Is Russia a terminally declining power?

Monday 16 February 2026

The proposition that Russia is a terminally declining power — and therefore no longer a strategic threat to the United States — has become fashionable in certain policy circles in Washington. It is invoked to justify the gradual American pivot away from Europe and towards other theatres, most notably the Indo-Pacific. Yet the argument rests upon a chain of assumptions, each of which merits careful scrutiny. Decline is not the same thing as irrelevance; nor does economic weakness automatically translate into strategic impotence.

To assess the claim properly one must begin with the structural facts.

Russia’s Structural Position

The Russian Federation’s economy is modest relative to that of the United States. In nominal terms, her gross domestic product fluctuates around the level of a medium-sized European state. Sanctions imposed since 2014 and dramatically expanded after 2022 have constrained access to Western capital markets, advanced semiconductors and certain categories of industrial machinery. Demographically she faces a shrinking and ageing population, accelerated by emigration and the heavy casualties of war.

From these facts emerges the thesis of terminal decline. A country with stagnant productivity, capital flight and a contracting labour force cannot, it is argued, sustain long-term great-power competition with a continental economy such as the United States, nor with the combined weight of the European Union.

There is substance in this. The war in Ukraine has consumed extraordinary quantities of matériel and manpower. Russia has compensated through mass mobilisation, prison recruitment, adaptation of industrial production and the import of components from non-Western partners. Yet such adaptation does not necessarily equate to prosperity. It is arguable that Russia has transformed herself into a war economy that sacrifices long-term civilian development for short-term military endurance.

However — decline in absolute terms is not the same as decline in relative disruptive capacity.

Military Capacity and Strategic Reach

Despite economic weakness, Russia retains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the RS-28 Sarmat, ballistic missile submarines of the Borei class and long-range aviation together form a triad capable of inflicting catastrophic damage upon the United States. Nuclear parity — or near-parity — is not negated by lower gross domestic product.

Moreover Russia has demonstrated an ability to sustain high-intensity conventional warfare over multiple years. Her forces have suffered immense attrition in Ukraine, yet they continue to fight, to adapt tactically and to replenish stocks at a rate that has surprised Western analysts more than once. She also maintains military footprints beyond her immediate borders — in Syria, the South Caucasus and parts of Africa — through a mixture of state and quasi-state instruments.

Declining empires can remain dangerous. History provides examples: late Ottoman Turkey, imperial Germany in 1914, even Britain after the Second World War. Strategic anxiety may increase as relative power diminishes. A state that perceives its window of opportunity closing may take risks that a rising power would avoid.

The American Pivot and Its Logic

The United States’ strategic reorientation towards the Indo-Pacific predates the 2022 escalation of the Ukraine war. Under President Barack Obama, Washington announced a “pivot to Asia”, recognising that the principal long-term competitor was the People’s Republic of China. The subsequent administrations of Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden — despite vast differences in rhetoric — have maintained this structural emphasis.

China’s economy rivals that of the United States in scale; her industrial base is immense; her navy expands at a remarkable pace; her technological ambitions are comprehensive. In relative terms, China presents a systemic competitor across economic, technological and military domains. Russia does not.

Within this comparative framework Russia may appear as a secondary theatre — dangerous but bounded, disruptive but not transformative. From this perspective, Europe — wealthy, populous and technologically advanced — should assume greater responsibility for her own defence against a Russia whose conventional power is tied down and whose economy is constrained.

Thus emerges the policy syllogism: if Russia is declining and Europe is wealthy, American resources are better concentrated where the long-term balance of power is truly in question — namely the Pacific.

But this syllogism contains vulnerabilities.

Is Russia Truly “Terminally” Declining?

The adjective “terminal” implies inevitability and irreversibility. It suggests a trajectory from which there is no plausible recovery. That conclusion may be premature.

Russia retains vast natural resources — hydrocarbons, rare earth elements, agricultural capacity — and she has demonstrated resilience under sanctions by redirecting trade towards Asia and the Global South. Her macroeconomic management, although imperfect, has avoided systemic collapse. The ruble has experienced volatility but not annihilation. Inflation has been elevated yet contained relative to wartime extremes in other historical conflicts.

Furthermore military decline is not linear. A force that has learned painful lessons in Ukraine may emerge more tactically sophisticated, particularly in drone warfare, electronic warfare and defensive fortification. Should the conflict freeze rather than conclude decisively, Russia could consolidate territorial gains and reconstitute strength over time.

Decline in per capita wealth does not automatically translate into reduced willingness to project power. Indeed states facing stagnation may lean more heavily on nationalist narratives and external confrontation to maintain domestic cohesion.

Does Decline Mean No Threat to the United States?

From a purely conventional standpoint, Russia lacks the logistical reach to invade or directly challenge the continental United States. But that has not been the nature of the threat for decades. The threat has been nuclear, cyber, informational and regional.

Nuclear deterrence ensures that Russia remains existentially relevant to American security calculations. Cyber operations and interference campaigns continue to occupy the attention of American agencies. Regionally, Russian aggression can destabilise NATO allies, test alliance credibility and thereby indirectly affect American global posture.

A declining Russia could, paradoxically, be more unpredictable. Strategic frustration may lead to asymmetric tactics. A state that cannot compete symmetrically may choose to disrupt.

Europe’s Role and American Calculation

The American pivot does not necessarily presuppose that Russia is harmless. It may instead reflect confidence that Europe — particularly after the shock of 2022 — is rearming. Defence expenditures across NATO’s European members have risen substantially. Germany has announced a Zeitenwende (turning point), Poland is expanding her armed forces dramatically, and Scandinavian states have integrated more fully into the alliance structure.

If Europe can credibly deter Russia conventionally, the United States can afford to reallocate marginal resources. This is less a declaration that Russia has ceased to be dangerous than a redistribution of burdens within an alliance.

Yet alliance cohesion itself is not automatic. If American attention visibly shifts, Moscow may test NATO’s periphery. The Baltic states, the Arctic, the Black Sea — each remains a potential pressure point. A premature conclusion that Russia’s decline renders her strategically irrelevant could invite miscalculation.

A renewed world order

The proposition that Russia is a terminally declining power contains elements of truth, particularly in light of the rise of Europe (for which Russian aggression is principally responsible). Her economy is constrained, her demography unfavourable and her war in Ukraine costly beyond initial expectation. In relative terms, she does not match the scale of the United States or China.

But decline is not disappearance. Russia retains nuclear parity, regional military capability and a demonstrated willingness to bear extraordinary costs in pursuit of strategic objectives. A declining power can still inflict damage disproportionate to her economic weight.

The American pivot towards the Indo-Pacific is better explained not by the irrelevance of Russia but by the rise of China. Russia may be weaker than she was, but she is not strategically null. The United States reallocates attention not because Russia ceases to matter, but because another competitor matters more.

In international politics, terminal diagnoses are rare. Powers ebb and flow; they adapt, contract, sometimes revive. To treat Russia as a spent force would be to misunderstand the persistence of military capacity detached from economic scale — and to underestimate the dangers inherent in a wounded but still heavily armed state.