Russia's strategic nuclear submarine fleet: devastated

By Robert Harris

Russia may have just suffered a crippling wound to one of the legs of its nuclear triad, and it may have been the only leg they had left.

At 11:24 AM local time, on 30 July (23:24 July 29th GMT), a magnitude 8.8 earthquake struck under the sea just off the coast of Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula, about 120 kilometers from the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. As a result, tsunami warnings were issued around almost the entire Pacific Rim (Hawaii recorded a 5 meter crest), and the resulting tectonic disturbance is currently suspected as one of the causes of a volcanic eruption at the Klyuchevskaya Sopka volcano (the largest active volcano in the Northern hemisphere) some 470 km away on the northern end of the same peninsula.

At press time the writer has not been able to obtain information regarding the VEI (Volcanic Explosivity Index) scale of the eruption but since VEI measures by the amount of volcanic material discharged this is unsurprising, as it would not be possible to measure a still-ongoing eruption. However, it can be said without speculation that Kyyuchevska Sopka, as the highest stratovolcano in Eurasia and one of the most active currently being monitored is known for major eruptions. This is notable for a few reasons. First of all because an 8.8 quake is massive. The US Geological Survey ranks this as one of the six largest ever recorded (the highest ever recorded was 9.5). Secondly, because the quake's epicenter is only 120 kilometers from Vilyuchinsk, which is the only Pacific base housing Russia’s nuclear submarines.

The quake wasn't isolated either. At the time of this writing there have been seven - and still counting - confirmed aftershocks and six foreshocks of a higher magnitude than 6.0, any of which would be a significant quake in its own right.

Unsurprisingly, the Kremlin has not been forthcoming about information regarding the scale of the damage, but given the magnitude of the quake and its aftershocks, the inherent vulnerability of naval bases to tsunamis, and the fact that the 470 km separating Vilyuchinsk Base from the crater of Kyyuchevska Sopka puts the base well within the likely range of ashfall if the still-ongoing ashfall is anything higher than VEI-4.0 it's hard to envision a scenario in which the base would not suffer damage. Turkey's "Türkiye Today" has reported that there is no confirmed damage to the base, but local news media from near the epicenter have shown significant structural damage from the quake alone to even durable concrete buildings, and that was in areas not affected by the tsunami, at a time before the volcano began erupting. While it's unlikely that the scale of any damage will be fully publicized, it is safe to say it will be less than Ukraine might hope, but still greater than Moscow admits.

So, what does this mean for the Russian Navy?

Given the information vacuum, all currently available answers are at least partly speculation, but it is possible to at least engage in educated speculation. First of all, if Russia's Pacific fleet's nuclear submarines were in port at the time the earthquake struck, it's hard to envision a scenario in which any such submarine would still be seaworthy, especially considering the Russian submarine fleet's already well-documented state of disrepair (which earned international attention last year as the Russian Navy sailed one of its most powerful submarines within viewing distance of Florida only to be mocked by onlookers for the missing surface panels).

And if they weren't, then any significant damage to the port would leave them stuck at sea with no way to make berth unless they are able to travel all the way around the Eurasian landmass to reach the Kola Peninsula (the Arctic home of Russia's Atlantic submarine fleet), a port so far north it is often icebound for months at a time. The alternative would be for Russia to go to their Chinese allies, hat-in-hand, and ask Beijing to allow Russian submarines to dock at China's submarine base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. However, given China's notoriously guarded stance on any public viewing of its submarine fleet, the Kremlin could not guarantee the answer would be yes.

And of course, either journey would be long and hazardous for submarines that were not planning to suddenly be rerouted several thousand kilometers.

The interesting result of this is that it casts serious doubt on the operability of Russia's Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) fleet, which in turn places a question mark over one of Russia's most zealously guarded strategic assets, one that defines the difference between a superpower and a middle power: second-strike capability.

"Second-strike capability" refers to a nation's assured ability to respond with a powerful nuclear counterattack even after suffering a devastating first strike from an enemy. It is the backbone of credible nuclear deterrence—ensuring that no adversary would launch a nuclear attack in the first place, knowing they would face inevitable and catastrophic retaliation.

This doctrine relies on survivable nuclear assets, such as submarines armed with ballistic missiles, that can remain hidden and operational even in the event of a surprise assault on land-based forces. In other words, it's summarized as the power to credibly tell another nuclear power "if I go down I'm taking you with me". Without second-strike capability, a nuclear power is just as vulnerable to a nuclear first-strike as any other state would be.

In Russia’s case, SLBM platforms, like those stationed at the Vilyuchinsk base on the Kamchatka Peninsula, are a crucial part of that second-strike arsenal. If an earthquake or natural disaster damages the base’s infrastructure or affects the readiness of its ballistic missile submarines, it could significantly weaken the credibility of Russia’s deterrent posture. In other words, Russia, who has built much of its foreign policy on nuclear sabre-rattling for years, has just lost the ability to guarantee they have a nuclear reply if NATO strikes them first.

Of course, the timing is interesting for another reason.

At the beginning of this article I made mention of "the nuclear triad". This refers to the three primary means of delivering a nuclear warhead: strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), and SLBM's. Essentially, a full nuclear triad is essential for a nuclear state to use its nuclear arsenal as a deterrence against attack by another nuclear state.

Well, Of the three legs of that triad, Russia's strategic bomber fleet was heavily damaged earlier this summer by Ukrainian intelligence's Operation Spiderweb. While it's unclear just how badly damaged the fleet was, considering that Russia does not have any strategic bombers currently in production, the loss of even a few and the damage of other (notable because the factories that produced replacement parts no longer exist) is significant.

Regarding ICBM's, four of Russia's last five ICBM tests have been cancelled at the last minute due to technical issues and the one that was not cancelled drew attention when the missile being tested exploded thirty seconds after launch. And now, a major chain reaction of natural disasters has put the third leg of this triad in a cast.

It is impossible to do more than speculate. But for Russia, whose military performance in Ukraine has been dismal and who currently relies upon the threat of nuclear retaliation to keep the West at bay, the fact that it is even feasible to speculate in this direction is certain to lead to a state of panic in the Kremlin. If this was in fact the deathblow to Russia's nuclear credibility, then it is good news for the world in the long term.

But in the short term, well ... the most violent animal is a mortally wounded one. And the "Russian bear" may have just suffered a mortal wound to its credibility as a nuclear threat.

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Robert Harris is a teacher in Lviv and the author of Smells Like Bull-shevik to ME! - A Conservative Talks to Conservatives About Russian Lies.