Russia's 2025 conscription drive: a desperate bid for manpower?

On 1 April 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an order calling up an additional 160,000 men for military conscription, marking yet another significant expansion of Russia’s armed forces. This move raises critical questions about Russia’s military strategy, the sustainability of its war effort, and the broader demographic and economic consequences of drafting such a vast number of young men into service.

Who Is Being Drafted? A Contrast with Ukraine

Unlike Ukraine, where conscription applies to men aged 27 to 60, Russia’s military draft targets a younger demographic, conscripting men aged 18 to 30. This stark contrast reflects differing recruitment challenges: Ukraine, faced with a smaller population and ongoing battlefield losses, has sought to expand her draft to older citizens with prior experience. Russia, on the other hand, continues to draw from her pool of young men, a decision that could have far-reaching effects on the country’s demographic stability and economic future.

Why Does Russia Need So Many More Soldiers?

President Putin has assured the Russian public that these new conscripts will not be sent directly to the Ukrainian front lines. However, such assurances should be treated with scepticism. If these troops are not being deployed to the war, what role are they expected to play? Potential explanations include:

• Frontline Deployment Under a Different Name: While officially designated as “support personnel” or “rear-area troops,” many could still find themselves stationed close to combat zones, freeing up more experienced contract soldiers for direct combat.

• Occupation Duties: Some may be sent to reinforce Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, providing security and logistical support in occupied regions of Ukraine such as Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia, where guerrilla warfare and partisan attacks persist.

• Border and Domestic Security: Given the heightened risk of internal dissent, Moscow may use these troops to reinforce internal security forces, quelling unrest in restive regions.

Regardless of their intended role, the expansion of Russia’s armed forces suggests that the Kremlin is preparing for a prolonged conflict rather than seeking a negotiated settlement.

Russia’s Military Overreach: A Numbers Game

Russia already boasts one of the largest standing armies in the world, with approximately 1.32 million active personnel and over 2 million reservists. By comparison, the US military has around 1.4 million active-duty personnel, but with a vastly larger economy (US$27.2 trillion as of 2023 compared to Russia's US$2.2 trillion) and expanding population (340.1 million compared to Russia's 143 million; down from 146 million in 2020) to sustain it. Russia’s disproportionately large military for a country with a declining population raises serious concerns about sustainability.

For context:

• China, the world's second most populous nation with 1.411 billion people (but with a GDP of US$17.73 trillion), has around 2 million active military personnel but can draw from a much larger youth base and, like the United States, can easily afford to maintain so large an army.

• India, with a rapidly growing economy (GDP of US$3.56 trillion; population of 1.438 billion), maintains a 1.45 million-strong active military, but again, has a far greater population from which to recruit and is not engaged in any active conflicts.

• Russia, with a population of only about 140 million, is maintaining a military force that is out of proportion with its demographic reality.

The Cost of Drafting Young Men: Economic and Demographic Consequences

Russia’s decision to continue drawing from its youth has economic and social implications that cannot be ignored. With one of the lowest birth rates in the world and an already shrinking working-age population, the continued deployment of young men to the military instead of the workforce will further strain Russia’s long-term economic outlook.

Key consequences include:

• Labour Shortages: Removing tens of thousands of young men from the economy every year weakens Russia’s workforce, particularly in industries requiring physical labor.

• Brain Drain and Emigration: Many educated young men are fleeing the country to avoid conscription, further depleting Russia’s intellectual and entrepreneurial capital.

• Demographic Decline: With fewer young men available for family life, birth rates could decline even further, exacerbating Russia’s population crisis.

Conscription Expands to Moscow and St. Petersburg: A Political Gamble?

Perhaps the most significant shift in this latest round of conscription is the increased drafting of men from Moscow and St. Petersburg. Until now, the Kremlin has largely avoided pulling conscripts from its wealthier, politically influential cities, instead targeting rural areas, ethnic minorities, and poorer regions like the Far East and North Caucasus. The inclusion of the urban middle class in conscription efforts signals that the traditional recruitment pool may be drying up.

This decision is politically risky. Young men from Russia’s major cities are more likely to be educated, connected to independent sources of information, and resistant to Kremlin propaganda. Widespread conscription in these regions could lead to:

• Increased Domestic Unrest: Urban populations have historically been at the forefront of political change in Russia. If discontent grows, Moscow and St. Petersburg could see larger protests, despite the government’s crackdown on dissent.

• Greater Evasion and Resistance: Many young men from wealthier families will likely use connections or bribes to avoid conscription, highlighting the growing divide between the elite and ordinary Russians.

• Long-Term Destabilisation: If Putin is forced to call up even more troops in the future, resentment in urban areas could escalate into genuine political opposition.

How Long Can This Continue?

With Russia’s demographic crisis worsening and military losses mounting, Putin’s ability to sustain the war without triggering severe economic and social backlash is increasingly uncertain.

If conscription continues at this rate:

• By mid-2026, the Russian government may struggle to find enough young men to draft without further reducing the workforce and damaging economic productivity.

• By 2027, domestic opposition could intensify, especially if economic conditions worsen due to Western sanctions and prolonged military spending.

• If Russia continues expanding its armed forces without a clear strategy for achieving victory, it may face the same internal pressures that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union’s war effort in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Putin’s decision to draft 160,000 more young men is a sign not of confidence but of necessity. While the Kremlin insists these conscripts will not be sent to the Ukrainian front, history suggests otherwise. Russia’s reliance on an increasingly large military force raises questions about sustainability, both economically and politically.

By extending conscription into major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, the Russian government is gambling that its repressive state apparatus can contain growing discontent. However, as Russia’s demographic crisis deepens and military demands increase, the Kremlin may soon find that its ability to sustain the war effort—both on the battlefield and at home—is reaching a breaking point.