Securing the Arctic: Need and Methods in an Era of Russian and Chinese Assertiveness

Monday 12 January 2026

The Arctic is no longer a distant periphery governed chiefly by ice and silence. Climate change has reduced sea ice, extended navigation seasons and exposed resources once locked beneath permanent frost. As accessibility grows, so does strategic competition. For the Euro-Atlantic community, the Arctic has become a test of whether rules-based order can be preserved at the planet’s northern extremity against the ambitions of revisionist powers, most notably Russia and China.

Here we consider why securing the Arctic has become necessary and how it may be achieved, with particular attention to the interaction of military posture, economic governance, environmental stewardship and alliance diplomacy.

Why the Arctic matters

Three dynamics explain the Arctic’s elevation to strategic priority.

First, geography. The Arctic Ocean connects the North Atlantic and North Pacific. Control over the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap, Arctic airspace and undersea approaches affects the survivability of transatlantic reinforcement in any European crisis. Russia’s Northern Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula, hosts a substantial portion of Moscow’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. The Arctic therefore sits at the intersection of conventional defence and nuclear stability.

Secondly, economics. The Northern Sea Route promises reduced transit times between Asia and Europe during ice-free months. While the route’s commercial viability remains seasonal and fragile, Russia seeks to regulate it as an internal waterway, charging fees and asserting jurisdiction that conflicts with international maritime law. China, branding herself a “near-Arctic state”, frames the route as part of a Polar Silk Road, aiming to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on chokepoints further south.

Thirdly, resources and technology. Hydrocarbons, rare earth elements and fisheries are increasingly accessible. The infrastructure required to exploit them, including ports, cables and satellites, carries dual-use potential. In an era where civilian and military technologies are intertwined, Arctic development becomes inseparable from security.

The Russian challenge

Russia has treated the Arctic as a bastion and a showcase. Over the past decade she has refurbished airfields, ports and radar sites, deployed air defence systems and invested heavily in icebreakers, including nuclear-powered vessels unmatched elsewhere. These capabilities enable persistent presence and rapid escalation control in northern waters.

More subtly, Russia blends military power with legal and economic pressure. By asserting expansive continental shelf claims and regulating navigation along the Northern Sea Route, she seeks to normalise a de facto sphere of control. The objective is not constant confrontation but leverage: the ability to shape access, pricing and risk for others.

The Chinese dimension

China’s approach is quieter but no less consequential. She lacks an Arctic coastline yet compensates through investment, research and diplomacy. Chinese companies pursue stakes in ports, energy projects and undersea cables, often presenting themselves as benign partners in development. Scientific stations and ice-capable research vessels provide valuable data while cultivating a long-term presence.

Beijing’s interest is strategic patience. By embedding herself in Arctic governance and infrastructure now, China aims to ensure freedom of manoeuvre in future decades, when ice loss and technology make the region more central to global trade and communications.

Principles for securing the Arctic

Effective Arctic security rests on restraint as much as resolve. The aim is not to militarise the High North unnecessarily but to deny coercion and preserve openness.

A first principle is alliance cohesion. Arctic security is inseparable from the credibility of NATO. With Finland and Sweden’s accession, the Alliance now encompasses most Arctic littoral states. This geographic reality should translate into integrated planning, shared situational awareness and regular, predictable exercises focused on defence rather than provocation.

Secondly, international law must be upheld. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides the framework for continental shelf claims and navigation rights. Challenging unlawful assertions through diplomacy, arbitration and presence operations is essential to prevent precedents that erode the global commons.

Thirdly, resilience matters as much as force. Arctic communities, many of them indigenous, are the first to experience climate stress and infrastructure vulnerability. Secure communications, reliable energy and robust search-and-rescue capabilities reduce the scope for external actors to exploit emergencies for influence.

Methods: from deterrence to governance

In practical terms, securing the Arctic requires a multi-faceted approach.

Military deterrence should be credible but proportionate. This includes air and maritime patrols, undersea surveillance and the protection of space-based assets vital for navigation and early warning. Investment in ice-capable vessels and cold-weather logistics is necessary, not to mirror Russia’s posture but to ensure access and persistence.

Economic screening and standards are equally important. Transparent rules for foreign investment in ports, energy and data infrastructure can prevent strategic dependencies without excluding legitimate commerce. Cooperation amongst Arctic states on financing and insurance can offer alternatives to opaque arrangements.

Scientific cooperation should be protected rather than abandoned. Joint research on climate, ice dynamics and biodiversity builds trust and produces shared data. However safeguards are required to ensure that scientific platforms are not repurposed for intelligence gathering or military mapping.

Finally, diplomacy must be patient and inclusive. Even as relations with Russia remain adversarial, channels for risk reduction, incident prevention and environmental protection should remain open. With China, engagement should be conditional, welcoming genuine contributions while resisting attempts to redefine governance norms.

Conclusions

The Arctic’s transformation is irreversible. What remains contested is whether it becomes a zone of managed competition or creeping domination by those willing to exploit ambiguity. Securing the Arctic against Russian and Chinese assertiveness does not require confrontation for its own sake. It requires clarity of purpose, alliance solidarity and the steady application of law, capability and governance.

For Europe, and for Ukraine watching from the margins of the High North, the lesson is familiar. Where security is neglected, power fills the vacuum. In the Arctic, as elsewhere, vigilance is the price of openness, and restraint the condition of peace.