Special Tribunal for Aggression Against Ukraine: Hope and Hurdles

On 25 June 2025, Ukraine and the Council of Europe formally signed the Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (aggression meaning unlawful invasion), in Strasbourg. The agreement, signed by President Zelenskyy and CoE Secretary‑General Alain Berset, creates a dedicated judicial body to prosecute those responsible for Russia’s invasion — targeting “the head of state, the head of government, and the foreign minister” amongst senior political figures.

Strengths of the Tribunal

• Filling the ICC Gap

  
  

  While the International Criminal Court prosecutes war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, it lacks jurisdiction over the crime of aggression without a UN Security Council referral or Rome Statute amendment. This tribunal closes that gap.

  
  

• Targeting High-level Responsibility

  
  

  By explicitly eliminating immunity for leaders, the Tribunal breaks a key barrier: it can proceed even if Putin or his top ministers never step foot on courtroom grounds. Trials in absentia are legally permitted, ensuring proceedings can move forward despite non-compliance.

  
  

• Built on International Collaboration

  
  

  Its creation reflects wide diplomatic support: 39 nations, including the EU and CoE members, form a coalition ready to finance it. Host options include The Hague, reinforcing international legitimacy.

  
  

• Symbol of Legal Commitment

  
  

  The Tribunal sends a strong message: aggression will not go unpunished. As Berset put it, “[t]his is … a tribunal to judge between victims and aggressors … because without accountability, there can be no lasting peace”  .

Potential Weaknesses & Challenges

1. Enforcement and Suspect Access

   
   

   Critics point out that Russia is far from likely to surrender officials. Unless trials are accepted in absentia and later recognised internationally, the Tribunal may be unable to secure custody of defendants — limiting its actual judicial power.

   
   

2. Selective Justice or New Precedent?

   
   

   The tribunal only covers aggression against Ukraine from 2014 onwards, raising questions about its narrow scope. Some fear future aggressors outside the orbit of the Statute's specific wording may escape scrutiny — risking an unsustainable model of ad hoc justice.

   
   

3. Resource Competition

   
   

   Establishing the Tribunal requires funding, investigators, and judicial infrastructure. Some analysts warn it may draw resources from the ICC or diplomatic efforts to amend the ICC's currently limited mandate to prosecute the crime of aggression — which would offer a permanent global solution.

   
   

4. Political Reliance & Longevity

   
   

   The Tribunal's legitimacy relies on sustained Western support. A change in government in a donor country could threaten both funding and resolve, much as the tribunal requires ongoing commitment to succeed.

Verdict: A Meaningful Yet Imperfect Tool

The Special Tribunal is a historic breakthrough — the first post‑World War II body to explicitly focus on crimes of aggression. It addresses a critical legal gap and raises the stakes for Russian leadership. Its flexible design, allowing proceedings in absentia, ensures that justice can proceed even without physical custody of defendants.

Yet without enforcement capacity or global backing (especially from non-Western powers), it risks becoming a potent symbol more than a face-to-face mechanism of accountability. Selective scope and uncertain funding add to its vulnerabilities.

Nevertheless as long as evidence from Ukraine and the ICC can be shared, and trials proceed, the Tribunal may still transform international jurisprudence — reasserting the principle that initiating a wrongful invasion is itself a crime that cannot be ignored or violated with impunity.

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A summary of the Tribunal's statute

A copy of the Tribunals's statute as agreed appears here:

CM(2025)103-final.pdf

Download PDF • 257KB

1. Establishment & Jurisdiction

• The Tribunal is created to prosecute individuals for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, focusing on senior political and military leadership responsible for planning, preparing, initiating, or executing the invasion.

• It is a stand-alone tribunal, not part of the International Criminal Court (ICC), but intended to complement existing international mechanisms.

• Jurisdiction is limited to the top leadership: presidents, prime ministers, ministers of defence, and equivalent authorities.

2. Legal Framework

• The Tribunal draws upon the Rome Statute of the ICC, the Nuremberg principles, and customary international law.

• The Statute explicitly affirms non-applicability of immunities for heads of state or senior officials.

• The crime of aggression is defined in accordance with Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute (2010 Kampala amendments).

3. Structure & Composition

• The Tribunal consists of judges, a prosecutor, a registrar, and support staff.

• Judges are appointed by participating states through a selection panel.

• It allows for international staffing and may include Ukrainian judges and prosecutors to ensure legitimacy and relevance.

4. Location & Language

• The Tribunal will be located in The Hague, Netherlands, and may conduct proceedings in English, French and Ukrainian.

• The working languages of the Tribunal will be English and French.

5. Fair Trial Guarantees

• The Statute emphasises full adherence to international human rights standards, including the rights of the defence, presumption of innocence, and public trials.

• Appeals and review mechanisms are incorporated.

6. Enforcement & Cooperation

• The Tribunal relies on cooperation with States, international organisations and Ukraine’s domestic institutions for arrests, evidence gathering and enforcement of sentences.

• Sentences will be served in states that agree to accept convicted persons, similar to ICC practice.