Private and Informal Police Units in Ukraine

The war that has convulsed Ukraine for more than a decade has produced a host of institutional distortions. Public bodies have been forced to adapt to unprecedented pressures, and a number of private or semi-formal security structures have proliferated in the gaps left by over-stretched state institutions. One of the most troubling phenomena is the rise of private or informal police units, which blur the boundaries between legitimate state authority and private coercive power. This problem is not unique to Ukraine, for many post-Soviet states grapple with the legacy of informal enforcement networks. Nevertheless it has acquired particular salience in Ukraine because of the stresses imposed by the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 and the consequent mobilisation of society.

Ukraine’s police, like the rest of her public administration, have faced extreme demands since the first phase of the Russian invasion in 2014. The old militia system inherited from the Soviet Union was replaced with a new National Police in 2015 as part of sweeping reforms intended to eradicate corruption, improve public trust and introduce a more Western model of community policing. These reforms achieved mixed results. The reformed patrol police won public confidence, but the deeper structures of criminal investigation and regional policing remained uneven and vulnerable to old habits. The pressures of war in 2022 then stretched police resources thin. Large numbers of officers were drafted into military service, regional police commands were evacuated, and the immediate priority became maintaining rudimentary order in frontline communities and liberated areas.

It is within this context of institutional overload that private or informal policing groups have expanded. They take several forms. Some are conventional private security companies that have broadened their activities during wartime. Others are volunteer formations that emerged in 2014, originally as self-defence groups, and later evolved into para-policing or vigilante structures. Still others are local political patronage networks that use armed volunteers to exert influence, defend property or intimidate opponents. The unifying characteristic is that these groups exercise some of the functions of policing without clear legal authority, professional oversight or democratic accountability.

In the early years of the conflict the existence of volunteer battalions and self-defence units was frequently seen as a patriotic response to a failing state. Many of those groups were later incorporated into the National Guard or the Armed Forces, and their members made immense sacrifices on the battlefield. The problem arises when structures that were not fully absorbed into the state apparatus continue to act with police-like powers. In some cities volunteers staff checkpoints, detain suspected collaborators or enforce curfews. Although many act responsibly, the absence of formal training and legal status creates risks of arbitrary behaviour, abuses of power and conflicts with official police.

A further category is the proliferation of private security companies. Ukraine has a large private security sector, partly because citizens have long harboured doubts about the reliability of the state. Wartime has increased demand for private guards, escorts, risk consultants and property protection services. The challenge arises when private firms, often staffed by former police or military personnel, begin to take on quasi-policing functions. They may hold suspects, conduct informal searches, or intervene in neighbourhood disputes. Some operate under contracts with local authorities or private enterprises. Others grow close to political patrons who use them as instruments of influence. These blurred boundaries undermine the principle that the monopoly of legitimate force belongs to the state alone.

The problem is aggravated by the uneven quality of regional police commands. In wartime environments, local police chiefs wield wide discretion, sometimes relying on volunteer groups or private security firms to maintain order. These arrangements may be understandable in liberated or frontline districts where state structures have been hollowed out. Nevertheless the longer they persist, the more entrenched informal policing networks become. There is a danger that such networks may resist later attempts at reintegration into the formal police hierarchy, particularly if they are linked to local political or economic interests. Further they exist all over the country, even in cities far from the conflict zone.

Human rights concerns are unavoidable. Informal police units often lack proper detention facilities, training in evidence collection or knowledge of procedural safeguards. Suspects may be held without clear legal authority, and the potential for coercion or mistreatment is considerable. Even well-intentioned volunteers may make errors, and citizens may be unsure where to seek redress. The distinction between patriotic initiative and unlawful vigilantism becomes difficult to maintain. There have been instances where people in police uniforms, carrying weapons, have demanded on-the-spot payments of fines for infractions, including from foreigners.

Ukraine’s international partners have repeatedly emphasised the need for clear command structures, transparent oversight and respect for rights, particularly in areas near the frontline or recently liberated from Russian occupation. But the problem exists throughout the country.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs faces a difficult balance. On the one hand, it must maintain public order during a prolonged war. On the other hand, it must prevent the emergence of parallel security structures that weaken state authority and encourage corruption or factionalism. Since 2022 the Ministry has undertaken programmes to professionalise territorial defence units, integrate volunteers into recognised formations and strengthen the reach of the National Police in liberated areas. International assistance has supported training and equipment for police, particularly in demining, community policing and stabilisation operations.

Nevertheless the structural pressures remain profound. War tends to empower informal actors, because speed and improvisation are valued over procedure and oversight. Local commanders, municipal authorities and private interests all have incentives to cultivate their own security arms. Once established, these structures can be difficult to unwind. The risk after the war is that informal policing units may drift into organised crime, political enforcement or protection rackets. Ukraine’s neighbours in the Western Balkans illustrate how wartime irregulars can become post-war spoilers if not integrated early.

Looking ahead, the most realistic path is a multi-faceted strategy. First, Ukraine should continue to expand and support her National Police, particularly in stabilisation policing, criminal investigation and community liaison. Building police capacity is essential not only for public order but also for future reconstruction and integration with European structures. Secondly, the state should classify, register and regulate private security companies with far greater clarity. Licensing standards, training requirements and reporting obligations should be tightened. Thirdly, volunteer formations that still perform policing roles should be formally absorbed or demobilised. Integration programmes must be transparent, and volunteers should be offered clear legal status, training and supervision.

Lastly, public trust must be rebuilt. Citizens must feel confident that the state will enforce the law fairly, respond to crime effectively and respect their rights. Only then will the incentives for informal policing diminish. War has forced Ukrainians to take responsibility for their own security, sometimes in improvised ways. Yet a modern European state cannot tolerate private or quasi-private organs of force that operate outside the constitutional framework. Ukraine’s long journey towards the rule of law will require the patient dismantling or integration of these structures. The process will be slow and politically sensitive, but it is essential for the consolidation of her democracy and for the stability of her post-war society.