Moving the Border Without Moving the Frontier: Poland, Ukraine and the Future of European Borders
By Matthew Parish
Thursday 22 October 2026
There are few places in Europe where the contradictions of the modern international order are more visible than at the border between Ukraine and Poland. Here two nations that share centuries of history, periods of bitter antagonism and an increasingly intimate strategic relationship confront one another across a succession of customs booths, passport inspection desks, steel barriers and queues of increasingly exasperated motorists. To travel from Lviv to Kraków, a journey that ought to be perfectly straightforward in an integrated European transport system, can become an unpredictable expedition into the mysteries of administrative bureaucracy. The frontier is simultaneously a gateway to European civilisation and a monument to everything that European integration was supposed to abolish.
Now an intriguing proposal is gathering momentum. Ukrainian and Polish officials have been discussing arrangements under which Ukrainian border guards and customs officers could undertake their duties on Polish territory, alongside their Polish counterparts. The immediate purpose is partly humanitarian and military: Russian attacks upon Ukrainian border infrastructure have made it increasingly dangerous to maintain inspection facilities on the Ukrainian side of the frontier. But the implications extend considerably further. They concern the nature of sovereignty, the evolution of the European Union, the economic integration of Ukraine with its western neighbours and the transformation of international borders in an age in which warfare is conducted increasingly by inexpensive flying machines.
On 20 October 2026, Poland’s Ministry of the Interior confirmed that it was prepared in principle to consider such joint arrangements, should security conditions require them. However no final decision has been taken, and the Polish government emphasised that the European Union’s Schengen rules would have to be respected. Ukraine, meanwhile, has been seeking to conclude the necessary bilateral agreements, with senior officials expressing the hope that progress might be achieved before the end of the year.
The proposal therefore remains conditional rather than an accomplished reform. Nevertheless, it represents something important. Two neighbouring states are considering how to reorganise the practical exercise of sovereign governmental authority so that their common border can continue functioning during a war. Beneath what appears to be an obscure administrative adjustment lies a potentially significant development in the relationship between Ukraine and Europe.
The border as an instrument of war
The immediate problem is straightforward. Russia has increasingly targeted Ukraine’s transport and logistics infrastructure, including facilities in the western regions of the country that were previously considered comparatively secure. Railway installations, fuel depots, electrical substations and road connections are all attractive targets because their destruction can interfere with Ukraine’s economic activity and military logistics simultaneously.
Border checkpoints have become particularly vulnerable. In September 2026, Russian attacks damaged facilities near Ukraine’s crossings with Moldova and Poland, including an attack on the Starokozache crossing that killed two people. Other strikes damaged railway and transport infrastructure near Yahodyn, one of the principal gateways between Ukraine and Poland.
Such attacks reveal an important feature of contemporary warfare. It is no longer necessary to seize a road or railway physically in order to prevent its use. A relatively inexpensive drone, launched from a considerable distance away, can destroy the infrastructure upon which an international transport corridor depends. Repeated attacks can force the authorities to close a crossing even where the physical damage is comparatively modest, because the lives of customs officers, passengers, hauliers and border guards cannot reasonably be treated as expendable.
Moving Ukrainian customs and immigration procedures onto Polish territory would reduce this particular vulnerability. Russia would face a substantially different political and military calculation were it to attack a facility situated entirely within a NATO member state. An attack upon Polish territory could precipitate an international crisis of altogether greater magnitude than a comparable attack upon a Ukrainian installation.
This does not mean that the facilities would become invulnerable. Russia has demonstrated a willingness to engage in dangerous provocations near NATO territory, and accidental or deliberate incursions into allied airspace remain a serious concern. Moreover, the transfer of border controls would not necessarily protect the roads, railway lines and assembly areas remaining on the Ukrainian side. Nevertheless, the proposal seeks to exploit a fundamental asymmetry in Europe’s security architecture: the territory of Poland enjoys collective defence guarantees that Ukraine does not yet possess.
The result would be an ingenious form of defensive infrastructure policy. Rather than constructing ever larger fortifications around exposed border installations, the two countries would relocate some of the administrative functions into a jurisdiction where military attacks carry potentially much greater consequences. This is deterrence achieved not by moving soldiers but by moving civil servants.
The peculiarities of European sovereignty
The proposal also raises a fascinating question of international law. What does it mean for the officials of one sovereign state to exercise governmental authority within the territory of another? Traditionally, border control has been regarded as one of the quintessential attributes of state sovereignty. The power to decide who may enter or leave a country’s territory, and under what conditions goods may cross its frontiers, is inseparable from the existence of the state itself.
