Post-War Constitutional Reform in Ukraine (Part #1): Necessity or Risk?
- Matthew Parish
- Jun 5
- 3 min read
As Ukraine approaches a post-war future — one still uncertain, but increasingly imaginable — a profound national question begins to emerge: should the country revisit and revise her constitution? Calls for constitutional reform, once theoretical, have become more urgent in light of the unprecedented strain the Russian invasion has placed on the Ukrainian state. Yet as with any effort to refound a nation, the idea carries promise and peril in equal measure. The debate over Ukraine’s constitutional future is not just legal — it is existential.
The Case for Reform: A Constitution Stretched by War
Ukraine’s current constitution, adopted in 1996 and amended multiple times since, was forged in a different era: one of post-Soviet transition, fragile institutions, and unclear geopolitical direction. Over the decades, it has been bent — sometimes by decree, sometimes by necessity — to accommodate changing political orders. The war has now exposed its deeper limitations.
The constitutional framework has struggled to address the scope and scale of martial law, the delegation of emergency powers, and the constitutional rights of citizens under siege. It has also shown its fragility in balancing executive power with parliamentary sovereignty — a tension exacerbated during wartime centralisation. Furthermore the role of local self-government, courts and law enforcement in both occupied and liberated territories has revealed profound structural ambiguities.
A post-war Ukraine may require more than legal patchwork. It may demand a reconceptualisation of the very relationship between state, society, and sovereignty.
Nationhood Reimagined: Opportunity for Renewal
The argument for constitutional reform is also aspirational. The war has catalysed a transformation of Ukrainian identity — civic, inclusive, and deeply rooted in the idea of resistance. Any new constitutional reform process could reflect this lived reality, enshrining what Ukraine has become rather than what it was.
Supporters of reform envision a more resilient democratic system, with stronger guarantees of judicial independence, decentralisation and civil rights. Others point to the potential for codifying Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic orientation more explicitly, not only as foreign policy but as a constitutional identity — similar to what countries like Ireland and Germany have done in embedding European integration within their supreme law.
Some experts argue that post-war constitutional conventions or referenda could also serve as nation-building rituals — bringing together diverse parts of Ukrainian society, including those liberated from Russian occupation, to forge consensus on the rules of the new republic.
The Risks: Legal Instability and Political Exploitation
Nevertheless the stakes are high. Reforming a constitution — particularly one drafted in wartime’s emotional aftermath — is inherently fraught. Critics warn that sweeping changes could destabilise an already fragile legal order, sow political division, and open the door to power consolidation under the guise of national unity.
There is also the danger of external influence. With Ukraine depending on Western aid, reconstruction funds and security guarantees, there is concern that constitutional reform could become a site of foreign leverage — with competing interests pushing for different models of governance, judiciary reform or privatisation. Balancing sovereignty with these competing interests will be no easy task.
Finally there is the issue of timing. Can a country still clearing mines, burying the dead and counting its displaced be expected to undertake foundational constitutional revision? For some, the answer is yes — precisely because there is no peacetime normal to return to. For others, it is a perilous distraction.
Learning from Others: Post-Conflict Constitutions in Practice
Ukraine is not the first country to face this dilemma. After World War II, Germany and Japan both underwent comprehensive constitutional overhauls, under international supervision but with domestic input. South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution became a model of negotiated reconciliation. Bosnia’s Dayton Constitution, by contrast, was rushed, externally imposed, and remains a source of dysfunction.
Ukraine’s case is unique, but lessons abound. Legitimacy, more than perfection, will be key. Any new or amended constitution must be seen as authentically Ukrainian — not dictated by donors, not imposed by elites, but debated, participatory, and rooted in wartime experience.
Conclusion: A Constitutional Crossroads
Ukraine will emerge from this war changed. Her people have endured loss and demonstrated heroism, and her institutions have adapted under fire. Whether her constitution can — or should — evolve accordingly remains an open question.
Constitutional reform offers Ukraine a chance to codify her post-war values, strengthen her democratic core, and protect herself from future authoritarian drift. But it also risks politicisation, instability and public fatigue if mismanaged or ill-timed.
The decision ahead is not just legal. It is moral, strategic, and symbolic — a chance to decide, perhaps once and for all, what kind of state Ukraine wants to be, and on whose terms.
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The current Ukrainian constitution
The current Ukrainian constitution (updated and in force today) is available in English here:
And in Ukrainian here:
