Invisible Frontlines: Russian Hybrid Warfare in Western Europe and the Battle for Infrastructure and Morale

As Russia’s conventional war in Ukraine grinds on, the Kremlin continues to wage a second, shadow war across the European continent — one that bypasses tanks and missiles in favour of sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, and proxy violence. This is hybrid warfare, and its targets are not just physical infrastructure but also the psychological resilience of European societies. The Kremlin’s aim is clear: to destabilise, divide and demoralise Europe into retreating from its support for Ukraine — and to erode the West’s capacity to resist authoritarian encroachment.

Hybrid Warfare: The Tools and Tactics

Hybrid warfare is a doctrine that blends military, intelligence, cyber, economic and informational tools to achieve strategic objectives without triggering full-scale conflict. It is deniable, ambiguous and often uses third-party actors to avoid attribution.

In recent months and years, a disturbing pattern has emerged:

• Sabotage of Critical Infrastructure: Western governments, including Germany, the UK, and Sweden, have reported incidents consistent with state-backed sabotage. These include railway disruptions, cable severings, and fires at power substations.

  
  

  • In Sweden, investigations into the 2022 Nord Stream pipeline explosions strongly point to Russian involvement or direction.

    
    

  • In Germany, intelligence services uncovered plots to disable railway systems and communication lines using local proxies under Russian influence.

    
    

  • In France and the United Kingdom, fires and break-ins at military depots, logistics hubs and industrial facilities have been reported without clear criminal motive — raising suspicions of foreign involvement.

  
  

• Activation of “Sleeper” Operatives: A growing number of Russian intelligence operatives and assets, long embedded in Europe under commercial or diplomatic cover, have been exposed.

  
  

  • In April 2024, a coordinated plot involving Russian nationals and locally radicalised individuals was disrupted in Poland and the Czech Republic, intended to sabotage weapons shipments to Ukraine.

    
    

  • Britain’s Security Service, MI5, has warned of “an uptick in hostile state activity” and the British government has quietly expelled suspected Russian agents posing as students, NGO staff or business consultants.

  
  

• Cyber and Psychological Warfare: State-sponsored Russian cyber groups like:

  
  

  • Sandworm (a Russian advanced persistent threat (APT) hacker group run by Russia's principal military intelligence service, the GRU, from a Moscow suburb);

    
    

  • APT28 (also known as Fancy Bear, another GRU-affiliated APT hacking organisation); and

    
    

  • Cozy Bear (an APT hacking organisation seemingly in competition with Fancy Bear; Cozy Bear is affiliated with the SVR, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, a distinct branch of the Russian government's security and intelligence apparatus),

    
    

have launched persistent attacks against European energy grids, hospitals, and government servers. These are often accompanied by disinformation campaigns blaming Ukrainians, migrants or Western elites, sewing distrust in democratic institutions.

Psychological Aims: Undermining Morale and Unity

The ultimate objective is not simply physical damage but also psychological and political destabilisation. Russian hybrid warfare aims to:

• Foster fatigue over the costs of supporting Ukraine, encouraging voices that argue peace — at any price — is preferable.

  
  

• Exploit domestic tensions: fuelling divisions over migration, inflation, and security to polarise societies.

  
  

• Erode faith in governance: using false-flag operations and disinformation to make governments appear incompetent or conspiratorial.

These efforts are subtle but persistent. False narratives about Ukrainian refugees “draining social services” or about “Western weapons ending up with terrorists” are amplified by anonymous social media networks and sympathetic fringe media whose funding may be connected to Russian sources.

Countermeasures: The Western Security Response

European governments and NATO have grown increasingly attuned to this threat, though the response has been uneven. Several key developments are under way:

• Enhanced Counterintelligence: The expulsion of hundreds of Russian “diplomats” — many of whom were linked to the GRU or SVR — in the last two years has degraded Moscow’s espionage networks. Poland, Estonia, and the United Kingdom have been especially aggressive in this regard.

  
  

• Hardened Infrastructure: Germany and France are now deploying surveillance drones and armed security patrols to protect energy and transportation hubs. Cybersecurity protocols have been upgraded, with EU-wide coordination on digital threat detection.

  
  

• Disruption of Subversive Networks: In early 2025, Czech intelligence dismantled a pro-Russian influence ring distributing bribes to European politicians and funding anti-Ukraine protests.

  
  

• Public Awareness Campaigns: Some countries, most notably the Baltic states and Finland, have launched national education campaigns to inoculate citizens against disinformation and enhance digital literacy.

  
  

• Legal Measures: New laws in Denmark, Sweden, and Germany criminalise cooperation with foreign intelligence or sabotage networks, even in the absence of direct violent action. The United Kingdom has enacted legislation making it a crime not to disclose one's connections with a foreign government deemed hostile.

Still, challenges persist. Hybrid threats blur the line between crime, protest, and warfare. European legal systems, designed for peacetime civil liberties, often struggle to respond nimbly. Coordination among EU and NATO members is improving but remains inconsistent, especially in Southern Europe.

Looking Ahead: Preparing for a Protracted Hybrid War

As long as the Kremlin views the collapse of Western unity as essential to its strategic aims, hybrid warfare in Europe will intensify. Future scenarios may include:

• Coordinated multi-country infrastructure attacks during a high-profile NATO summit or EU decision point.

  
  

• Cyber assaults on banking systems, triggering panic and blame-shifting.

  
  

• Assassinations or disappearances of exiled Russian dissidents or Ukrainian officials in Europe.

  
  

• Weaponised migration events, orchestrated along borders, particularly via Belarus or the Balkans.

To resist this, the West must think beyond conventional defence. Hybrid warfare demands hybrid resilience: not just military preparedness, but a society-wide capacity to detect and repel malign influence. This means building trust in institutions, promoting media literacy, improving public infrastructure security and deepening international coordination — including with private-sector actors like telecommunications and logistics companies.

Conclusion: A War Without Fronts

Europe’s confrontation with Russia no longer lies only on the eastern Ukrainian steppes. It has entered cities, rail networks, server farms, and the minds of its citizens. It is a war without fronts, fought by operatives who wear no uniform, using tools that often leave no fingerprints.

The stakes are as high as in any conventional battle: sovereignty, security and the future of the European project. Russia’s hybrid war is not a distraction from the war in Ukraine — it is a natural extension. Winning it requires vigilance, solidarity and the understanding that peace must be defended not only with weapons but with constancy and firm collective will.