Yet modern international law has never been quite as rigid about sovereignty as political rhetoric sometimes suggests. States routinely consent to foreign officials performing limited public functions within their territory. International airports, customs cooperation agreements and arrangements for immigration preclearance all demonstrate that the territorial location of an administrative act does not necessarily determine which state’s laws govern it. The important questions concern consent, jurisdiction, responsibility and the precise limits of the powers conferred upon foreign officials.
There is already substantial experience of coordinated controls along the Ukrainian-Polish frontier. Ukraine’s Ministry for Development has identified five existing shared crossing points, although arrangements differ between locations. The wider proposal is therefore not an unprecedented departure but an extension and modernisation of an established practice.
The principal legal difficulty arises because Poland belongs to the European Union and the Schengen Area, whereas Ukraine does not. Poland cannot simply delegate control of the EU’s external border to Ukrainian officials. Nor could Ukrainian border guards independently exercise coercive powers on Polish territory without an appropriate legal basis.
The Schengen Borders Code expressly contemplates shared border crossing points established by bilateral agreements. It also imposes important safeguards concerning arrests, the seizure of property, the rights of persons entitled to freedom of movement and applications for international protection. These are not merely technical complications. They concern the fundamental rights of individuals who may find themselves subject to the authority of two states simultaneously.
For example, consider a Ukrainian citizen whom Ukrainian officials believe should not be permitted to depart Ukraine because of wartime restrictions, but who has already reached an inspection facility situated on Polish territory. Which state’s officials may detain him? Which legal rules govern an appeal against the decision? What happens if an individual requests international protection from Poland while Ukrainian officials are conducting their departure checks? These questions illustrate why the apparently simple business of relocating a passport desk can become an exercise in complex constitutional and international law.
The emerging arrangements contemplate coordinated checks in which Ukrainian and Polish officers perform their respective functions in sequence, rather than an unrestricted transfer of Polish border-control powers to Ukraine. Such a distinction is essential if the two countries are to maintain confidence in their respective legal systems while satisfying European Union requirements. It also explains why Brussels remains involved in what might otherwise seem a straightforward bilateral agreement.
There is, however, a broader philosophical consideration. Sovereignty does not necessarily diminish when states cooperate in the exercise of their public powers. On the contrary, a country that cannot adequately protect its border officials against hostile attack may exercise its sovereignty more effectively by obtaining the consent of a neighbour to conduct its administrative functions in safer surroundings. Sovereignty should be understood not merely as the right to exclude foreign interference but also as the capacity to govern effectively.
The economic geography of the frontier
The economic consequences of the proposal may ultimately be as important as the military ones. Ukraine’s western borders have become indispensable arteries of international trade since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. The vulnerability of maritime export routes has repeatedly obliged Ukrainian businesses to seek alternatives through Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Every interruption to these routes imposes costs upon an economy already struggling with the destruction of industrial capacity and the enormous expense of national defence.
Border delays are economically destructive because they impose costs without producing corresponding benefits. A lorry standing idle in a queue is not transporting goods, its driver is not performing productive work and its cargo may deteriorate while waiting. Fuel is consumed, wages accumulate and delivery schedules become unreliable. These costs are ultimately borne by exporters, importers, consumers and taxpayers.
Economists sometimes describe such losses as deadweight costs: resources expended without creating an equivalent economic benefit. The point is not that border inspections are inherently wasteful. They serve legitimate purposes, including the prevention of smuggling, the collection of customs duties and the enforcement of immigration laws. Rather, unnecessary duplication of procedures creates additional expense without necessarily producing additional security.
If Ukrainian and Polish officers can operate in adjacent facilities, sharing relevant information and coordinating inspections, there are obvious opportunities to reduce administrative inefficiency. A vehicle need not necessarily endure two lengthy queues separated by several kilometres of road. Officials can communicate directly when documentary discrepancies arise, and the management of traffic can be organised as a single continuous process rather than two independent administrative exercises.
Nevertheless, the physical relocation of controls would not automatically eliminate delays. There remain differences in customs procedures, electronic systems, security requirements and the standards applicable to goods entering the European Union. An efficient border requires adequate inspection lanes, trained personnel, modern communications equipment and sensible administrative rules. Putting two bureaucracies in the same building does not magically abolish bureaucracy, although it may at least oblige them to communicate.
The issue has become particularly urgent because Ukraine’s agricultural exports remain an important source of friction with neighbouring European economies. Polish farmers have previously protested against the economic consequences of Ukrainian agricultural competition, while Polish hauliers have expressed concerns about the terms upon which Ukrainian transport companies access European markets. These disagreements culminated in prolonged border blockades during 2023 and 2024, demonstrating how easily an international frontier can become an instrument of domestic political pressure.
