Poland and the Baltics: Frontline States in NATO’s New Cold War

The geopolitical contours of Europe have shifted dramatically since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. What was once a relatively stable security architecture has fractured under the weight of aggression, revanchism and the reawakening of imperial ambitions. Nowhere is this change felt more acutely than in Poland and the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—NATO’s northeastern frontier. As the alliance recalibrates for what increasingly resembles a new Cold War, these countries have transformed into NATO's most exposed and determined defenders, reshaping their militaries, societies, and political outlooks in the process.

Strategic Geography and Historical Memory

Poland and the Baltic states share more than just geography. They are bound by a historical legacy of occupation, partition and domination by Russian and Soviet power. For Poland, memories of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and four decades of communist rule remain fresh. For the Baltics the traumatic experience of forced Soviet annexation in 1940, mass deportations and decades of repression still informs national identity and policymaking.

This historical consciousness has led these states to view the war in Ukraine not as a distant regional conflict, but as a potentially existential threat. Where some Western European capitals hesitated, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were amongst the first to send arms to Ukraine, call for stronger sanctions against Moscow and press NATO for a more robust forward presence.

Military Transformation and Defence Buildup

Since 2022, Poland and the Baltics have embarked on an unprecedented military buildup:

Poland

• Defence Spending: Poland is now spending over 4% of its GDP on defense—twice the NATO target.

  
  

• Procurement: She has embarked on one of the largest arms purchases in Europe, acquiring U.S.-made M1 Abrams tanks, F-35 fighter jets, and HIMARS rocket systems, alongside Korean K2 tanks and K9 howitzers.

  
  

• Manpower: Warsaw is rapidly expanding the size of its army, aiming for 300,000 troops in 2025 and even more in coming years, including both professional soldiers and territorial defence volunteers.

  
  

• Infrastructure: Poland has become NATO’s primary logistics hub for Ukraine, hosting massive depots, training grounds, and transit corridors.

Baltic States

• All three have committed to increased defense budgets—Estonia for example has passed 3% of GDP.

  
  

• Emphasis has been placed on territorial defence, cyber warfare and civilian resilience, with a significant role for citizen militias and conscription.

  
  

• Lithuania and Latvia have reinstated or expanded conscription to build up reserves.

  
  

• The Suwałki Gap—a vulnerable 100-km stretch of territory between Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave (with Lithuania on one side and Poland on the other)—is heavily monitored and increasingly militarised.

NATO’s Role

• Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroups have grown in size and firepower, now evolving into brigade-level units in response to Baltic demands. British troops are stationed in Estonia, Canadian and Scandinavian troops are stationed in Latvia, and German troops are stationed in Lithuania. Multiple NATO countries have troops stationed in Poland.

  
  

• The Vilnius NATO Summit (2023) promised pre-positioned equipment, faster troop rotations and better air and missile defence integration. Its implementation is ongoing.

Cyber, Hybrid and Disinformation Threats

In addition to conventional military threats, Poland and the Baltic states face a constant barrage of hybrid warfare tactics from Russia:

• Cyber attacks: Institutions in Estonia and Latvia have faced waves of DDoS attacks and other technological intrusions linked to Russian intelligence services.

  
  

• Disinformation: Kremlin-linked media and Telegram channels spread narratives about NATO aggression, fabricated incidents and attempts to destabilise support for Ukraine.

  
  

• Border Incidents: Belarus, acting as a proxy, has engaged in migrant weaponisation at the Polish and Lithuanian borders (e.g. sending over inmates from prisons and psychiatric hospitals to claim asylum)—another form of hybrid coercion.

These states have responded by building some of Europe’s most robust cyber defence structures, investing in media literacy programmes, and enacting legal frameworks to combat hostile foreign influence. Some of these have been controversial if understandable: for example, Poland's 2025 decision to suspend the right of those arriving at her Belarus border to apply for asylum.

Political Will and Social Resilience

What sets Poland and the Baltics apart in this “New Cold War” is not only military preparedness but a high degree of political will and societal consensus. Across party lines, these nations have maintained strong support for Ukraine and NATO. Public opinion polling shows record-high trust in the armed forces and the necessity of national defence investment.

In Lithuania and Estonia, total defence doctrines integrate civilians into national defence, emphasising continuity of government, supply chain resilience and the role of civil society in crisis response. Poland has also made defence a central plank of its national identity, deeply rooted in her long struggle for sovereignty.

Strategic Importance and NATO’s Future Posture

As the war in Ukraine drags on, Poland and the Baltics are no longer seen as peripheral members of NATO—they are its strategic core in the East. Their proximity to Kaliningrad, Belarus and the front lines of Ukraine makes them essential to any future deterrence or defence strategy.

In addition the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO has transformed the strategic geography of the region. The Baltic Sea, once a contested space, is becoming a de facto NATO lake, with enhanced coordination among Nordic and Baltic militaries and the potential for an integrated regional defence system.

Risks and Future Outlook

Yet challenges remain:

• Escalation Risks: As NATO presence grows, so does the risk of miscalculation or direct confrontation with Russian forces.

  
  

• Economic Burden: Sustaining 4% defence spending may strain budgets, especially amidst inflation and social pressures.

  
  

• EU Cohesion: Disparities between Eastern and Western Europe on the urgency of the Russian threat could test unity.

Nonetheless the trajectory is clear. Poland and the Baltics are not just front line states—they are the vanguard of NATO’s eastern transformation, pushing the alliance to adapt to a new era of confrontation with a revanchist Russia.

In the new Cold War unfolding across Europe, Poland and the Baltic states stand at the crucible. Forged by history, sharpened by threat perception, and animated by democratic resolve, they have become indispensable anchors of the transatlantic alliance. As they invest in new capabilities, build societal resilience, and shape NATO strategy, these frontline nations demonstrate that geography is not destiny—but their determination to resist another Soviet-style takeover might be.