Post-War Parliament: Will Ukraine Need a New Electoral System?
- Matthew Parish
- 3 minutes ago
- 3 min read

As Ukraine is well into the fourth year of her full-scale war with Russia, questions about the nation’s future are beginning to crystallise in both policy and public debate. Amongst the most important, and perhaps most sensitive, is the question of how Ukraine should elect her parliament in a post-war environment. The return of peace will not merely signify a military or territorial turning point. It will also herald the need to revitalise Ukrainian democracy and renew national institutions shaped by the exigencies of war. This, inevitably, raises the question: does Ukraine need a new electoral system?
The System We Had
Prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukraine used a mixed-member electoral system. Half of the Verkhovna Rada’s 450 members were elected through proportional representation with closed party lists, while the other half were elected via single-member districts (SMDs) using first-past-the-post voting. This hybrid approach, while offering both party coherence and local accountability, had long been subject to criticism. Allegations of vote-buying, gerrymandering, and the undue influence of oligarchs in SMDs were widespread. Indeed President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party swept the 2019 parliamentary elections largely due to widespread public disillusionment with these entrenched patterns.
Legislative reform was already underway before the invasion. A law was passed to move Ukraine to a fully proportional electoral system with open party lists, aimed at increasing transparency and reducing corruption. The reform was due to take effect in the 2023 parliamentary elections, but those elections were postponed due to martial law. Now, as military efforts continue and millions of Ukrainians remain internally displaced or abroad, the question arises: is the planned reform still suitable—or does Ukraine need something more ambitious?
A Country Changed by War
The war has transformed Ukrainian society in ways that no electoral legislation written before 2022 could have predicted. Millions have been displaced; thousands of communities have been destroyed or depopulated. The demographic and geographic basis of political representation has been irrevocably altered. Single-member districts drawn in 2012 now map to regions that are either depopulated, under occupation, or undergoing emergency reconstruction. Any return to those boundaries would be a democratic fiction.
Moreover, political pluralism remains essential, but new political dynamics have emerged. The wartime consensus has created a more united national narrative, while regional divisions—once prominent in Ukrainian politics—have become less sharp. A more integrated electoral system might be a better reflection of today’s Ukraine.
Possible Reform Models
A post-war Ukraine may wish to consider several models:
Fully Proportional System with Open Lists: This system, already planned, would maintain national party coherence and improve transparency by allowing voters to choose individual candidates within party lists. It would also avoid reliance on physical constituency boundaries, which may remain fluid for some time.
Multi-member Districts Based on Oblasts: A compromise model could involve proportional voting within Ukraine’s administrative regions. This would retain a degree of local representation while still emphasising party-based competition.
Reserved Seats for Displaced Persons and Military Personnel: Given the scale of wartime displacement and military service, a just electoral system must find mechanisms to enfranchise these groups. This may involve dedicated representation or mobile ballot measures.
Digitised and Diaspora Voting: Millions of Ukrainians remain abroad. Including them in the democratic process may require expansion of electronic voting or extended in-person voting in consulates. This must be done securely, to maintain confidence in electoral outcomes.
Representation Without Oligarchy
The core challenge for Ukraine’s post-war parliament will be to build a system that protects political plurality without relapsing into the dysfunctions of the past. Oligarchic influence in electoral financing, shadow party structures, and regional patronage must be further diminished. Transparent party financing, media regulation, and civil society oversight will all be crucial pillars of a healthier democracy.
The war has also redefined who the electorate trusts. Volunteer coordinators, frontline mayors and independent civic leaders have often shown more legitimacy than traditional centralised politicians. Integrating these new civic actors into post-war politics will be vital.
Conclusion
As Ukraine prepares for peace, the structure of her parliament must reflect a new national identity forged in resilience and sacrifice. A fair, inclusive, and future-oriented electoral system will be a cornerstone of Ukraine’s democratic recovery. Reform is not merely a technical adjustment—it is a statement of who Ukraine is, and who she wishes to be.