Russian mobile internet blackouts

Russia’s rolling mobile internet blackouts have evolved into a dual-track system of control: periodic domestic outages for users on Russian SIM cards and an entry-period blackout for foreigners roaming onto Russian networks. Both tactics sit at the intersection of wartime security practice, censorship by other means, and creaking infrastructure, and together they are reshaping how people inside the country communicate, transact and receive news.

From sporadic disruptions to a national playbook

Beginning in early 2025, mobile data shut-offs that had once been localised around protests or security incidents hardened into a routine instrument of statecraft. Authorities framed the outages as a way to blunt Ukrainian long-range drone attacks by degrading cellular signals thought to be used in navigation or target confirmation. By late spring and into summer, blackouts appeared in dozens of regions, sometimes lasting hours, sometimes days; in parts of Nizhny Novgorod region the losses were prolonged for weeks, paralysing normal life. 

This approach was not created in a vacuum. Russia had already used ad hoc network disruption against domestic unrest, for example during the January 2024 Bashkortostan protests that followed the jailing of environmental activist Fail Alsynov, when messaging services were reportedly throttled or blocked across the republic. International monitors later noted the role of a shutdown in the authorities’ wider crackdown. 

By May 2025, blackouts scaled up. On 9 May, Victory Day, mobile data was switched off across swathes of the country; subsequent waves of outages tracked intensified Ukrainian strikes and major public events. Russian and international reporting counted hundreds to thousands of discrete incidents through June–August, with economic losses mounting and everyday services interrupted. Payment systems, online taxi services, airport operations and logistics chains all faltered when cell data vanished, a reminder of how deeply digital rails now underpin basic commerce. 

The new rule for foreigners: a blackout at the border

In October 2025, Moscow added a second pillar: a mandatory 24-hour blackout on mobile data and SMS for any foreign SIM that registers on Russian networks. Neighbouring regulators in Belarus publicly relayed the policy to their own subscribers, and Russian and international outlets confirmed the measure. In practice, a visitor crossing into Russia finds that roaming voice may function, but mobile internet and text messaging are disabled for the first day. Operators in Kazakhstan likewise warned travellers. 

This border blackout aligns with a broader tightening around identity and device control. From early 2025, Russia expanded biometric and ID prerequisites for SIM issuance and threatened disconnections for foreigners who failed to submit biometrics; officials also explored compulsory IMEI registration, binding handsets to identities. The policy stack gives regulators a higher-resolution map of who is using what device, on which network, and where, while the new 24-hour roaming rule reduces immediate communications upon entry. 

How the domestic outages work in practice

Operationally, mobile blackouts inside Russia have three recurring patterns.

• Geofenced suppression around sensitive sites. Local authorities or Roskomnadzor (the federal communications authority) instruct mobile operators to cut or throttle LTE/3G in defined cells near air-defence zones, depots, airports or parade routes; fixed broadband often remains. Such cones appeared repeatedly around Victory Day events and in regions absorbing frequent drone strikes. 

• Event-driven cordons. During politically sensitive moments or public gatherings, traffic to major messaging platforms is throttled or blocked at the ISP level, and in some cases whole-cell shutdowns follow. Bashkortostan’s experience in January 2024 foreshadowed a method later used more systematically. 

• Prolonged regional outages framed as protection. In front-line-adjacent areas or regions hosting strategic industry, operators maintained blackouts for weeks, citing drone risks. Residents reported a de facto communications curfew, with predictable collateral damage to commerce and public safety. 

Sector-by-sector impact

Retail and payments: Russia’s cash-lite turn since 2020 made point-of-sale terminals and QR payments heavily dependent on mobile data. Blackouts stranded shoppers at tills and pushed merchants back to cash, with knock-on effects for settlement and accounting. Analysts estimated large hourly losses during the summer waves. 

Transport and logistics: Taxi platforms stalled, drivers lost navigation, and airport operations suffered when ramp and gate staff could not rely on cellular handhelds. Logistics hubs operating on just-in-time models (where products are made only when needed, to improve efficiency) experienced delays as tracking and dispatch apps went dark. 

Industrial operations: Plants that shifted maintenance and telemetry to cellular back-haul saw gaps in monitoring and alerting; firms reverted to manual routines, increasing error and downtime risk. The effects were most acute in regions with lengthy shutdowns. 

Media and information: When mobile data disappears, so do push alerts, live streams and user-generated video—the lifeblood of real-time reporting. Authorities simultaneously expanded restrictions on voice calls in encrypted messengers and advanced new laws curbing “extremist” content and VPN promotion, deepening isolation. 

Why Moscow is doing this

Three drivers stand out.

First, battlefield spillover. Shutting down mobile networks is framed as a counter-drone measure, on the assertion that Ukrainian systems may leverage Russian SIMs or ambient cellular signals. Whether that materially degrades autonomous or satellite-linked platforms is contested, but the narrative supplies a security pretext. 

Second, crowd control and narrative management. Russia’s experience since 2011 has shown that smartphones compress the time between an incident, mobilisation and mass distribution of video. Toggling the network during protests or sensitive trials buys the authorities time and reduces viral spread. 

Third, identity consolidation. The foreign-SIM blackout at entry, together with biometric demands and IMEI-to-user binding, curtails anonymous or pseudonymous communications in the crucial first 24 hours after arrival and raises the friction for foreigners seeking local connectivity. 

Unintended consequences

Security trade-offs abound. In wartime, resilient communications help civilians obtain air-raid warnings, contact emergency services and verify rumours. Long or poorly targeted blackouts raise accident risks and impede first responders who also depend on commercial networks as fall-backs. Economically, repeated outages erode productivity and trust in digital payments just as sanctions and the exit of Western vendors squeeze equipment supply and maintenance, increasing the risk of structural degradation of Russia’s connectivity over time. 

For foreigners, the 24-hour roaming blackout complicates compliance and safety. Travellers lose access to two-factor authentication, banking apps and local transport services precisely when they need them most, and those who do not or cannot obtain a Russian SIM under tightened rules face longer periods of digital immobility. 

Adaptation and workarounds

Russians are adapting in predictable ways. Merchants keep cash drawers fuller; individuals pre-download offline maps and rely more on fixed broadband at home and work; some companies deploy private radio or mesh solutions in critical facilities. Yet these are palliatives, not substitutes for resilient national cellular coverage. Meanwhile the state promotes domestic platforms and a government-backed messaging application, part of a push to channel communications into channels subject to constant government surveillance. 

What to expect next

The domestic blackout regime is likely to persist as a flexible lever: narrower geofenced cuts around strategic sites; broader city-wide outages during anniversaries or crises; and intermittent regional suppressions tied to threat levels. The 24-hour blackout for foreign SIMs will probably be complemented by deeper integration of biometric and device identifiers, with roaming access progressively shaped by compliance status and risk scoring. Each measure solves a short-term control problem at the cost of long-term economic friction and digital isolation.

Russia’s mobile internet policy is becoming a permanent wartime operating system: a blend of tactical jamming, bureaucratic identity policing, and infrastructural triage. It reduces the state’s fear of sudden mobilisation and complicates foreign presence at the edges, but it also exacts a civilian tax in lost time, money and safety that will compound the longer the country lives with the lights half off.