Mandatory military service in Europe

The question of whether mandatory national service is required across Europe to deter a future war with the Russian Federation has returned with a force not seen since the Cold War. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, her mass mobilisation of society for war and her willingness to absorb extraordinary losses in pursuit of imperial objectives have shaken long-standing European assumptions about security, professional armies and the sufficiency of technological superiority. The issue is not merely military. It touches social cohesion, political legitimacy, economic resilience and the moral relationship between citizen and state. The issue, therefore, is neither a simple endorsement nor a categorical rejection of compulsory service, but a consideration of what deterrence now demands and whether voluntary systems alone can credibly meet those demands.

European deterrence has rested for three decades upon three pillars. The first has been the American security guarantee, embodied in NATO. The second has been small but highly professional armed forces, optimised for expeditionary warfare rather than continental defence. The third has been the belief that economic interdependence would restrain large-scale war. All three pillars are now under strain. The United States remains committed to NATO, but European strategists must contemplate a future in which Washington’s attention is divided or conditional. Professional European armies are capable, but thin. Economic interdependence has manifestly failed to restrain Russia, which has accepted strategic impoverishment in exchange for perceived imperial revival.

Deterrence against Russia is not simply a matter of advanced weapons. It is a matter of mass, endurance and societal willingness to fight. Russia’s military culture, whatever her deficiencies in command and equipment, is built upon the assumption that war is a national endeavour involving mobilisation, sacrifice and prolonged hardship. A Europe that can field only limited professional forces risks appearing brittle, even if technologically superior. Deterrence fails not when an enemy believes she can win cheaply, but when she believes the opponent will fracture politically before decisive costs are imposed.

Mandatory national service offers one obvious response. By expanding the pool of trained manpower, it promises strategic depth. It embeds military skills within society rather than confining them to a professional caste. It signals political seriousness, both to adversaries and to allies. Countries that retain conscription, such as Finland, Estonia and Norway, are widely regarded as possessing a credibility disproportionate to their size. Their deterrence rests less upon the number of active soldiers than upon the knowledge that aggression would trigger rapid societal mobilisation.

However the European continent is not uniform. The political cultures of France, Germany, Italy, Spain or the United Kingdom differ profoundly from those of the Nordic and Baltic states. In many countries, the abolition of conscription was not merely a budgetary decision but a reflection of social change. Large urbanised populations, fragmented media environments and declining trust in institutions complicate any attempt to impose universal obligations. A poorly designed or politically contested conscription system risks undermining deterrence rather than strengthening it, by exposing internal division and resistance.

There is also the question of military utility. Modern warfare requires technical competence, discipline and integration with complex systems. Short periods of poorly structured service can produce large numbers of nominally trained individuals with limited operational value. Russia herself illustrates this danger. Her partial mobilisation in 2022 generated mass but at severe cost to quality, morale and cohesion. Mandatory service is not a panacea unless it is embedded within a broader reform of training, reserves, logistics and command culture.

An alternative model, or perhaps a complement, lies in robust reserve forces combined with selective compulsory service. Rather than universal conscription, states could require a defined period of national service that includes military and non-military tracks, with the military component feeding well-trained reserves. Such systems exist in varying forms in Scandinavia and could be adapted to larger states. The aim would be not to create millions of active soldiers, but to ensure that a significant proportion of the population possesses recent training, mobilisation familiarity and psychological preparedness for national defence.

Pan-European coordination is crucial. A patchwork of national systems, some compulsory and others voluntary, risks inefficiency and political tension. Yet full harmonisation is neither realistic nor necessary. Deterrence operates at the aggregate level. If Europe as a whole can demonstrate that she can rapidly expand her forces, sustain losses and maintain political unity under pressure, the precise national mix becomes less important. Mandatory service in frontline states may suffice if larger Western European states invest heavily in reserves, logistics, industrial mobilisation and territorial defence.

The economic argument cuts both ways. Mandatory service imposes opportunity costs, particularly in ageing societies. Yet the cost of strategic vulnerability is far higher. Moreover well-designed service programmes can contribute to skills formation, social integration and resilience against non-military crises. The question is not whether Europe can afford such systems, but whether she can afford not to consider them seriously.

Deterrence against Russia requires a visible transformation in European strategic culture. Moscow must believe not only that Europe possesses weapons, but that she possesses the will to use them. Mandatory national service is one of the clearest signals of such will, but it is also one of the most politically demanding. It should therefore be viewed not as an ideological commitment to militarisation but as a conditional instrument. Where voluntary systems and reserves can credibly deliver mass, endurance and cohesion, compulsion may be unnecessary. Where they cannot, refusal to consider mandatory service becomes a strategic indulgence.

Europe’s challenge is not to mimic Russia’s model, but to convince Russia that war against Europe would be futile, protracted and politically disastrous. If mandatory national service contributes to that conviction in some states, it should be adopted without embarrassment. If it does not, Europe must nonetheless find other means to embed defence within society. Deterrence in the twenty-first century is ultimately societal. Whether through compulsory service or alternative structures, Europe must demonstrate that she is no longer a continent defended by professionals alone, but one prepared, if required, to defend herself as a whole.