Kyiv and the Caucasus: New Partnerships from Tbilisi to Yerevan

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the diplomatic geography of Eurasia has begun to shift dramatically. As Ukraine entrenches its position as Europe’s eastern bastion, it is simultaneously forging new and often surprising ties with the nations of the South Caucasus—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. These partnerships, long overshadowed by Russia’s regional dominance and Western ambivalence, are now emerging as key facets of Ukraine’s evolving foreign policy and as signals of the new regional order that is taking shape from the Black Sea to the Caspian.

In the post-Soviet space, shared history can either be a burden or a bridge. Kyiv is attempting to make it the latter.

Georgia: A Parallel Struggle

Ukraine and Georgia have long been bonded by a shared experience of Russian aggression. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War was an early warning of the Kremlin’s ambitions, ignored by much of the international community at the time. Ukraine’s political elite took note. Today, amidst war, Ukraine has redoubled her diplomatic courtship of Tbilisi—despite a difficult relationship with the current Georgian Dream government, which has maintained a precarious balancing act between the West and Moscow.

While official ties remain strained, people-to-people and civil society relations between Ukrainians and Georgians are warm. Thousands of Georgians have volunteered in Ukraine’s armed forces since 2014. Ukrainian politicians openly support Georgia’s democratic opposition. Ukraine views Georgia’s success—or failure—in democratic reform as a barometer for broader Black Sea security. Kyiv is also increasingly investing in multilateral cooperation, such as the GUAM Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, a small regional international organisation which includes Moldova, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Ukraine’s strategy towards Georgia appears to be one of long-term alignment, built on shared values and security imperatives, even if short-term politics remain fraught.

Armenia: A New Opportunity in a Shifting Landscape

Ukraine and Armenia have historically had a cautious relationship, shaped by diverging positions on Russia and the legacy of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For years, Armenia’s membership in the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian collective military pact) and her dependence on Russian security guarantees put her at odds with Ukraine’s westward orientation.

However Russia’s failure to intervene during the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh—leading to the effective end of the Armenian enclave—shattered illusions in Armenia's capital Yerevan. In 2024 and 2025 Armenia has grown increasingly critical of Moscow, withdrawn from CSTO military exercises, and reached out to Western partners.

Ukraine has quietly seized the moment to improve ties. Ukrainian diplomats have praised Armenia’s pivot, and humanitarian aid flows have begun, including support for Armenian IDPs. Ukraine does not take sides in the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, but she recognises that a politically independent Armenia is a strategic opportunity to reduce Russian influence in the region.

Armenia, for her part, has expressed muted but clear sympathy for Ukraine’s struggle, including allowing Ukrainian NGOs to operate in Yerevan and opening space for dialogue on future cooperation. Cultural exchanges and economic dialogue—especially in the IT and agriculture sectors—are also increasing.

Azerbaijan: A Strategic Calculus

Azerbaijan poses a more complex dynamic. Kyiv and Baku have historically maintained solid if cautious bilateral relations. Both countries are secular post-Soviet republics with long experience managing energy interests and resisting Kremlin coercion. But Azerbaijan’s close relationship with Turkey, a key Ukrainian defence partner, and her increasing geopolitical assertiveness have made Baku more significant in Kyiv’s calculus.

Since 2022 Azerbaijan has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine and hosted bilateral security talks. Ukraine has reciprocated with diplomatic support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, framing the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in terms compatible with international law. Notably, Baku has also contributed diesel fuel and energy supplies to Ukraine during critical shortages in winter 2022–23.

Yet real strategic cooperation remains constrained. Azerbaijan maintains a pragmatic relationship with Moscow and seeks to avoid antagonising either side overtly. Ukrainian policymakers remain wary of Baku’s authoritarian governance and its occasional use of energy leverage in regional politics.

Still, both sides see opportunity: in trade (especially agriculture and industrial goods), in logistics (including alternative Caspian transit routes avoiding Russia), and in technical collaboration on post-conflict reconstruction.

Regional Connectivity: From the Black Sea to the Caspian

Ukraine’s outreach to the Caucasus is not only about bilateral diplomacy. It reflects a deeper strategy to build resilience and connectivity across the Black Sea-Caspian corridor. Russia’s war has made traditional transit routes through Belarus and Russian territory impossible. Ukraine is turning to east-west corridors via the Caucasus, including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor, running through Georgia, Azerbaijan and into Central Asia.

Kyiv’s vision is to strengthen its position as a logistical and geopolitical bridge—between Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. To do this, it needs not only infrastructure but political partnerships. Its growing engagement with Tbilisi, Baku, and Yerevan is a crucial part of that puzzle.

The Strategic South

The South Caucasus has long been viewed by great powers as a peripheral chessboard. For Ukraine, it is now a potential arc of opportunity—economically, diplomatically and strategically. While none of the Caucasus states are without complications, all are moving—at different speeds—away from Moscow’s orbit.

Kyiv’s engagement is pragmatic, not ideological. It is about loosening Russia’s grip upon a volatile region, creating economic alternatives, and forming new alignments based on mutual interest and shared threat perception.

In this quiet but vital diplomacy, Ukraine is positioning herself not only as a defender of Europe, but as a shaper of Eurasia’s emerging order.