc struggles.

Negative identity: the axis defines itself by opposition to Western hegemony rather than by offering a compelling positive model. Sovereignty and stability may appeal to embattled elites in the Global South, but they do not inspire mass movements.

China’s authoritarian capitalism: once admired as a path to growth, China’s model now appears brittle, with slowing growth and heavy-handed repression. Russia offers militarism and resource dependency. North Korea offers poverty and isolation. Belarus offers little at all.

Global South pragmatism: many countries court Chinese investment and buy Russian energy, but few wish to bind themselves to an authoritarian bloc. India, Indonesia, Brazil and African democracies balance engagement with China and Russia while maintaining ties with the West. The authoritarian bloc lacks the institutional depth to anchor others in its orbit.

Historical Parallels

History provides perspective on such an axis.

• The Axis Powers of the 1930s appeared formidable but were fatally undermined by divergent interests. Germany sought European dominance; Japan sought Asian empire; Italy wavered. Initial successes masked long-term fragility. The Xi-Putin-Kim-Lukashenko alliance would face similar strains: China’s need for stability versus Russia’s appetite for disruption echoes the mismatch between Germany and Japan.

  
  

• The Warsaw Pact was superficially cohesive, but only because Moscow imposed unity by force. Once legitimacy faltered, it collapsed quickly. Xi cannot command the loyalty of Putin, Kim, or Lukashenko with the same authority, and China is unlikely to invest in coercive management.

  
  

• The Non-Aligned Movement reminds us that broad coalitions can exist without deep cohesion. Its diversity diluted its effectiveness. The authoritarian bloc risks the same fate: unity in rhetoric but disunity in action.

These parallels suggest that the authoritarian axis would alarm but not endure.

How Smaller States Might Behave

The reaction of smaller states is crucial to judging the bloc’s credibility.

• Asia: Southeast Asian states would hedge, deepening ties with both China and the United States. Vietnam and India would resist Chinese dominance. North Korea’s provocations would alienate South Korea and Japan, driving them closer to Washington.

  
  

• Europe: Belarus may serve Moscow, but other Eastern European states—Poland, the Baltics, Ukraine—would rally more firmly behind NATO. The axis would stiffen rather than weaken Western unity.

  
  

• Middle East and Africa: Some states might exploit the bloc for economic or security assistance, but few would enter binding alignment. Their interests are transactional, not ideological.

  
  

• Latin America: While some governments flirt with China and Russia, the region as a whole remains wary of foreign domination.

Overall, smaller states would opportunistically extract benefits but resist submission, limiting the bloc’s ability to form a true counter-order.

Xi's Dream

The image of Xi Jinping at the head of an authoritarian axis, with Putin, Kim, and Lukashenko as lieutenants, is a potent symbol of the global contest between democracy and autocracy. Yet on closer inspection, the bloc’s strengths—nuclear weapons, geographic expanse, shared hostility to the West—are outweighed by its weaknesses: divergent strategies, economic fragility, lack of legitimacy, poor military interoperability, and limited ideological appeal.

The United States and Europe, although beset by internal challenges, retain unmatched economic power, military capacity, and soft power. Their alliances are built not on coercion but on voluntary association and shared values. While the authoritarian axis might destabilise regions, it cannot credibly present itself as a global alternative to the free world.

Its greatest danger lies not in supplanting liberal democracy but in testing its resilience through crises. A war in Ukraine, a confrontation over Taiwan or a nuclear provocation by North Korea might strain Western unity. But the long arc of history suggests that blocs built upon repression and fear crumble when confronted by alliances rooted in freedom and consent.

For that reason, the West must treat such an axis not as an equal rival, but as a disruptive coalition—dangerous, yes, but ultimately brittle. Its roar may be loud, but its foundation is weak.