Joint border controls would not resolve these underlying commercial disputes. They cannot reconcile incompatible agricultural interests or determine how European transport markets should be regulated. Indeed, some Polish political groups have already expressed distrust of the proposal, reflecting broader anxieties about Ukrainian competition and the exercise of foreign governmental authority on Polish soil.
Nevertheless, more efficient border management could help separate legitimate regulatory questions from avoidable administrative inefficiency. A Polish farmer may reasonably demand protection against unfair competition, just as a Ukrainian exporter may reasonably demand predictable access to international markets. Neither interest is advanced by an inefficient border that needlessly consumes the resources of both countries.
Poland’s difficult strategic position
The Polish government faces a delicate political calculation. Poland has been among Ukraine’s most important European supporters since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, providing military assistance, logistical support and refuge to large numbers of displaced Ukrainians. The city of Rzeszów has acquired an extraordinary strategic importance as a logistical gateway between Ukraine and the Western alliance.
Yet Polish support for Ukraine exists alongside domestic political pressures that can be highly critical of Ukrainian economic interests. Polish nationalism also retains memories of historical disputes between the two countries, particularly the tragedies of the twentieth century. These historical antagonisms have not disappeared merely because Poland and Ukraine now confront a common strategic threat.
The proposed border arrangements therefore require careful political presentation. Ukrainian border guards operating on Polish territory might be interpreted by some Polish voters as an unacceptable concession to a foreign state. Conversely, the Polish government’s willingness to host Ukrainian officials could be understood as evidence of a mature strategic partnership in which practical cooperation takes precedence over symbolic anxieties about territorial jurisdiction.
The latter interpretation is more persuasive. There is no suggestion that Poland would surrender its territorial sovereignty, any more than the presence of foreign diplomatic personnel or allied military units entails the abandonment of national independence. The proposed arrangements would operate under carefully negotiated international agreements, with the responsibilities of each country’s officials defined in advance.
Indeed, Poland arguably has an important national interest in ensuring that Ukraine’s western frontier remains open and efficient. A functioning Ukrainian economy reduces the burden of European financial assistance, strengthens Ukraine’s capacity to resist Russian aggression and supports the commercial development of eastern Poland. Prosperity and stability on the Ukrainian side of the border are not merely charitable objectives for Warsaw. They are components of Poland’s own long-term security.
One might also observe that Poland’s geopolitical influence has increased enormously through her role as Ukraine’s principal western gateway. The country has become indispensable to the movement of supplies, humanitarian assistance, commercial goods and people between Ukraine and the European Union. A modernised system of shared border controls could consolidate that position, transforming Poland from a neighbouring state into an even more closely integrated logistical partner.
A rehearsal for Ukrainian membership of the European Union
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the proposal is its relationship to Ukraine’s eventual accession to the European Union. Ukraine remains outside the EU’s institutional structures, but its economic, administrative and security systems are increasingly being adapted to European standards. Joint border management is an obvious area in which this process can proceed before formal membership.
In October 2026, the European Union launched a three-year, €7.5 million partnership involving Frontex, the European Union Agency for Asylum and the International Organization for Migration. Its purpose is to help Ukraine align its border management and asylum systems with European and Schengen requirements, including through training, operational cooperation and improvements in information sharing.
This illustrates a fundamental characteristic of European integration that is often overlooked in political debates. Integration is not achieved solely through grand declarations, treaties or ceremonies in Brussels. Much of it consists of the laborious alignment of administrative systems that make cooperation possible in everyday life. Customs officers must learn to exchange information. Immigration databases must become compatible. Officials must understand one another’s laws, and public institutions must develop habits of mutual trust.
From this perspective, joint Polish-Ukrainian border controls would provide a valuable practical experiment in European integration. Ukrainian officials would work alongside their Polish counterparts under arrangements that take account of EU law. Over time, such cooperation could encourage the harmonisation of standards and procedures, reducing the institutional distance between the two countries.
There is also a paradox. Ukraine is seeking European Union membership, an eventuality that would fundamentally alter the legal character of the Polish-Ukrainian frontier. Yet in the meantime, enormous administrative resources are being devoted to managing that same frontier more efficiently. The countries must invest in a border-control system whose precise legal functions may eventually change as European integration proceeds.
This is not necessarily irrational. Even if Ukraine joins the European Union, its accession would not automatically result in the immediate abolition of immigration controls between Ukraine and Poland. Membership of the Schengen Area is a separate legal and institutional process. Customs arrangements, external security requirements and the management of international migration would also continue to demand administrative attention.
Nonetheless, the broader direction is clear. The border that once separated Ukraine from the European project is increasingly becoming a place where Ukrainian and European institutions learn to operate together. It is an incremental but substantial change in the political geography of the continent.
The dangers of making Poland the front line
There is one potential disadvantage that deserves particular attention. By relocating border controls onto Polish territory, the two countries may reduce the exposure of Ukrainian officials to Russian attacks while simultaneously creating facilities in Poland whose continued operation becomes essential to Ukraine’s wartime economy.
This could increase the strategic significance of particular Polish border installations and make them attractive targets for Russian intelligence operations, sabotage or other forms of hostile interference. Poland would have to ensure that appropriate security arrangements were established, including surveillance, counterintelligence cooperation, emergency planning and the protection of essential communications systems.
There is a distinction between exploiting the deterrent value of NATO territory and assuming that NATO membership makes particular facilities immune from hostile action. The latter would be dangerously complacent. Russia has demonstrated considerable ingenuity in conducting hostile operations that remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict, and the security of Polish border infrastructure must be considered accordingly.
It would also be mistaken to regard relocation as a substitute for hardening the infrastructure that remains within Ukraine. Russian attacks may still interrupt access roads, damage railway junctions or destroy electricity supplies. A coordinated border crossing situated entirely on Polish territory would be of limited use if vehicles and trains could not reach it from the Ukrainian side.
The correct approach therefore involves redundancy as well as relocation. Alternative transport routes, emergency inspection facilities, secure communications and the ability to divert traffic rapidly between crossings are all necessary elements of a resilient border system. Ukrainian officials have already emphasised the importance of contingency arrangements, temporary infrastructure and shelters for border personnel.
This is an important lesson in the economics of wartime infrastructure. The cheapest system is not necessarily the most efficient when the probability of deliberate destruction must be taken into account. Some duplication of facilities, which might appear wasteful in peacetime, becomes economically justified when it permits essential transport links to survive repeated attacks.
The meaning of a frontier in the twenty-first century
The Ukrainian-Polish border has always possessed a significance extending far beyond the movement of people and goods. It crosses a region in which political boundaries have repeatedly shifted, empires have risen and fallen, populations have been displaced and national identities have developed in the shadow of competing imperial ambitions.
Lviv itself offers a reminder of this complicated history. It has been governed by Polish, Austrian, Soviet and Ukrainian authorities, while its streets retain architectural and cultural traces of the many communities that have inhabited it. For much of the twentieth century, the frontier between Poland and Ukraine was embedded within a political geography dominated by larger powers. Today the two countries possess the opportunity to determine the practical arrangements of their common border through cooperation between independent states.
This is an achievement that should not be underestimated. Russia’s invasion has been justified in part by an imperial conception of political geography in which the independence of neighbouring states is subordinate to the supposed security requirements of Moscow. The proposed Polish-Ukrainian arrangements represent the opposite principle. They would permit two sovereign states voluntarily to coordinate the exercise of public authority in pursuit of their mutual interests.
Indeed, one of the most remarkable features of the European Union has been its ability to transform borders from instruments of historical antagonism into administrative arrangements capable of being modified through law and agreement. The abolition of most internal frontier controls within the Schengen Area did not require European nations to abandon their national identities. Instead, it demonstrated that national independence could coexist with extensive cooperation over the movement of people and goods.
Ukraine is not yet part of that system. Its border with Poland remains one of the European Union’s external frontiers, and considerable legal and political obstacles remain before it can be transformed into something resembling the largely invisible boundaries between existing Schengen states.
Nevertheless, the proposal for joint border controls suggests a way forward. It is a modest administrative reform with unusually wide implications, combining military security, economic efficiency, legal innovation and European integration in a single practical undertaking.
Its success will depend upon the willingness of Poland, Ukraine and the European institutions to resolve detailed questions of jurisdiction, responsibility and operational management. Those questions should not be dismissed as mere bureaucratic formalities, because properly designed legal safeguards are indispensable to the success of the arrangement. Equally, they should not be permitted to become an indefinite excuse for inaction while Russian attacks threaten the functioning of essential international transport corridors.
There is something profoundly revealing about the fact that Russia’s invasion has led Ukraine and Poland to contemplate moving Ukrainian border officials into Poland. Moscow’s objective has been to isolate Ukraine, constrain its sovereignty and sever its political and economic connections with Europe. Yet the practical consequences of Russian aggression have repeatedly been to encourage precisely the opposite developments.
The movement of Ukrainian passport officers and customs inspectors a few hundred metres across an international frontier might appear an insignificant event in the history of a continent at war. In reality, it could symbolise a much larger transformation. Ukraine would not be surrendering its sovereignty to Poland, nor would Poland be compromising its independence by accommodating Ukrainian officials. Both countries would be discovering that the intelligent exercise of sovereignty can require institutions to cooperate across territorial boundaries.
The frontier would remain where it has always been. But its political meaning would have begun to change. And in a Europe struggling to defend itself against the return of imperial warfare, that may be a more important development than the movement of a thousand border posts.
